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Abstract 
Under the corporate statutes, a board of directors is vested with the power to manage the 
business and affairs of a corporation. The directors’ statutory authority is tempered with 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care rooted in the common law. Courts impose the duties of 
loyalty and care to protect the interests of a corporation and its shareholders from unfaithful and 
irresponsible directors. The duty of care is in place to assure that directors diligently attend their 
responsibilities. Directors are personally liable for the entire amount of damages suffered by a 
corporation as a result of a breach of the duty of care. Directors often make large-scale business 
decisions, and they may face draconian monetary liability for a breach of the duty of care. This 
may deter competent people from serving on corporate boards and may undermine responsible 
corporate risk-taking. Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits a 
certificate of incorporation to include a provision eliminating personal monetary liability of 
directors for a duty of care violation. After the enactment of section 102(b)(7), the duty of care 
virtually exists as an unenforceable legal standard. Section 102(b)(7) eliminates any meaningful 
threat of personal liability for “mere” inattentive director conduct. This may cause suboptimal 
director behavior in corporate decision-making or oversight. Behavioral psychology research 
indicates that the threat of punishment or even just the awareness of having one’s behavior 
monitored is an important motivator of actor behavior. Accordingly, there should be an efficient 
enforcement mechanism for the duty of care. Directors should not be afforded a free-pass to 
ignore their due care responsibilities. Section 102(b)(7) pushes the fulcrum point between 
authority and accountability too far in favor of director authority. This runs counter to the 
traditional wisdom that authority should be accompanied by accountability. Therefore, there is a 
need for a balanced approach to revive an enforceable the duty of care while protecting 
directors from draconian monetary liability. Directors should not be afforded ex ante protection 
from personal liability for a duty of care violation. Where directors fail to act with due care, they 
should justify the challenged conduct in a court room on the basis of good faith. If directors are 
able to justify their due care failure on the basis of good faith, they should not be held liable for 
money damages. Under this middle-ground approach, the viability of a duty of care action would 
be maintained, and directors would be protected from draconian monetary liability. 
  
 
 
 iv  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my deceased brother, Üsame, and my dear sister, Şeyma. 
May Allah bring us all together in His Paradise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 v  
Acknowledgements  
All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. Peace be upon His Prophet Muhammad. I am 
very grateful to Allah for giving me the ability, strength, and patience to write this dissertation. I could 
never have accomplished this without His help. All praise is to Him, and all mistakes are mine.  
I would like to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to my mother and father. I always recall 
my beautiful and warm voice of my dear mother, Hilal Aydın, sincerely praying for me whenever I 
needed support. My valuable father, İsmail Aydın, is my first mentor. With his great vision, he 
passionately inspired me to pursue knowledge and to study this program. He always supported me 
emotionally and financially. I can’t thank my mother and father enough for their favors.  
I owe special gratitude to my lovely wife Nafiye Aydın. I deeply thank her for patiently 
supporting me during this study. In this difficult process, she passionately looked after our sweet daughter 
Zeynep Eda and our son Ahmed Necmeddin. Without her patience and support, this dissertation couldn’t 
be accomplished. She is the one who deserves the most gratitude.  
I am also very thankful to my advisor and the chairperson of the dissertation committee, Professor 
Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., for his advice, encouragement, constructive input, and for initially believing that I 
could achieve this important task. He has been a great mentor with his experience, deep expertise, and 
friendly attitude. I feel so fortunate for having the opportunity to work with him and learn from him.  
I would like to extend my thanks to Professor Mike A. Kautsch, Professor Virginia Harper Ho, 
and William P. Matthews, Esq. for their acceptance to serve as committee members for my dissertation. 
I would like to sincerely thank my friend, Mr. Adham Hashish. He has been a great friend with 
his charming personality and deep intellect. I enjoyed his company during my stay in Lawrence. I also 
would like to thank my friend, Mr. Erhan Oruç, for patiently supporting me at the final stage of writing 
this dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank Islamic Society of Lawrence (ISL). I am very glad to have 
been a part of it. 
  
 
 
 vi  
Table of Contents  
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... v 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... ix 
Chapter I. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter II. A Brief History of Fiduciary Law and the Role of the Board of Directors in 
Corporations .................................................................................................................................. 7 
A. Fiduciary Law in General ................................................................................................... 7 
1. Fiduciary Relationships .......................................................................................... 7 
2. The Roots of the Fiduciary Relation: Trust Law .................................................... 9 
3. Fiduciary Duties .................................................................................................... 11 
B. A Brief History the Role of Fiduciary Law in Corporations ............................................ 13 
C. The Role of the Board of Directors in Corporations......................................................... 20 
1. The Fiduciary Nature of Directors ........................................................................ 20 
2. Corporate Structure and the Supremacy of Directors ........................................... 22 
3. Decision-Making and Monitoring/Oversight Functions ....................................... 24 
Chapter III. The Duty of Care ................................................................................................... 28 
A. The Difference between a Standard of Care and a Standard of Review (In General) ...... 28 
B. The Standard of Care: Decision-Making and Oversight ................................................... 32 
1. Delaware ............................................................................................................... 32 
a. Decision-Making................................................................................................... 34 
b. Oversight ............................................................................................................... 44 
2. Principles of Corporate Governance and Model Business Corporation Act ........ 49 
C. The Standard of Review: Decision-Making; the Business Judgment Rule ...................... 53 
1. Statement and Effect of the Business Judgment Rule .......................................... 53 
a. Gross Negligence .................................................................................................. 67 
b. Waste (Irrationality) .............................................................................................. 74 
2. Preconditions for Application of the Business Judgment Rule ............................ 78 
3. Policy Reasons supporting the Business Judgment Rule ...................................... 80 
4. The Business Judgment Rule as a Presumption in Delaware ............................... 87 
a. Methods of Rebutting the Presumption ................................................................ 87 
b. Effect of Rebutting the Presumption: Entire Fairness Standard ........................... 89 
D. The Standard of Review: Monitoring/Oversight .............................................................. 95 
E. Exculpatory Charter Provisions ........................................................................................ 99 
1. The Genesis: Smith v. Van Gorkom and Its Effects .............................................. 99 
a. The Case................................................................................................................ 99 
 
 
 vii  
b. Aftermath of Van Gorkom: Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crises and 
Director Unavailability. .................................................................................................. 108 
2. The Legislative Response: Section 102(b)(7) and Its Interpretation by the Courts
 110 
a. Charter Provisions Exculpating Directors from Liability for Money Damages for 
Breach of Duty of Care but Not for Acts or Omissions Not in Good Faith ................... 110 
b. The Ubiquitous Nature of Section 102(b)(7) Provisions .................................... 115 
c. Section 102(b)(7) Exculpatory Provisions Apply to Oversight/Monitoring Cases
 117 
d. Rationale/Policy Reason Supporting Section 102(b)(7) Provisions ................... 118 
Chapter IV. Duty of Loyalty and Good Faith ........................................................................ 122 
A. Traditional Duty of Loyalty: Pecuniary Conflicts of Interest ......................................... 122 
1. Three Periods of Common Law Development ................................................... 122 
2. The Fourth Period: Section 144 and “Fairness” As a Process of Review by a Fully 
Informed Decision-Maker ................................................................................................... 126 
B. The Duty to Act in Good Faith ....................................................................................... 130 
1. Section 102(b)(7) Exculpatory Provisions Focus the Interest of Scholars and the 
Plaintiffs’ Bar on Conduct Not in Good Faith .................................................................... 130 
a. The Scope of Good Faith .................................................................................... 132 
b. Is It a Third, Independent Duty? ......................................................................... 134 
2. Disney and Stone ................................................................................................. 139 
a. Disney ................................................................................................................. 139 
b. Stone v. Ritter ...................................................................................................... 147 
3. “Conscious Disregard of One’s Responsibilities”: A Meaningful Standard or a 
Rhetorical Device? .............................................................................................................. 150 
Chapter V. Shareholder Derivative Suits and the Director Demand Requirement ........... 159 
A. The Dual Nature of Derivative Suits .............................................................................. 159 
1. A Corporate Cause of Action .............................................................................. 159 
2. The Plaintiff-Minority Shareholder’s Standing to Bring the Action .................. 162 
B. The Director Demand Requirement ................................................................................ 165 
1. The Purpose of the Director Demand Requirement ............................................ 165 
2. The Relation of the Director Demand Requirement to the Business Judgment Rule
 166 
3. Heightened Pleading Requirements .................................................................... 167 
C. Demand Excusal: Futility ............................................................................................... 168 
1. Decision–Making Cases...................................................................................... 168 
2. Monitoring/Oversight Cases ............................................................................... 171 
3. Exculpatory Provisions and Substantial Likelihood of Liability ........................ 172 
D. Wrongful Refusal ............................................................................................................ 173 
E. Special Litigation Committees ........................................................................................ 177 
 
 
 viii  
Chapter VI. A Proposal to Strike a Balance on Due Care Liability of Directors in Delaware
..................................................................................................................................................... 182 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 215 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 216 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 ix  
Abbreviations 
ABA American Bar Association 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
BJR Business Judgment Rule 
DGCL Delaware General Corporation Law 
D&O Directors and Officers 
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange  
RMBCA Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
PCG Principles of Corporate Governance 
SEC Securities Exchange Commission 
SLC Special Litigation Committee  
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
U.S. United States of America  
  
 
 
 x  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1  
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The business corporation plays a significant role in the modern economy. A substantial 
part of economic activity occurs and jobs and wealth are created through publicly-held 
corporations. The corporate form of business organization predominates in the leading sectors of 
the modern economy because it enables enterprises to collect funds from the public and invest in 
large-scale and long-term business projects. Traditionally, the corporation has been a highly 
desirable business form for large-scale enterprises that are to be publicly held.
1
 A corporation is a 
legal entity which can exercise legal power and have rights and obligations in its own name.
2
 In 
other words, a corporation has its own legal personality that makes it separate from its owners, 
managers, and employees. Shareholders, who are residual or ultimate owners of a corporation, 
are not personally liable for corporate obligations; their liability is limited to the amount they 
invest in a corporation.
3
 The ownership status, however, does not entitle shareholders to manage 
the business and affairs of a corporation. One of the main characteristics of the corporate form is 
centralized management; that is, the separation of legal control from beneficial ownership.
4
 
Shareholders elect a board of directors, and the authority to manage the business and affairs of a 
corporation belongs to its board of directors.  
Under the corporate statutes, a corporation is managed by or under the direction of its 
board of directors.
5
 In performing board service, directors must act in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.
6
 “To do so, they must focus on maximizing the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its shareholders.”
7
 Because “directors are entrusted with power to 
use in the interest of others,”
8
 they “stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its 
stockholders.”
9
 The directors’ fiduciary duties are an equitable response to the power that is 
                                                 
1
 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 192 (11th 
ed. 2014). 
2
 Id. at 191–92.   
3
 Id. at 191.  
4
 Id. 
5
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).  
6
 CORPORATE LAWS COMM., ABA BUS. LAW SECTION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 11 (6th ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK]. 
7
 Id.  
8
 Deborah A. Demott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879, 881 (1988). 
9
 Guth v. Loft, Inc, 5 A.2d 503, 510  (Del 1939). 
 
 
 2  
conferred upon them by the corporate statutes.
10
 Equity imposes a fiduciary limitation on 
statutory authority to protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders and to assure 
that directors truly act in accordance with the purpose for which they are elected.
11
  
Traditionally, the directors’ fiduciary duties are divided into two categories: loyalty and 
care. The duty of loyalty requires directors to prefer the best interests of the corporation over 
their own interests or any other extraneous consideration. Directors must act in good faith and in 
the best interests of the corporation. The honest belief and the best interests of the corporation 
must guide every action of directors. The duty of loyalty is in place to prevent directors from 
abusing their board position to advance their personal interest (or a related person’s or 
institution’s interest) at the expense of the corporation and its shareholders. The duty of care 
describes the manner in which directors must perform board service. The duty of care requires 
that directors act diligently, attentively, and on an informed basis when discharging their board 
responsibilities. The duty of care is in place to assure a diligent attendance to directorial 
responsibilities. Equity developed the concepts of loyalty and care over a century on a case-by-
case basis, and the duties of loyalty and care reflect the fundamental values in performing board 
service.  
The directors’ statutory authority and their fiduciary responsibilities create a tension in 
corporate law. On one hand, directors are empowered with a discretionary authority to manage 
the business and affairs of a corporation. On the other hand, the common law imposes a fiduciary 
limitation on the board’s authority. Directors are accountable to the corporation and its 
shareholders if they act in violation of their fiduciary duties. The tension between authority and 
accountability—deference to directors’ decisions and the scope of judicial review—has been 
characterized as the defining tension in corporate law.
12
 A strict accountability regime would 
inevitably reduce “the efficiency of corporate decision making.”
13
 Deference to the board’s 
                                                 
10
 See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 
678 (2009); Leo E. Strine Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 499, 501 (2002) (“Delaware’s enabling statute is premised on its use within a system of corporate law 
that uses the common law of fiduciary duties as an additional restraint on director action.”). 
11
 See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“An underlying premise for the imposition of fiduciary duties is 
a separation of legal control from beneficial ownership.”).  
12
 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A. 2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (citing E. Norman Veasey, The 
Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 403 (1997)). 
13
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 129 (2004). 
 
 
 3  
authority would necessarily involve a risk of “opportunism or even plain carelessness.”
14
 The 
legal precepts “that speak to when a court will intervene at the behest of stockholders in the 
decisions of the board of directors and impose liability on directors …  for their business 
decisions are central” to corporate law.
15
  
The primary precept equity developed over a century to create a balance between director 
authority and accountability is the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule 
recognizes that the authority to manage business and affairs of a corporation belongs to its board 
of directors; not to courts or its shareholders. A court will not substitute its own judgment for a 
board’s business judgment at the behest of shareholders as long directors comply with the 
prerequisites of the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule precludes judicial 
inquiry into the substantive quality of a business decision and protects directors from personal 
liability even though a business decision results in an unfortunate outcome to the corporation. To 
be afforded business judgment rule protection, directors must exercise a disinterested, informed, 
and good faith business judgment that is attributable to a rational business purpose. The business 
judgment rule is the primary standard of review that defines the judicial inquiry into the 
directors’ decisions. It operates as a presumption that directors exercise sound business 
judgments and are faithful to their fiduciary duties. Although the business judgment rule comes 
into play with respect to both the duties of loyalty and care, “it is most intimately associated with 
the duty of care.”
16
 
The duty of care has long been a controversial area of corporate law. While all agree that 
directors should act diligently, attentively, and on an informed basis, there is no consensus 
whether these objectives should rise to the level of an enforceable duty.
17
 The scholarly debate in 
this area can be generally categorized into two groups. The first group argues that directors 
should not be held personally liable for corporate losses as long as they act in good faith and take 
minimal proceduralist steps when discharging their board responsibilities.
18
 The second group 
argues that directors must discharge their board responsibilities with reasonable diligence, and 
                                                 
14
 Id.  
15
 Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).  
16
 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 88.  
17
 See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, The Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2000).  
18
 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of 
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1307 (2000). 
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they should be accountable for their negligent conduct.
19
 Under Delaware’s business judgment 
rule, the directors’ decision-making process is subject to judicial review under a lenient standard 
of gross negligence, and the substantive quality of a business decision is subject to judicial 
review under a very undemanding standard of waste (irrationality). Even Delaware’s arguably 
balanced approach is far from satisfying corporate scholars at both ends.  
This dissertation’s specific focus is the corporate directors’ duty of care. It attempts to 
provide a middle-ground approach with respect to the due care liability of directors. It argues that 
an efficient enforcement of directors’ due care responsibilities is necessary for inducing 
heightened director attentiveness. It also recognizes that directors should not be subject to 
monetary liability for their actions taken in good faith. Accordingly, it suggests a two-step 
analysis to determine whether directors should be held liable for money damages for a duty of 
care violation. First, alleged due care failures should be subject to judicial review under a lenient 
standard of gross negligence. Where directors are found to have breached their duty of care, they 
should bear the burden of demonstrating that the challenged conduct was taken in good faith. If 
directors are able to justify their conduct on the basis of good faith, they should not be held liable 
for losses that the corporation may have suffered as a consequence.  
This subject is a topic of public importance. As mentioned before, business corporations 
conduct a tremendous volume of business activities in the modern economy. Well-functioning 
corporations contribute to the welfare of a society by creating wealth and jobs and by furthering 
innovation. The corporate form enables the public to invest in enterprises without assuming 
managerial responsibilities and personal liability. This helps financing large-scale and innovative 
business projects. The legal rules that are in place to incent and control the individuals at the 
helm of corporations are vitally important for ensuring an efficient functioning of corporations 
and an efficient use of investment funds. An efficient corporation will contribute to the 
betterment of a society. Thus, corporate law and this subject closely relate to the public interest. 
This dissertation attempts to provide a legal framework that promotes both director engagement 
and corporate risk-taking.  
 This dissertation examines the corporate directors’ duty of care under Delaware law. 
Delaware has long been the preeminent jurisdiction of business incorporation in the United 
                                                 
19
 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 287, 312 (1994). 
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States. It is the leading jurisdiction for publicly-owned corporations listed on the stock 
exchanges. More than half of publicly-held corporations (including 64% of Fortune 500 
companies) have incorporated in Delaware.
20
 The primary advantage of incorporating in 
Delaware is its General Corporation Law. Further, Delaware courts are the leading judicial 
authority on corporate law in the United States. One commentator portrayed Delaware’s 
authority by stating that Delaware judges “sit at ‘the center of the corporate law universe.”’
21
 The 
body of case law developed by Delaware courts provides guidance not only to other jurisdictions 
in the United States but also to the international corporate law community. Thus, this 
dissertation’s exclusive focus is Delaware corporate law.  
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits a certificate of 
incorporation to include a provision exculpating directors from personal liability for money 
damages for a duty of care violation.
22
 This dissertation argues that the statutory infusion of 
exculpatory provisions into corporate law disrupted the traditional fiduciary analysis developed 
by Delaware courts over the years. The liability regime created by section 102(b)(7) is not 
adequate for inducing heightened director attentiveness. Therefore, this dissertation proposes the 
repeal of section 102(b)(7) and provides an alternative approach with respect to the duty of care. 
It proposes a reinvigoration of an enforceable duty of care along with ex post liability protection. 
The directors’ due care failures should be subject to judicial review at the instance of 
shareholders. Where directors are found to have breached their duty of care, they should bear the 
burden of demonstrating good faith with respect to the challenged conduct in order to avoid 
personal monetary liability.  
This dissertation’s proposal fits nicely into the existing legal framework under Delaware 
common law. In Delaware, a plaintiff is required to satisfy a standard of gross negligence to 
establish a breach of the duty of care. Although the gross negligence standard involves a lenient 
judicial review in favor of directors, unlike section 102(b)(7), it does not constitute a formidable 
barrier to a plaintiff challenging inattentive director conduct. In the decision-making context, a 
showing of a grossly negligent decisional process shifts the burden to the defendant directors to 
                                                 
20
 See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2013), 
available at http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/2012CorpAR.pdf.  
21
 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 121 (quoting D. Gordon Smith, Chancellor Allen and the Fundamental Question, 21 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577, 578 (1998)). 
22
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  
 
 
 6  
satisfy the entire fairness standard, which involves searching judicial scrutiny into both the 
process and substance of the challenged decision. This dissertation proposes that, in the duty of 
care context, the greatest weight should be given to the directors’ good faith under an entire 
fairness review. In the oversight context, if a plaintiff demonstrates a grossly negligent oversight 
failure, the directors should bear the burden to demonstrate that they have otherwise made a good 
faith effort to discharge their oversight responsibilities.   
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter II provides some background 
on fiduciary law and the role of a board of directors in a corporation. Chapter II also examines 
the role fiduciary law played in the historical development of corporations. Chapter III examines 
the journey of the duty of care in Delaware, the business judgment rule, and the relationship 
between these two. It starts with explaining the divergence of standards of conduct and review, it 
then examines the standards of care and review in the decision-making and oversight contexts. It 
also provides a brief overview of the standard of care under the Principles of Corporate 
Governance and the Model Business Corporation Act. Following, it explains the business 
judgment rule doctrine in detail. It then examines the landmark corporate law case of Smith v. 
Van Gorkom
23
 and the legislative response (section 102(b)(7)). Chapter IV examines the duty of 
loyalty and good faith. It starts with examining three common law periods governing interested 
director transactions. It then examines the statutory provision regulating self-dealing director 
transactions (section 144) and its relation to the common law rule. Following, Chapter IV 
examines the prominent corporate law case of In re The Walt Disney Company and the emergent 
role of good faith in corporate fiduciary law. Chapter V examines shareholder derivative suits 
and the director demand requirement. Chapter VI concludes that section 102(b)(7) virtually 
eliminates any meaningful threat of personal liability for inattentive conduct, and this may not be 
adequate for deterring directors and protecting the corporation and its shareholders from 
irresponsible behavior. Chapter VI proposes a reinvigoration of the duty of care along with ex 
post liability protection for good faith conduct to encourage director attentiveness while 
promoting responsible risk-taking. 
  
                                                 
23
 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  
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CHAPTER II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FIDUCIARY LAW AND THE ROLE OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN CORPORATIONS 
A. Fiduciary Law in General 
1. Fiduciary Relationships 
As human beings, we must depend and rely on the expertise of other people in a society. 
Fiduciary law derives its roots from this reliance. When one relies on the service of another 
person, the law classifies the latter as a fiduciary. Accordingly, the law imposes certain 
obligations on the fiduciary because this reliance “implies a condition of superiority of fiduciary 
over the other.”
24
 In general terms, a fiduciary is a person who has a duty to act in the interest of 
another person.
25
 In fiduciary relationships, fiduciaries discharge business, or manage money or 
property for the benefit of the other party, and not for their own benefit.
26
 The concept of 
fiduciary embraces a wide range of relationships in our daily life. Physicians, lawyers, trustees, 
agents, financial advisors, and corporate directors and officers are examples of fiduciaries. 
Trust and dependency are essential characteristics of fiduciary relationships.
27
 “A 
fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by one individual in 
another.”
28
 The dependent party vests the fiduciary with discretionary power, with the 
expectation that the fiduciary will exercise that power for her benefit. Typically the beneficiary 
has a continuing relationship with the fiduciary “that resists complete specification by agreement 
or contract and instead bestows discretions.”
29
 Thus, a fiduciary “is held to something stricter 
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of the behavior.”
30
 
The many agency relations that fall under the fiduciary context are so diverse that stating 
a general definition of fiduciary relationships covering every legal position is practically 
impossible.
31
 In Worldspan, L.P., the court emphasized the situation-specific characteristic of 
fiduciary relations by stating that since the existence of a fiduciary relationship depends on the 
                                                 
24
 Dension State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982). 
25
 Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949). 
26
 Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities Revisited, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 923, 925 (2013). 
27
 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 430 (1993). 
28
 First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Utah 1989). 
29
 TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4 (2011) (citing Joshua Getzler, Duty of Care, in BREACH OF TRUST 41 
(Peter B.H. Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 2002)). 
30
 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546–47  (N.Y. 1928). 
31
 FRANKEL, supra note 29, at 2; Demott, supra note 8, at 922.  
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facts and circumstances of each individual case, “there is no invariable rule which determines the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship.”
32
 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter of the United States 
Supreme Court noted that “to say a man is fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to 
further inquiry.”
33
 While dealing with the facts of a particular case, the courts often base their 
definition of fiduciary relationships on a detailed list of elements.
34
  
In her treatise regarding fiduciary law, Tamar Frankel states that while the definitions of 
fiduciaries are not identical, all definitions share three main elements: “(1) entrustment of 
property or power, (2) entrustors’ trust of fiduciaries, and (3) risk to the entrustors emanating 
from the entrustment.”
35
 In addition to these elements, the definitions may contain more detailed 
features that distinguish one species of fiduciaries from another. Yet, these differences derive 
from the nature of the three main elements in fiduciary relationships.
36
 Thus, some fiduciary 
relationships are more intense than others. “The greater the independent authority to be exercised 
by the fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty.”
37
 The laws of trust and agency 
provide good examples of fiduciary relations with different legal grounds.
38
 
Agency is a fiduciary relation where a person (agent), by mutual consent, acts on behalf 
of a principal and is subject to that principal’s control.
39
 In agency, although a principal entrusts 
power to the agent, the level of risk which arises from the entrustment is low because the 
principal is able to control the agent’s actions.
40
 In a trust, however, there is no mention of 
control of the power and the beneficiaries’ consent to the arrangement. Trust is created when a 
property owner entrusts property to another, requiring the trustee to manage the entrusted 
property for the benefit of specified beneficiaries.
41
  
The difference between trust and agency derives from the risk level of abuse of 
entrustment and the ability of the entrustors to control such abuse.
42
 In a trust, the trustee is 
bound by the trust document and the beneficiaries do not have control over the trustee. In 
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contrast, the agent is bound by the principal’s consent and control. Therefore, a trustee is under 
stricter fiduciary limitation than is an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred.
43
 The 
fiduciary status of corporate directors, on the other hand, provides more unique example 
compared with fiduciary status of trustees and agents. The directors of a corporation are entitled 
to exercise an unconstrained authority when they manage the business and affairs of a 
corporation. In contrast to trust and agency, directors are not bound with any document or strict 
principles and not subject to control of shareholders. Fiduciary law ensures that directors act with 
due care and in the best interest of corporation and its shareholders. Thus, fiduciary obligations 
of corporate directors have a great importance and are one of the key elements in the governance 
structure of corporate form.  
 Nevertheless, the fiduciary law plays an important role in most legal relationships that 
we encounter in our daily life. The fiduciary law is designed to ensure that fiduciaries do not 
misuse the trust placed upon them. Indeed, the fiduciary concept developed through imposition 
of trust law principles in other legal relationships where it is suitable. Today, like corporate 
directors, all fiduciaries are generally subject to fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The next 
section provides a brief overview of the development of the fiduciary concept in general. 
2. The Roots of the Fiduciary Relation: Trust Law 
The fiduciary concept had its origin in the law of trusts.
44
 In trust, faithfulness which is 
literal meaning of fiduciary describes the duty or responsibility owed by one who held legal title, 
but not beneficial ownership, to property of another, who lacked legal title but could claim the 
benefits of ownership.
45
 The former individual, who holds the property for another’s benefit is 
referred to as the trustee and the latter individual who is benefited by trust is referred as to the 
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beneficiary. The common law imposed quite rigid standards on faithfulness of trustee to the 
beneficiary.
46
 Courts required trustees to manage the trust prudently and prohibited them from 
personally dealing in trust property even if that dealing did not harm the interests of the 
beneficiary.
47
  
The law of fiduciary obligation has developed through analogy to trust in which the 
obligation conventionally applies.
48
 Judicial opinions resorted to analogy to examine whether the 
relationship involved in the litigation was sufficiently like trust to support an extension of the 
obligation to that relationship.
49
 Courts adopted the fiduciary term to apply to situations falling 
short of trusts, but in which one person was nonetheless obliged to act like a trustee.
50
 The rules 
and principles governing fiduciary relationships were, in essence and in origin, the same as those 
of the law of trusts.
51
 In Ex p. Dale the court stated that “a fiduciary relationship is one in respect 
of which if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the 
principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust.”
52
  
In time, however, strict analogy to trust gave way to broad principles and flexibility in 
fiduciary law. Today, the word “fiduciary” embraces all trust-like situations, including the trust 
itself. It is not definitive of a single class of relationships to which a fixed set of rules and 
principles apply.
53
 The mere statement that a relationship falls under the fiduciary concept means 
no more than that in some respects the fiduciary is in a trustee-like position.
54
 Falling under the 
fiduciary concept does not warrant that the all trust principles will apply to the fiduciary 
relationship, because the fiduciary concept covers such diverse legal relations that strict 
application of trust principles will not fit all situations. Each fiduciary relation is fact-specific 
and requires special treatment. 
Thus, the evolution of fiduciary law owed much to its flexible and fact-specific 
characteristics. These features of fiduciary relationships also resisted a tidy categorization. 
Judges made their analyses first to determine whether the relationship before them involved the 
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fiduciary element, and if so, they determined to what extent one of the parties in the relationship 
was subject to fiduciary constraint. As the fiduciary law developed, concrete rules became 
substituted for courts’ exercise of discretion based on broad principles.  
Fiduciary obligations of corporate directors provide a good example of this process in 
fiduciary law. The rules, however, cannot foresee all possible violations in every fiduciary 
context. Therefore, there is still room in fiduciary law which requires discretion-based judgment. 
This makes the fiduciary concept one of the most elusive concepts in the law.
55
  
3. Fiduciary Duties 
A fiduciary relationship deserves a special protection because of the trust and dependency 
involved in it.
56
 The confidence placed by one party in the other triggers the risk of possible 
abuses by fiduciaries. Therefore, fiduciary duties developed through common law as a judicial 
assurance to such risks to beneficiaries. Although not to the same extent, all fiduciaries are 
generally subject to fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
57
 The main duties of loyalty and care are 
aimed at deterring fiduciaries and protecting beneficiaries from wrongdoing. The first risk is the 
possible temptation of fiduciaries to abuse the entrustment, and the second risk is possible faulty 
performance of fiduciaries.
58
 The duty of loyalty is designed to ensure that fiduciaries act in the 
best interest of beneficiaries, and avoid acts that put their interests in conflict with 
beneficiaries’.
59
 The duty of care requires fiduciaries to execute their services, and execute them 
with prudence, attention, and proficiency.
60
  
The duty of loyalty prohibits fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing entrusted 
property or power.
61
 Loyalty entails the exclusive benefit principle in favor of the beneficiary 
and prophylactic prohibition on self-dealing by fiduciary.
62
 It requires that fiduciaries act for the 
sole benefit of the entrustors and forbids them from acting in conflict of interest against the 
interest of beneficiaries. The notion is that the fiduciary should act only as the beneficiary would 
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act for himself and as between the fiduciary’s interest and the beneficiary’s interest the fiduciary 
should serve only the latter.
63
  
After all, if the entrusted property or power does not belong to the fiduciaries, it follows 
that the fiduciaries may not benefit from it, except upon the consent of the beneficiary or the 
source of his authority or the law.
64
 To assure such exclusive service, the fiduciary is to refrain 
from engaging in any transaction with the beneficiary’s assets which he might either gain for 
himself or harm the beneficiary.
65
 The duty of loyalty prohibits actions even though they are not 
necessarily injurious to beneficiaries.
66
 Thus, loyalty is in place to “dampen the fiduciaries’ 
temptations to misappropriate entrusted property or power, or to justify benefitting themselves, 
and establish a continuous reminder that entrusted property and power do not belong to 
[them].”
67
 
On the other hand, the duty of care is related to the quality of the services that fiduciaries 
offer and perform.
68
 It requires that fiduciaries devote a reasonable amount of time and attention 
to their services. They should also possess and use the expert skills they purport to possess.
69
 The 
duty of care focuses on the area that is left to fiduciaries’ discretion in reliance on their 
expertise.
70
 In contrast to the duty of loyalty, a violation of the duty of care is linked to lack of 
expertise, inattention, and negligence.
71
 Nonetheless, the approach to the duty of care is less 
strict than the approach to the duty of loyalty because the first is closely related to discretionary 
power of fiduciaries. 
Similarly, one can consider the duty of care to be less important than the duty of 
loyalty.
72
 Judges and scholars usually emphasize the duty of loyalty much more than duty of care 
when they deal with fiduciary context generally. The duty of loyalty is related to fundamentals in 
a fiduciary relationship; it prohibits self-dealing and abuse of property or power, and protects the 
interest of the beneficiary. On the other hand, the duty of care is related to how to perform 
services and it contains ambiguous standards compared to the duty of loyalty.  
                                                 
63
 Id. 
64
 FRANKEL, supra note 29, at 108. 
65
 Brudney, supra note 62, at 602. 
66
 FRANKEL, supra note 29, at 108. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. at 169. 
69
 Id. at 171. 
70
 Id. at 169. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
 
 
 13  
Nevertheless, there is no uniform application of fiduciary duties which fits in all fiduciary 
relationships. As the conditions that implicate fiduciary relationships are not identical, so change 
the application of fiduciary obligations. Also, the sanctions imposed upon violation of fiduciary 
obligations may differ.
73
 The context and application of fiduciary duties are flexible because they 
developed in common law through analogy rather than strict principle. Judges applied trust 
principles in relationships similar to trust and in time that resulted in broad fiduciary principles. 
Thus, based on these principles, judges apply fiduciary duties case by case to the extent that they 
fit in a particular fiduciary relationship.  
B. A Brief History the Role of Fiduciary Law in Corporations 
The nature and role of corporations in the economy have changed drastically over time. 
Accordingly, the regulatory regime of corporations significantly evolved, particularly in the 
course of the nineteenth century. Strict regulatory control over corporate behavior gave way to 
extremely permissive corporate laws.
74
 Fiduciary duties of directors followed a similar path, the 
demanding fiduciary regime of corporate directors ended up with virtually no fiduciary liability 
in the twenty-first century.   
The fiduciary law of corporate directors was greatly influenced by changing 
characteristics of corporations. In the early twentieth century scholars and judges viewed 
directors as trustees.
75
 This view was shaped by concerns about the concentration of private and 
public power in corporations, and it helped legitimate emerging powerful public corporations.
76
 
The mid-century notion that directors were representatives of the shareholders was informed by 
the ideals of democracy.
77
 The courts used this notion to justify their deference to directors’ 
decisions. The late twentieth century description of directors as agents was influenced by market 
ideology, and this vision helped eviscerate fiduciary duties of directors.
78
 
“The first corporations, run by their proprietors and constrained by law, exercised state-
granted privileges to further the public interest.”
79
 Under early American law, corporations could 
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be formed only under a charter granted by states upon special application.
80
 Each special charter 
specified the obligations and privileges of the particular corporation.
81
 As strictly state-created 
entities, corporations were considered to be subject to rigid control by their creators.
82
 The 
understanding was that corporations were artificial entities and they owed their “existence to the 
willingness of the state to grant its being.”
83
 The then-dominant concession theory of 
corporations held that since corporations existed under the will of the state, a corporate entity 
possessed only rights and privileges specifically granted to it by the state.
84
 This view 
legitimated states’ strong regulatory control over corporations through an exclusive and 
individualized charter system.  
The board of directors was part of corporate structure at that time; however, it was not 
considered to be a significant body.
85
 Since corporations were regulated and strictly controlled 
by states, directors were not expected to play a major role in their corporations. In business 
corporations, those who owned all or a majority of a corporation’s stock managed the 
corporation.
86
 Thus, directors, if different from the owners, served for the prestige associated 
with the position.
87
 
In the early nineteenth century, with the growth of the American economy and rapid 
industrialization, the corporate form became very popular as business entities. The corporate 
form provided great advantages for businesses such as legal personality, the ability to centralize 
the management, the power to issue transferable shares, and the right to limit the liability of 
individuals participating in the business company.
88
 Because of these important benefits and 
increasingly large and complex business activities, progressively more businesses sought 
corporate charters. As a result, legislatures could not keep up with the demand for special 
charters, and the inefficiency of the system became apparent.
89
 Following the failure of the 
special charter system, states began to enact general incorporation laws.
90
 General incorporation 
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laws repealed individualized process and regulated a standardized set of requirements to gain a 
corporate charter.
91
 
The turn to general corporation law from special charters gradually loosened regulatory 
control over corporations by states. Similarly, the understanding of corporations changed in a 
more business friendly manner. However, during that time, corporate statutes set a number of 
limitations for corporations. They limited the capital which corporations could raise, the length 
of the corporation’s existence, and the activities in which a corporation could engage.
92
 
Nevertheless, new developments suggested that corporations were essential to promote business 
and corporate law should “enable business men to act, not police their action.”
93
 This desire led 
states to further liberalization of corporate regulatory law. Accordingly, states turned to enabling 
corporate statutes which reduced state control to a minimum so that entrepreneurs could operate 
freely.
94
 States were no longer imposing any conditions on access to the corporate form or any 
limits on corporations, and they could structure their affairs under their articles or bylaws.
95
 
The board of directors emerged as an important institution with the development of 
modern public corporation in the late nineteenth century.
96
 As giant public corporations began to 
emerge, the status of the board attracted broader public attention in the context of corporate 
power and its potential abuse.
97
 During that time, despite the growing dispersal of share 
ownership, corporate control was concentrated in the hands of investment bankers, controlling 
shareholders, and top management.
98
 Jurists turned their focus on directors and wanted them “to 
act as trustees, subject to heightened duties and liabilities,” to prevent the control group from 
harming “both the community at large and the individual shareholder through its participation in 
management or through market manipulation.”
99
 Vesting directors with public power and trust 
also helped legitimate emerging large public corporations in society.
100
 Judges referred to 
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directors as trustees in a fiduciary context and required them to comply with high fiduciary 
standards.
101
 
Indeed, the board of directors and its fiduciary status played an important role in the 
transition from strict regulatory regime to permissive corporation laws. On one hand, demands of 
growing businesses resisted close control over corporations by public authorities. On the other 
hand, the corporation expanded into a huge concentrate of resources,
102
 because it was legally 
and practically able to collect large amounts of public capital. Its operation crucially affected 
society, and there was a need of a control mechanism. At that point, non-statutory fiduciary law 
was considered to fill the gap in absence of statutory restraints on corporations. Regulators were 
willing to permit more flexibility in statutory corporate regulations as long as the common law 
required corporate behavior to be monitored by strict fiduciary duties.
103
 
Common law of fiduciary duties could limit the ability of directors to abuse the flexibility 
of enabling statutes at the expense of shareholders.
104
 Managers could move freely when they 
managed their corporations, “but their movements would be held in check, not by substantive 
regulation, but by certain minimum standards imposed by fiduciary duties.”
105
 The behavior of 
corporate management was subject to ex-post judicial review measured by fiduciary 
principles.
106
   Thus, the loosening of regulatory control over corporate boards was justified by 
the view that “fiduciary duty doctrine would provide sufficient disciplining incentive” on 
corporate boards and executive management.
107
 Especially, duties of loyalty and care were 
recognized as important control mechanisms over a corporation’s board of directors.
108
  
Meanwhile, the changing nature of corporations led scholars to reconsider the theoretical 
conceptualization of corporate form. Aggregation theory replaced concession doctrine since 
corporations were no longer dominated by state authorities.
109
 Aggregation theory derived from 
partnership law and viewed a corporation as an aggregation of individuals.
110
 The state’s role in 
corporations was not important because shareholders were the main element of corporate 
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aggregates, and they could monitor corporate behavior effectively.
111
 However, aggregation 
conceptualization was short lived, because partnership analogy was unable to explain complex 
corporate mechanisms. In practice, contrary to the theory, shareholders were not exercising 
control over corporate affairs. The management and control of corporations were completely 
ceded to top management.
112
  
After codification of enabling statutes, corporate conceptualization shifted from 
aggregation to the real entity theory. The real entity notion held that a corporation had an identity 
and attributes independent from its shareholders or other constituencies.
113
 In the legal 
perspective, corporations existed just like individuals, and they were subject to the sovereign 
state in that manner.
114
 The real entity theory supported the notion that described directors as 
trustees. Both concepts were grounded in the understanding that corporations were powerful, 
perhaps even sovereign, entities.
115
 As trustees for the community in these large and powerful 
organizations, the boards of directors reflected the public nature of corporations.
116
  Real entity 
doctrine prevailed until the mid-twentieth century along with the concept which characterized 
directors as trustees. 
By the mid-twentieth century, statutorily-built corporate governance structures proved to 
be inefficient.
117
 Despite legislatively imposed checks and balances to prevent the rise of 
overpowered corporate executive authority, “paramount executive authority emerged.”
118
 Insider 
professional management became more powerful and dominated the board and the affairs of the 
corporation. In the meantime, the number of individual shareholders had drastically increased, 
and the concentrated ownership structure in corporations changed into dispersed ownership.
119
 
Therefore, shareholders were not in a position to affect or control corporate affairs. In this 
context, legal literature focused more on the relationship between shareholders, managers, and 
directors rather than corporate power. The purpose of the board of directors, as representatives of 
                                                 
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. at 1001. 
115
 Mitchell, supra note 76, at 66. 
116
 Id. at 70.  
117
 Id. 
118
 Mitchell, supra note 76, at 70 (quoting James A. Ward, Power and Accountability on the Pennsylvania Railroad, 
1846-1878, 49 BUS. HIST. REV. 37, 38 (1975)). 
119
 Mitchell, supra note 76, at 108. 
 
 
 18  
shareholders, was to protect shareholders from excessively powerful management and to mediate 
conflicts between these two.
120
   
Understanding directors as representatives of shareholders, associated with other changes 
in the corporate arena, implied a less demanding fiduciary regime for directors. In the 1930s, the 
federal securities regulations emerged as an important constraint on management. The Securities 
Act of 1933 and the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act imposed mandatory disclosure 
requirements on corporations to ensure that shareholders received adequate information about 
the business and affairs of corporations. The enactment of securities regulations helped to ease 
the strict fiduciary notion since they employed a comprehensive disclosure mechanism on 
corporate actions. In addition, shareholders began to use derivative suits more aggressively to 
interfere in corporate actions.
121
 The courts, in response, emphasized the business judgment rule 
in a way that gave excessive deference to directors’ discretion.
122
 Thus, the business judgment 
rule was expanded at the expense of fiduciary liability to prevent growing shareholder derivative 
suits and perhaps due to the belief that securities regulations granted shareholders adequate 
protection.
123
  
Mainstream legal literature continued to evolve in a director-friendly manner in the late 
twentieth century. The board of directors was not sufficiently involved in managing the affairs 
and business of the corporations “to perform the tasks traditionally assigned to it.”
124
 Therefore, 
academic discussions focused on the function of directors in corporations, and the monitoring 
concept emerged. Under the monitoring concept, the board was not there to manage the 
corporation. Rather, the board’s task was to determine general and financial policies under which 
business was conducted and to supervise executives who managed the corporation. The 
monitoring board concept worked in tandem with the notion that the board of directors should be 
independent from top executive management to perform the oversight duty effectively. 
Accordingly, the notion of director independency became popular in large publicly-held 
                                                 
120
 Id. at 109. 
121
 Id. at 67.  
122
 Id.  
123
 Id. at 118. For example, Delaware courts collapsed the duty of care into business judgment rule and changed the 
standard of review from negligence to gross negligence. Id. at 68. 
124
 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, 
and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 376 (1975). 
 
 
 19  
corporations, and the monitoring board was composed of a majority of independent or outside 
directors.
125
  
Substantial changes in corporate conceptualization accompanied the monitoring board in 
the 1980s.
126
 The focus of scholarly debates moved from concerns of corporate hierarchies to 
economic aspects of corporations such as cost reduction and profit maximization issues.
127
 The 
“nexus of contract” or “contractarian” theory of the corporation dominated legal literature, which 
is still the prevailing theory today. Under this theory, a corporation is not a person or entity; it is 
a set of contractual relationships among participants in the corporate enterprise.
128
 “[T]he firm is 
not a thing but rather a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations 
among the various inputs making up the firm.”
129
 Shareholders, directors, officers or other 
participants in the corporation do not have any special status or power, rather each participant 
assumes only those rights and obligations afforded it by contract.
130
 State law requirements are 
not external regulations over corporations, but they merely provide standard default rules so that 
participants do not need to negotiate certain basic points every time they contract.
131
 
The contractarian theory holds that the management of corporations has no special status, 
but it is only one of many bargaining units.
132
 There is no need of external legal constraints on 
top officers or directors, because efficient markets provide an adequate control mechanism on 
corporate management.
133
 As prevailing theory recognized no internal power or hierarchy among 
corporate constituencies, the view that characterized directors as representatives of the 
shareholders was not common anymore. Legal environments turned their focus to the law of 
contracts and agency to tailor the status of directors in accordance with the new concept of the 
board and corporate theory. Hence, the idea that “directors were [mere private] agents of 
shareholders”
 
gained prominence.
134
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The agency status of directors, which was suggested by understandings of market-based 
corporate theory, developed in parallel to the monitoring board, which was composed of a 
majority of outside independent directors.
135
 The monitoring board’s main task was to monitor 
the executives, and “independent directors were best suited for this task.” 
136
 Not surprisingly, 
the characterization of the monitoring board as the agent of shareholders suggested very limited 
fiduciary liability, if any, for directors. The presence of independent directors substantiated 
minimal fiduciary liability regime for the whole board, including insider directors. The 
contractarian theory helped legitimize minimizing director liability by suggesting that there is no 
need for regulatory control over management since “discipline of corporate management comes 
from the policing feature of the market.”
137
 The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a 
set of events in the corporate arena that resulted in virtually no fiduciary liability of directors.
138
 
While the duty of loyalty of corporate directors is confined to mere procedural steps, monetary 
liability for breach of duty of care is totally eliminated by exculpatory provisions.
139
 Thus, 
“modernization of corporate theory caused the death of fiduciary duty.”
140
 
C. The Role of the Board of Directors in Corporations 
1. The Fiduciary Nature of Directors 
In a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary is in charge of acting primarily for the interest of 
the beneficiary.
141
 It implies discretion and authority on the fiduciary’s part, and dependency and 
reliance on the beneficiary’s part.
142
 Corporate relationships truly reflect these essential 
characteristics of fiduciary relationships. As fiduciaries, “directors are entrusted with power to 
use in the interest of others.”
143
  Under modern corporate statutes, the board of directors is vested 
with discretionary authority to manage or monitor the affairs and business of the corporation.
144
 
The board elects officers to delegate managerial authority to them both formally and informally. 
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The executive officers manage the corporation under the oversight of the board for the benefit of 
shareholders. Thus, corporate directors and officers “stand in a fiduciary relation to the 
corporation and its stockholders.”
145
  
In corporate law, directors have long been recognized to be bound by fiduciary 
obligations. In an old English law case, the court formulated fiduciary principles in corporate 
context, stating that, by accepting a managerial role, “a person is obliged to execute it with 
fidelity and reasonable diligence.”
146
 In early corporate law in the United States, fiduciary status 
of corporate directors was recognized as an analogy of trust. Although they are not technically 
trustees, directors occupy a position of trust and confidence.
147
 In corporations, shareholders 
invest their money with an expectation of higher return. Once they invest, they lose all control 
over their investment except the possibility of selling it on the market at market value.
148
 
Restricting the power of directors or maintaining the control by shareholders is unrealistic 
because of a number of factors such as dispersed ownership structure of corporations, infinite 
array of investment opportunities for corporations, risky nature of businesses, and the required 
high level of business skills for officers to manage corporations.
149
 So why would anybody 
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invest her money in a corporation despite the fact that she has no control of it? Presumably, the 
answer is that shareholders trust that the board of directors and executive manegement of the 
corporation will act in their interest to maximize the return of their investment. Shareholders 
expect that “corporate fiduciaries will use their funds to provide a desirable return at an 
acceptable level of risk and thus are willing to put their money in a corporation.”
150
 
The trust and confidence employed by shareholders in corporate directors require 
fiduciary limitations on corporate boards. The courts of equity imposed equity principles on 
director conduct to assure that they do not abuse their position of trust and confidence. Thus, 
corporate directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporations they serve and 
their shareholders.
151
 Directors must use their discretionary authority properly to promote the 
interests of shareholders and the corporation. Fiduciary duties ensure a reasonable and lawful 
exercise of statutorily assigned powers of directors. As the Delaware Supreme Court expressed 
in 1939, fiduciary status demands a corporate director to affirmatively protect the interests of the 
corporation and to refrain from doing anything that would cause injury to the corporation.
152
 
2. Corporate Structure and the Supremacy of Directors 
Corporations are artificial entities which exist by virtue of statutes. Corporate law defines 
the relative rights and duties of participants in the entity. It seeks to set the optimal balance of 
power among directors, shareholders, officers and other constituencies such as creditors and 
employees, and determines the process by which parties exercise their authority. In a typical 
corporation, the owners of the corporation (the shareholders) elect a body of individuals (the 
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board of directors) to be in charge of the corporation. The board of directors makes general 
policy decisions and elects executive officers. These officers implement decisions of the board 
and deal with day-to-day operational management of the corporation under the oversight of the 
board.  
The separation between ownership and control is the most distinctive characteristic of the 
corporate form. All corporation statutes build institutional governance structure of corporations 
upon this separation.
153
 As the owners of the corporation,
154
 shareholders are not entitled to 
participate in the management of the corporation; rather, their rights are limited to elect the board 
of directors and to approve or disapprove certain corporate actions.
155
 The board of directors and 
executive officers are responsible for the management of the corporation. The body of 
shareholders has no control over the management decisions or corporate affairs.  
One might think that shareholders have an indirect control over the corporation through 
their rights to elect directors and to vote on certain corporate actions.
156
 However, a number of 
regulatory and practical impediments prevent shareholders from exercising any meaningful 
control over the corporation by their existing rights.
157
 Additionally, the election process of 
members of the board insulates directors from shareholder pressure.
158
 As prominent corporate 
scholars Berle and Means put it, a shareholder “who invests in a modern corporation so far 
surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has exchanged the position of 
independent owner for one in which he may become merely recipient of the wages of capital.”
159
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Under all corporate statutes, the cardinal principle is that the business and affairs of a 
corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.
160
 Since the board is 
not able to deal with the daily business of the corporation, the rule is formulated as “by or under 
the direction of the board” so that the board can delegate its powers to employees of the 
corporation, while it retains ultimate responsibility. The board of directors is not subject to the 
control of shareholders or other corporate constituencies, because the board obtains its authority 
directly from corporate statute. Directors are not required to act in accordance with the wishes of 
shareholders.
161
 To the contrary, they should use their own business judgment in the best interest 
of corporation and its shareholders, and they can take actions that they believe in the best interest 
of the corporation and shareholders, even though shareholders do not agree with them regarding 
those actions.
162
 The courts have recognized the boards’ statutory power to manage the 
corporation by consistently rejecting shareholders’ attempts to seek judicial intervention to the 
board actions they did not agree with.  
In People Ex. Rel. Manice v. Powell, the court emphasized that the board of directors is 
not in a position of agency towards corporation, and “the powers of the board of directors are, in 
very important sense, original and undelegated.”
163
 In case law, the business judgment rule was 
created “to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to 
directors.”
164
 Under this rule, the courts will not review honest and informed decisions of 
disinterested directors. The business judgment rule and other rules related to shareholder 
litigation such as director demand requirement preclude shareholders from using litigation as an 
oversight mechanism over a corporation’s board of directors. Thus, “the board’s freedom to 
exercise business judgment is virtually unconstrained.”
165
  
3. Decision-Making and Monitoring/Oversight Functions 
Under the traditional model of corporate law, the function of the board was to manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation. Over time, however, the size of corporations and their 
businesses have grown tremendously, and it has become clear that, in practice, the boards are 
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unable to perform management functions in the traditional sense.
166
 Therefore, the 
conceptualization and regulatory regime of the board of directors evolved to embrace the 
practice. Under the modern corporate law, “the board still plays a central role in the 
corporation,”
167
 but most of the powers legally vested in the board are actually being performed 
by executive officers. In modern practice, executive officers perform most part of policy-making 
and management functions, and CEOs are the leading figures in corporations. The primary 
function of the board is not to manage the business of a corporation, but rather to monitor and 
oversee the conduct of the corporation’s business.
168
 Corporate statutes reflect this practical 
reality in the norm, “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors.”
169
  
This reality is also acknowledged explicitly in section 3.01 of the ALI’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance. Under section 3.01, subject to the functions and powers of the board of 
directors, the management of the business of a publicly held corporation should be conducted by 
or under the supervision of such principal senior executives as are designated by the board.
170
 
Section 3.02 states that the board should oversee the conduct of corporation’s business and 
performance of its managers and lists other major corporate functions that the board should 
fulfill.
171
 The board should actively perform decision-making authority on corporate actions that 
the board is obliged to or chooses to act upon, and should monitor the performance of the 
delegates in managing the business to the extent of the delegation of the board’s authority.
172
  
Thus, directors’ role in corporations includes two basic functions: decision-making and 
oversight.
173
 The decision-making function refers to actions taken at a point in time; the 
oversight function involves ongoing monitoring of the business and affairs of the corporation 
over a period of time.
174
 The decision-making function generally involves taking actions with 
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respect to specific corporate matters and formulating general corporate policy and business 
goals.
175
 Directors must select and compensate principal senior executive officers, and evaluate 
their performance and replace them when necessary. They must review and approve the 
corporation’s financial objectives, general corporate policies, major corporate plans and actions, 
and appropriate auditing and accounting principles and practices regarding financial 
statements.
176
 When they perform their decision-making function on corporate matters, directors 
should employ an informative and deliberative process. As the Delaware Chancery Court 
observed, however, “[m]ost of the decisions that a corporation, acting through its human agents, 
makes are, of course, not the subject of director attention.”
177
 While they retain the ultimate 
responsibility, directors delegate management of daily business operations to corporate officers. 
Therefore, directors must oversee corporate officers to secure the quality and integrity of the 
operation of the business.
178
  
The oversight function of the board does not require an active supervision or day-to-day 
scrutiny of corporate business and affairs; rather, it implies a general observation and oversight 
of the corporation.
179
 It requires that directors employ an appropriate monitoring system to 
ensure adequate information flow and evaluate the information received through monitoring 
systems, and take action if necessary. In particular, directors should pay “attention to corporate 
business performance, plans and strategies, risk assessment and management, compliance with 
legal obligations and corporate policies, and the quality of financial and other reports to 
shareholders, as well as attention to matters suggesting a need for inquiry or investigation.”
180
 In 
other words, they generally need to be aware of major corporate affairs and be ready to step in 
when necessary.  
To effectively perform its decision-making and oversight functions, the board may 
designate one or more committees to exercise the powers and authority of the board on certain 
corporate matters. Indeed, the modern corporate law requires the boards of directors to have 
committees, and now it is a prevalent practice that the boards of publicly held corporations have 
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certain committees. Under the rules of New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, listed 
corporations should have audit, nominating/corporate governance, and compensation committees 
in their boards.
181
 The board committees fulfill the duties specified in the corporate regulations 
and in the board resolution or by-laws. Directors should exercise reasonable care when they 
select the members of committees, and they are entitled to rely on information, statements, and 
reports submitted by committees.
182
  
Additionally, in modern corporate practice, the key function of the board of directors is to 
monitor executives and other corporate officers,
183
 and therefore, directors who are independent 
from top executive management are best-suited for the task of monitoring.
184
 Under the rules of 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, the listed corporations should have boards whose 
majority is composed of independent directors that do not have any material relationship with the 
corporation.
185
 The rules also require that nominating/corporate governance, audit, and 
compensation committees—or any committee to which these committees’ duties are delegated—
are composed solely of independent directors.
186
  
The regulations regarding board committees and independence of directors aim to 
enhance the quality of corporate governance. The fiduciary duties of directors, likewise, are in 
place to ensure that directors perform decision-making and oversight function properly and in the 
best interest of shareholders. Fiduciary principles do not contain substantial regulations; rather 
they provide common standards applicable to director behavior in general. The duty of care, for 
example, requires directors to employ an informative and deliberative process when they make 
decisions on corporate matters and when they perform oversight function over corporation. The 
next chapter examines the duty of care of corporate directors in the decision-making and 
oversight contexts.  
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CHAPTER III. THE DUTY OF CARE 
A. The Difference between a Standard of Care and a Standard of Review (In General) 
A standard of conduct describes how a person should conduct a given activity or perform 
a given duty.
187
 A standard of review describes the test a court should apply in reviewing a 
person’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability.
188
  In most areas of law, standards of 
conduct and standards of review are the same. For example, the standard of conduct with which 
an automobile driver should comply is that he or she should drive carefully, and the standard of 
review when a court determines whether a driver is liable in an accident is whether he drove 
carefully.
189
 In corporate law, however, those two standards often diverge.
190
 The duty of care, 
for example, has been a major area of corporate law that involves diverse standards of conduct 
and review.
191
 Directors are under a duty to comply with the standard of care, but courts apply 
different standards in reviewing director conduct to determine whether they fulfilled their 
fiduciary duty of care.  
The duty of care imposes a strict standard of care on corporate directors, but applicable 
standards of review for the performance of this duty are lenient. The standard of care requires 
directors to act reasonably when they take action on corporate matters that do not involve self-
interest. In the abstract sense, the concept of “care” evokes a tort-law/negligence-based analysis 
in determining whether the duty of care has been properly performed.
192
 However, the courts 
employ a quite different analysis in reviewing actions of corporate directors under the duty of 
care. The standards of review applicable to the exercise of the duty of care include multiple and 
complex tests.
193
 First, the court will review a director decision under the protective business 
judgment rule.
194
 The business judgment rule shields directors from liability by providing a 
presumption that directors act in accordance with their fiduciary duties. The burden is on a 
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plaintiff to rebut the business judgment rule presumption. If the plaintiff is unable to rebut the 
rule’s presumption, the directors’ decision will be subject to an exceptionally limited review of 
rationality (waste). Accordingly, if the business judgment rule applies, directors will not be held 
liable for a decision, even if the decision is not reasonable, as long as they act rationally.
195
  
The distinction between standards of conduct and review is predicated on important 
policy and fairness reasons.
196
 While the standard of care defines the desirable conduct that 
directors are generally expected to exercise, “it is fundamentally fair to review their conduct on a 
less demanding level”
197
 because directors often have to act with limited and incomplete 
information, they do not have control over the business environment that affects their decision, 
and they must take risks. A standard of review of ordinary care does not fit the risky nature of 
complex business decisions.
198
 The strict standard of ordinary care primarily addresses paradigm 
negligence cases that involve simple judgments such as automobile accidents. In those cases, 
typically, there is only one reasonable decision that can be made, and decisions with bad 
outcomes are inevitably bad decisions.
199
 For example, if an automobile driver makes a mistake 
in judgment as to speed or distance injuring a pedestrian, he will likely be responsible for 
damages.
200
 In contrast, in cases involving complex judgments that must be made on incomplete 
information and include risk, there is typically a range of decisions that are reasonable.
201
 Where 
a range of decisions are reasonable, it is often difficult, under a hindsight review, to sort out 
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decisions that had bad outcomes from bad decisions.
202
 If directors made a risky investment and 
it resulted in a corporate loss, for example, the decision might be considered as unreasonable 
simply because it turned out badly even though it looked reasonable at the time. However, it is 
not fair to hold directors responsible for an unsuccessful decision with the benefit of hindsight 
for the reason that the risk involved in the decision was realized.
203
 Although directors are 
required to exercise appropriate care, they are not insurers of the risks of the businesses that 
corporations engage in.  
Indeed, directors serve the best interests of shareholders when they make risky business 
decisions because generally higher risk is associated with higher return. A strict standard of 
review that imposes liability for ordinary negligence might discourage directors from taking risks 
and induce them to be over-cautious to avoid risk of litigation. The law, therefore, should not 
discourage directors from making “bold but desirable decisions,”
204
 as it would “defeat one of 
the very purposes [for] which corporations exist.”
205
 Just as the law limits the liability of those 
who contribute their financial capital to the enterprise, it must limit the liability of those who 
contribute their human capital (knowledge and judgment) in order to promote creation of value 
or wealth.
206
 Protecting directors from excessive liability is also required to attract competent 
people to serve as directors.
207
 Lax standards of review give directors greater freedom to make 
risky decisions without fear of personal liability.
208
 For example, a director who makes a mistake 
in judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will not be 
liable for damages suffered by the corporation.
209
 Liability will be imposed on directors “only if 
there is a clear variance between the conduct required by law and actual director conduct.”
210
 
Thus, although directors are required to act in accordance with conduct rules, lenient standards of 
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review give directors a certain margin which is essential to manage complex and large 
corporations.
211
  
One might think that a standard of conduct has no legal or practical importance if the 
conduct is reviewed under different standard.
212
 One commentator, for example, undermined the 
legal aspect of the standard of care by labeling the business judgment rule standard of review as 
the “de facto standard of conduct” of the duty of care, and stated that under the business 
judgment rule directors are required to exercise only “slight care” rather than due care.
213
 
Professor Eisenberg, on the other hand, argues that the standards of conduct in the fiduciary 
context are intended to control behavior and they have a real bite.
214
 Eisenberg points out that, 
under certain circumstances, the lenient standard of review may not be applicable and director 
conduct may be reviewed under the standard of conduct.
215
 For example, if directors are charged 
with a failure to act, the protective business judgment rule will not be available and, therefore, 
director inaction may be subject to review under the strict standard of conduct.
216
 Thus, the 
standards of conduct are “safe” rules whereas standards of review are “risky” rules.
217
 
With respect to the practical aspect, the standards of conduct serve as a foundation for 
professional practices in the market.
218
 For example, legal counsel is likely to give advice to 
directors based on standards of conduct rather than standards of review.
219
 Similarly, institutional 
guidelines or codes of conduct adopted by corporations that are circulated to corporate actors are 
usually based on the standards of conduct.
220
 Thus, directors’ actions will be judged by the 
market and shareholders based on professional practices. A director whose action does not meet 
the standard of conduct would likely face market-based consequences even though he might able 
to escape liability under lenient standards of review.  
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The divergence of standards of conduct and review may sometimes leave shareholders 
without remedy in cases where board sloppiness results in financial harm. However, in the 
corporate context, utilizing standards of review that are fully consistent with standards of 
conduct will likely cause greater harm to shareholders generally.
221
 The next section examines 
the duty of care of corporate directors and analyzes how the law attempts to strike a balance 
between the standard of care and applicable standards of review.  
B. The Standard of Care: Decision-Making and Oversight 
1. Delaware 
Corporate directors are subject to a duty of care in connection with the discharge of their 
responsibilities. The duty of care requires directors to act with reasonable diligence and care in 
performing the important tasks of directing and monitoring corporate affairs.
222
 In the decision-
making context, the duty requires directors to employ a reasonable decision-making process and 
to make reasonable decisions.
223
 In other words, it requires directors to be adequately informed 
on the subject matter of a decision and to make a reasonable decision upon carefully considering 
the relevant information. In the oversight context, the duty of care requires directors to 
reasonably monitor the conduct of a corporation’s business and affairs, to investigate a situation 
that raises concern, and to take necessary action to prevent corporate wrongdoing.
224
 Also, as a 
general rule, directors should have at least a rudimentary understanding of the business of a 
corporation.
225
  In addition, directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed of 
corporate business and affairs.
226
 Directors should attend board meetings regularly, and they 
should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation.
227
 In sum, under the duty 
of care, directors should act responsibly and exercise an informed attention to corporate matters.  
Most states’ corporate statutes include provisions defining the standard of care of 
corporate directors.
228
 In Delaware, the standard of care has been recognized and defined in court 
                                                 
221
 Id. at 467–68. 
222
 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 Intro. n. c. (1994). 
223
 Eisenberg, supra note 199, at 948. 
224
 Id. 
225
 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821–22 (N.J. 1981).  
226
 Id. 
227
 Id. 
228
 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 Intro. n. a. (noting that over two-thirds of the states have 
statutory provisions concerning the duty of care). 
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decisions.
229
 In 1963, the Delaware Supreme Court in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing 
Company adopted the ordinarily prudent person standard in the corporate fiduciary context.
230
 
The court held that corporate directors in discharging their functions are “bound to use the 
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”
231
 
With the Graham decision, the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly recognized for the first time 
that directors were subject to a duty to act in a careful and prudent manner.
232
 
The Graham decision was only the beginning of the journey of directors’ standard of care 
in Delaware. After Graham, the standard of care in the decision-making context followed a 
difficult path, while the standard of care in the oversight context followed a relatively easy path. 
The ordinarily prudent person standard, rooted in tort law, is designed as one-rule-fits-all 
standard and, at least in theory, defines the expected conduct of directors in the decision-making 
context as well as in the oversight context. When it comes to injecting specific requirements into 
the standard of care, however, not only do the requirements differ in the decision-making and 
                                                 
229
 There is no significant difference between statutory and common law formulations of the duty of care. One 
commentator observed: “The common law or statutory formulation of the duty of care in most states is to the same 
effect.” George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's 
Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623, 645 (1981).  
230
 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). See also Briggs v. 
Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891). Seven decades earlier than Graham, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that the degree of care to which directors were bound is “that which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would 
exercise under similar circumstances.” Id. at 152. Also, by 1963, many states had enacted statutes defining the 
fiduciary duty of care of corporate directors based on an ordinary care standard. See Henry Ridgely Horsey, The 
Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 988 (1994). Former 
Justice Horsey observed: “The importance of Graham lies not in the ultimate holding, but in the fact that not until 
1963 did the Delaware Supreme Court recognize the substantial body of decisional law holding a corporate director 
to a fiduciary duty of care.” Id. at 986. 
231
 Graham, 188 A.2d at 130; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing 
Graham’s duty of care formulation). 
232
 Horsey, supra note 230, at 985–88 (examining historical progress of the duty of care in Delaware and noting that 
Graham is the first Delaware case that explicitly recognized directors’ duty to act in an informed and prudent 
manner) Before Graham, Delaware cases that mentioned directors’ duty to be informed and prudent were usually 
confined to shareholder suits asserting claim of corporate waste. Id. at 987 n.77. For example, four decades before 
Graham, the Delaware Chancery Court in Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. stated that the price in 
selling the assets of a company should reasonably be referable to “an honest exercise of sound business judgment” 
and that “a reckless indifference to the rights of others” will not be allowed to stand. 1923 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at 
*32 (Del. Ch. March 28, 1923). In Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., the Chancery Court found that 
directors’ judgment was not “unintelligent and unadvised.” 19 Del. Ch. 326, 330, 167 A. 831, 1933 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
32 (Del. Ch. 1933). In Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors will not be 
liable for waste if the value received by the corporation “brings the court within the realm in which reasonable men, 
fully informed and acting in good faith, may be expected to differ.” 91 A.2d 57, 58–59 (Del 1952). In Cottrell v. 
Pawcatuck Co., the Delaware Supreme upheld the business judgment of the directors stating that “the negotiations 
proceeded in an orderly manner, without undue haste, and resulted in an arms’-length bargain.” 128 A.2d 225, 229 
(Del. 1957). 
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oversight context but also a difficulty arises in determining these specific requirements. Graham 
itself presented such difficulty. Graham, examining directors’ duty of care in the oversight 
context, did not provide any explication of the ordinarily prudent person standard. Moreover, 
following the ordinary prudent person standard, the court employed a quite lenient standard 
when determining the due care liability of defendant directors.
233
 Thus, providing a strict 
standard of care on one hand and using permissive language when determining due care liability 
on the other hand, the Graham analysis was not very helpful to reify directors’ standard of care 
in either the decision-making or oversight context.
234
  
Directors’ standard of care in the oversight context was revisited in Caremark almost 
four decades later after Graham. Caremark, interpreting Graham through legal developments in 
the corporate field, provided the current legal framework for the standard of care in the oversight 
context. Unlike the oversight context, the standard of care in the decision-making context has 
been addressed in a long line of cases by Delaware courts. The care in the oversight context 
presented more difficult issues due to policy concerns related to corporate risk-taking. Below, the 
progress of directors’ standard of care in the decision-making context is examined in Delaware 
decisions. Following that, Caremark’s standard of care in the oversight context is visited.  
a. Decision-Making 
In the two decades after Graham, Delaware courts continued to provide no clear 
framework with respect to directors’ standard of care.
235
 The courts’ heavy emphasis on the 
                                                 
233
 The court stated that, a director will be liable “[i]f he has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously 
untrustworthy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either 
willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the burden of 
liability upon him.” Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. Although the standards of conduct and review may differ in 
corporate fiduciary law, the court’s employment of strict and lenient standards without providing any justification 
caused confusion. The Delaware Supreme Court in a later opinion criticized Graham in a footnote as follows: 
“The Graham formulation is quite confusing and unhelpful. While the opinion seems to apply a “prudent man” 
standard, three paragraphs later it speaks of director liability in terms of reckless conduct.” Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor 634 A.2d 345, 364 n.31 (Del. 1993) (citations omitted). Interestingly, however, in Briggs, one of the 
cases cited in Graham decision, the Supreme Court of the United States employed the same approach. The Supreme 
Court of the United States first stated that directors were subject to the degree of care “which ordinarily prudent and 
diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances,” and then found no liability for the defendant directors 
who failed to exercise any sort of supervision over the management. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 152, 166. 
234
 Horsey, supra note 230, at 988 (“the accomplishment [of Graham] was diminished by the tentative and almost 
begrudging manner in which the court embraced” the duty of care). 
235
 Id. at 989. 
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protection accorded to directors under the business judgment rule
236
 overshadowed directors’ 
duty to act in an informed and prudent manner. In 1967, in Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., the Delaware Chancery court stated that when reviewing a business judgment of directors 
“the court should not interfere absent a showing of ‘gross and palpable overreaching.’”
237
 In 
1970, in Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., the Delaware Supreme Court approved the Meyerson 
standard of “gross and palpable overreaching” under the business judgment rule.
238
 One year 
later, the court in Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, after reiterating the gross and palpable overreaching 
standard, stated that “[a] board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, 
and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business 
purpose.”
239
 Thus, the duty of care of directors found no place for itself within Delaware 
business judgment rule until the early 1970s.  
In a number of cases in the early 1970s, the Delaware Chancery Court required “an 
informed decision” for directors to be afforded the protection of the business judgment rule.
240
 In 
1971, the Chancery Court in Kaplan v. Centex found defendant directors to have lost the 
protection of the business judgment rule due to their failure to make an informed business 
judgment.
241
 The court stated that “[a]pplication of the rule of necessity depends upon a showing 
that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment.”
242
 The following year, the 
Chancery Court in Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker stated that grossly negligent conduct of 
directors might constitute a breach of their fiduciary obligation to shareholders.
243
 In 1974, 
plaintiff shareholders’ claim in Gimbel v. Signal Companies included a failure of the board to act 
“with informed reasonable deliberation” in selling one of the subsidiaries of the company.
244
 
Upon a careful examination of the board’s decision-making process, the Chancery Court 
                                                 
236
 The business judgment rule is the primary standard of review in the decision-making context. It is a presumption 
that directors’ make informed and disinterested decisions in good faith. If not rebutted, the business judgment rule 
protects directors from liability unless the decision amounts to waste. See infra Part C.1.  
237
 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967); see also Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487 (Del. 1966) (stating that in the 
absence of bad faith or gross abuse of discretion the courts will not interfere with the business judgment of 
directors). 
238
 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970). 
239
 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
240
 It should be noted that, before the 1970s, one Chancery Court decision explicitly required a decision to be 
informed to qualify for the business judgment rule protection.  See Mitchell, 167 A. at 833. 
241
 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971). 
242
 Id. (emphasis added). 
243
 298 A.2d 346, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972). 
244
 316 A.2d 599, 611 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).  
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concluded that the factors, some of which suggest imprudence, as a whole were not sufficient to 
pierce the business judgment standard.
245
  
In spite of Chancery Court decisions that required an informed decision under the 
business judgment rule, the general perception in the early 1980s was that Delaware courts had 
refrained from imposing a duty of care limitation on directors’ actions. Corporate scholars, 
focusing on the Delaware Supreme Court’s early formulation of the business judgment rule, 
extensively criticized Delaware courts for failing to enforce the duty of care and thereby granting 
corporate directors excessive latitude.
246
 For example, one commentator noted that, while the 
duty of care of corporate directors was “fairly straight forward and rigorous”,
247
 the duty of care 
had become “moribund” by the 1980s due to the abstention of courts to impose it.
248
 Similarly, 
another commentator depicted the duty of care as “an endangered species” because of judicial 
reluctance to apply the standard of care against directors not found to be disloyal or lacking good 
faith.
249
 In a more recent article, William Allen, a former Chancellor in Delaware, observed that 
                                                 
245
 Id. at 615. It appears that Gimbel is the first Delaware case that made a clear distinction between the duty of care 
and waste (irrationality). After finding that directors made an informed judgment, the court examined “gross 
inadequacy of the price.” The court stated: 
Thus, the ultimate question is not one of method but one of value. The method does not appear so 
bad on its face as to alter the normal legal principles which control. But hasty method which 
produces a dollar result which appears perhaps to be shocking is significant. On the basis of 
affidavits relating to value, the Court has the tentative belief that plaintiff would have a reasonable 
prospect of success on the merits since limited record indicates a gross disparity between the fair 
market value of Signal Oil … and what the Board of Directors were willing to sell the company 
for… 
Id. See infra Part C.1.a. (discussing waste). 
246
 The criticism was so harsh that the members of Delaware General Corporation Committee Law Delaware State 
Bar issued a Resource Document to defend Delaware corporation law. The Resource Document included a section 
of “Fiduciary Capacity and Limitations on the Business Judgment Rule” under which the committee defended the 
business judgment rule and its application by Delaware courts. See Resource Document on Delaware Corporation 
Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 175, 185 (1977).  
247
 Dent, supra note 229, at 645. 
248
 Id. at 646. The author observed: “When stated in the abstract, the duty of care seems to impose a meaningful 
obligation on directors and officers. In practice, however, the duty has had almost no effect on corporate 
governance…” Id. at 644–45. “[C]ourts have often described the business judgment rule without any reference to the 
duty of care and, more important, have often dismissed suits against directors on the ground of the business 
judgment rule without first inquiring whether the directors had acted reasonably and with due diligence. In some 
cases, courts have simply ignored a statutory ‘prudent man’ standard in favor of a fraud or bad faith standard under 
the business judgment rule.” Id. at 647 (footnotes omitted). According to the author, the reason for the lenient 
treatment of the courts in the field of the duty of care was “the longstanding confusion over the proper role of the 
board of directors.” Id. at 651. While statutes assigned directors to manage corporations, courts recognized that in 
practice boards do not, and could not be expected to, manage corporations and refused to impose a high standard of 
care on directors. Id. at 661. 
249
 Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions through 
the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983). Like Professor Dent, Professor Cohn argued that the 
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“it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Delaware courts, and U.S. courts more generally, 
announced but did not enforce the duty of care” until mid-1980s.
250
  
The perception that Delaware courts failed to enforce a duty of care and the related 
criticism may have stemmed from the early formulation of the business judgment rule. Delaware 
courts had initially developed the business judgment rule without a duty of care component.
251
 
Pervasive application of the rule in the decision-making context and the lack of a Delaware 
                                                 
business judgment rule was a “judicially developed doctrine that has come to preclude inquiry into the merits of 
directors’ decisions in the absence of evidence of bad faith, fraud, conflict of interest, or illegality.” Id. at 594. Cohn 
observed as follows:   
Although the doctrine began as an adjunct to duty of care standards designed to protect directors’ 
decisions against hindsight evaluation when appropriate diligence had been exercised, the doctrine 
has enveloped the primary inquiry. This approach shifts judicial emphasis from questions of 
diligence to narrow, motive-oriented factors that must be satisfied in order to overcome the 
business judgment rule’s presumption of regularity. 
Judicial retreat into the presumptive arena of the business judgment rule creates considerable 
doubt that there remains a viable shareholder action in areas other than fraud, conflict of interest, 
disloyalty, or the disclosure concerns of the securities laws. So common is the disposition of cases 
by reference to the business judgment rule that a casual observer could readily conclude that the 
obligation of care and the defensive presumption of the business judgment rule are mirror images 
of a unitary standard. It is doubtful whether there still exists a sanction for lack of care, 
unadulterated by self-enrichment or other opprobrious behavior. If the reasonable care standard is 
no longer a viable means for corporate governance, it should be removed from the common law 
and the statute books as a misleading shibboleth. If the standard is economically or pragmatically 
viable and relevant to shareholder interests, however, its preservation must be more forcefully 
advocated. 
Id. at 594–95. Professor Cohn pointed out that the reason behind a strong business judgment rule and a weak duty of 
care is “judicial concern about the ambiguity of due care standards and the severity of available sanctions.” Id.  
250
 William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware 
Corporate Law, 4 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER 06/2008, at 11 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105591. In another article, Allen, joined by two co-authors, 
observed as follows:  
[W]e note that courts deciding Delaware corporate law cases have only recently viewed the 
director's duty of care as being judicially enforceable. Indeed, it is arguable that the pre- Van 
Gorkom case law reflected a judicial aversion to reviewing director action for any purpose other 
than identifying (and remedying) breaches of the duty of loyalty. The pre-1985 Delaware (and the 
American and English) tradition was highly deferential to decisions made by well-motivated 
corporate directors who acted without any conflicting self-interest. Judicial decisions that 
addressed director liability for non-self-dealing transactions suggested that the imposition of 
liability would require a showing akin to subjective bad faith. Even though the law of corporations 
continued to articulate the standard of conduct expected of directors in ordinary negligence terms 
(the ‘ordinarily prudent person’ standard), that normative articulation was different from the 
standard of judicial review which required a showing of far more egregious conduct to impose 
liability. 
Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 450–51 (emphasis in original).  
251
 See supra notes 235–39 & accompanying text. See also Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 
BUS. LAW. 625, 639 (2000) (stating that the concept of the business judgment rule in Delaware initially developed 
without a direct link, functionally or doctrinally, to the director duty of due care). It should be noted that the claims 
the courts addressed in Meyerson, Getty Oil, and Sinclair were not related to the duty of care, and this may be the 
reason for the courts’ failure emphasize the duty of care element of the business judgment rule.  
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Supreme Court decision that explicitly recognized a duty of care component of the rule led many 
to think that Delaware courts applied the business judgment rule at the expense of directors’ duty 
of care. In the early 1980s, the business judgment rule was understood as a common law concept 
to preclude a judicial inquiry into directors’ duty of care.
252
 As one prominent member of 
Delaware Bar acknowledged, however, this was a misunderstanding of Delaware law, and the 
misunderstanding stemmed from Delaware decisions.
253
 
In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis
254
 broke new ground in terms 
of defining the relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule.
255
 The court 
clarified the relation of the duty of care to the application of the business judgment rule by 
stating: 
[T]o invoke the [business judgment] rule’s protection directors have a duty to inform themselves, 
prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. 
Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their 
duties.
256
 
 
With this formulation of rule, the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly recognized the duty of care 
component of the business judgment rule. The Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson invalidated 
the misperception that the business judgment rule immunized directors from the responsibility to 
exercise a duty of care.  Contrary to the misperception, the court provided in a clear manner that 
                                                 
252
 Horsey, supra note 230, at 977 (“Those who surveyed the duty of care case law in this country before the mid-
eighties found an infertile field and were in nearly unanimous agreement as to their findings: the business judgment 
rule had been applied in such a manner as to constitute an almost per se bar to shareholder claims of directors’ 
breach of their fiduciary duty of care.”) (footnote omitted). 
253
 See Arsht, supra note 15, at 93. Arsht observed as follows: 
[T]he business judgment rule is today misunderstood, at least if one is to judge from the comments 
of its critics, who are, in the main, distrustful of state corporate laws and are led to suggest that the 
business judgment rule promises more in the way of immunity from liability than in reality it does. 
The misunderstanding stems, I suspect, both from the general failure to distinguish the business 
judgment rule from the presumptions and limitations that surround the rule’s application and from 
the tendency of courts to use loose language in expressing the rule.  Subsuming the presumptions 
and limitations under the term ‘business judgment rule’ leads to confusion because the single term 
is then employed with reference to wholly different aspects of the rule's application, which are 
governed by disparate legal principles. Judicial penchant for colorful phrases such as ‘gross 
negligence,’ ‘gross abuse of discretion,’ and ‘palpable overreaching’ simply fuels the fire. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  
254
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
255
 Cf. Johnson, supra note 251, at 636, 641–44 (criticizing Aronson for miscapturing the relationship between the 
duty of care and the business judgment rule by arguing that, while there is a limited relationship with the business 
judgment rule and the duty of care, the duty of care is an independent concept and not a component of the business 
judgment rule). 
256
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
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directors must exercise an informed judgment to be afforded the protection of the business 
judgment rule.  
In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court also undertook the difficult task to define the 
standard of care of corporate directors in the decision-making context. The court provided an 
articulate standard of care expected from directors under the business judgment rule.
257
 Before 
Aronson, the standard of care was built upon a reasonably prudent person standard. The 
reasonably prudent person standard, however, was originally designed for personal injury 
litigation, and it did not easily fit into the corporate director context. The abstract and strict 
nature of a reasonableness standard was not very helpful to determine the expected conduct from 
directors in dealing with complex corporate matters. In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court 
specified the standard of care in the corporate director context by stating that directors are 
required to “inform themselves … of all material information reasonably available to them.”
258
 
Also, the court wisely placed this articulation under the business judgment rule because the 
justifications of the rule explain why the reasonableness standard is not compatible with 
corporate director context. The court avoided the reasonableness standard and related doctrinal 
problems simply by attaching the duty of care to the business judgment rule. In so doing, the 
Aronson court removed the directors’ standard of care from the realm of tort law jurisprudence 
and created its own jurisprudence in the law of directors’ duty of care.
259
  Thus, Aronson 
formulation of the business judgment rule was clearly a step forward in the evolution of 
Delaware’s duty of care law. 
Indeed, the Aronson court’s articulation of the standard of care in the decision-making 
context caused a doctrinal confusion. Commentators interpreted the Aronson standard of care to 
                                                 
257
 Horsey, supra note 230, at 996 (stating that “the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis had placed a 
concept of the standard of care expected of directors into Delaware’s business judgment rule”). 
258
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
259
 Beginning with Aronson, Delaware courts built their own jurisprudence in the duty of care law. See e.g., Cede & 
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 351 (Del. 1993) The Cede court reversed the trial court’s tort law-based 
analysis that required the plaintiff to prove resulting injury from a duty of care breach. The Cede court also stated 
that “[t]he reasonable person standard lacks precision. Although it may appear to protect only director actions that 
do not constitute simple negligence, in practice it protects all director action not constituting gross negligence.” Id. 
at 364 n.31; Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000) (correcting the trial court’s “reasonably informed” 
formulation of the informational element of the business judgment rule); see also1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 438 
(observing that Delaware case law rejects the reasonably prudent person standard). 
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include two distinct elements; procedural and substantive.
260
 The procedural element required 
directors to “inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information 
reasonably available to them.”
261
 A substantive element followed this threshold requirement: 
“Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their 
duties.”
262
 An implicit two-pronged care analysis was found in a later decision of the court as 
well.
263
  
What is not found in the commentary or court decisions is an articulate definition of the 
substantive element of the duty of care.
264
 What exactly does substantive care mean, and how 
exactly does it differ from procedural care? If substantive care is independent from, and not 
related to, the decision-making process, then it necessarily refers to the reasonableness of a 
decision. In other words, substantive care necessarily relates to the substantive quality of a 
decision. In that case, courts should review the substantive merits of a decision to determine the 
availability of the business judgment rule protection. However, if the substantive quality of a 
                                                 
260
 See, e.g., Quillen, supra note 198, at 497 (“The duty of care subdivides into two elements as well, highlighted, 
fortunately, by the Supreme Court’s language in Aronson and also by the Trans Union opinion.”); Johnson, supra 
note 251, at 641 (stating that Aronson rightly distinguishes informedness and care). 
261
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
262
 Id. 
263
 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). After reiterating Aronson formulation, the court stated 
that the standard of review (gross negligence) articulated in Aronson is “also the proper standard for determining 
whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one.” Id. In so holding, the court 
implicitly held that the duty of care includes two separate elements; substantive and procedural.  
264
 A two-pronged duty of care formulation is not found in pre-Aronson decisional law as well. Before Aronson, 
Delaware courts reviewed alleged due care breaches for determining whether directors acted “without information 
that they can be said to have passed an unintelligent and unadvised judgment.” Mitchell, 167 A. at 833. Accordingly, 
Delaware courts only examined the directors’ decision making process in reviewing due care claims, and they did 
not require a substantive care apart from an adequate decision-making process. The substantive quality of a decision 
was also subject to judicial review in Delaware cases. However, the substantive quality of a decision was not 
reviewed to determine the substantive care. Rather, Delaware courts reviewed the substantive quality of a decision 
in a very limited context (waste or irrationality) and only to determine whether the decision could be attributed to 
any rational business purpose. See Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 615. It appears that the waste (irrationality) standard is the 
outer limit of the managerial authority bestowed upon directors by corporate statutes. Even though directors exercise 
due care (whether it be process or substantive care), they are responsible for a decision that is so out of pale that 
constitutes waste or that cannot be attributable any rational business purpose. Furthermore, most of the cases cited in 
the Aronson decision used verbal formulae—such as “fraud,” “gross overreaching,” “bad faith,” “misconduct,”—
sounding in lack of good faith rather than lack of (substantive) due care. See Aronson, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6.  
Therefore, Aronson was the first Delaware decision that made a two-pronged duty of care analysis. See Johnson, 
supra note 251, at 641 (noting that the Aronson formulation raised the question whether “the ‘informed’ element [is] 
simply one aspect of, or is it the same as, the concept of due care”). It should be also noted that after the enactment 
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, Delaware courts conceptualized the waste 
(irrationality) standard under good faith. See infra Part C.1.b. (examining the waste/irrationality standard). See also 
infra notes 270–75 (examining the court decisions with respect to the informational element of the business 
judgment rule). Thus, after the enactment of section 102(b)(7), Delaware courts basically turned back to the pre-
Aronson business judgment rule and waste (irrationality) analysis.  
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decision is reviewed for its reasonableness, the business judgment rule would have no utility in 
fiduciary analysis at all.
265
 One may disagree with that conclusion by arguing that courts do not 
review the reasonableness of a decision; they apply a lenient standard in reviewing substantive 
care. However, that is exactly what the business judgment rule does. Where the business 
judgment rule is not rebutted, the substantive quality of a decision is reviewed under the lenient 
standard of waste (irrationality).
266
 Substantive care with a lax standard of review (e.g., gross 
negligence) merely presents a different formulation of the traditional business judgment rule. 
Therefore, if Aronson and Van Gorkom included a substantive requirement under the business 
judgment rule, it probably referred to the outer limit of the business judgment rule (waste or 
rational business purpose test), not to substantive due care.
267
 
One may further argue that substantive care is not related to the substantive quality of a 
decision, and it rather refers to mental care when making a decision. However, such care concept 
is implicit in the procedural element of the duty of care. Procedural care requires that directors to 
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 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). The Caremark court 
observed as follows:  
[C]ompliance with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by 
reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from 
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed. … To employ a different 
rule—one that permitted an ‘objective’ evaluation of the [substance of a] decision—would expose 
directors to substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, in the 
long-run, be injurious to investor interests. 
Id. at 967–68 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
266
 In Delaware, the standard of care is nominally reviewed under a gross negligence standard. However, Delaware 
courts defined gross negligence as ‘“reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of 
stockholders’ or actions which are ‘without the bounds of reason.”’ Disney, 907 A.2d at 750. See also Rabkin v. 
Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986) (citing Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 
261 (Del. Ch. 1929) and Gimbel 316 A.2d at 615) (providing the same definition for a gross negligence standard). 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court provided the same definition as an example of bad faith in In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig. 906 A.2d 27, 67 n.111 (2006). Logically then, the gross negligence standard in reviewing the 
substance of a decision is same as waste (rational business purpose test) which implies bad faith conduct. See infra 
Part C.1.b. (examining waste standard). It should be also noted that the gross negligence standard with respect to the 
decision-making process is not as lax as Disney and Rabkin defined. Therefore, the nature of gross negligence 
standard in process and substance review is different. See infra Part C.1.a (examining the standard of gross 
negligence in process review). 
267
 It should be noted that neither Aronson nor Van Gorkom referred to the “rational business purpose test” (waste) 
of the business judgment rule in their analysis. However, before Aronson and Van Gorkom, Delaware courts made a 
clear distinction between the duty of care and the rational business purpose test. In Gimbel, which was cited in Van 
Gorkom, the court first found that the directors’ decision was an informed one, and then reviewed the decision under 
the rational business purpose test to address the claim concerning “gross inadequacy” of the sale price of the 
company. See Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 615. Therefore, if Aronson and Van Gorkom required a substantive element 
under the business judgment rule, that probably referred to the “rational business purpose” (waste) requirement, not 
to substantive care.  
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employ an adequate decision-making process. An adequate process requires directors not only 
inform themselves of material information but also consider the material information before 
making a decision. An adequate decision-making process is not limited to gathering material 
information. Directors should review and discuss the information they gathered. In reviewing the 
decision-making process of directors, courts examine board meetings to determine whether 
directors deliberated on the available material information as well.
268
 Indeed, a decision-making 
process solely limited to being informed of all material information, with no requirement to 
consider that information, would serve no purpose at all. Therefore, there is no need for a distinct 
substantive care other than what is implicit in the decision-making process. A slight modification 
of the Aronson standard of care would be sufficient to clarify this point. The Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in a later ruling may be helpful. In Brehm v. Eisner, the court provided: “[I]n 
making business decisions, directors must consider all material information reasonably 
available.”
269
 
 The Delaware Supreme Court may have meant something more than strict procedural 
care in Aronson. It is questionable, however, if the court’s formulation required a distinct 
substantive care apart from an adequate decision-making process. This point shows that, 
although it was a big step forward in the evolution of the duty of care law, the Aronson analysis 
was not crystal clear. The court’s subsequent analysis in Van Gorkom muddied the waters even 
more. Nevertheless, interpreting Aronson to require a distinct substantive care, at the minimum, 
would taint the clarity of Aronson’s standard of care in the decision-making context. 
Regardless of what the court really meant in Aronson and the related doctrinal confusion, 
the court in its later rulings clarified that the duty of care is process due care only. In Cede v. 
Technicolor, the Delaware Supreme Court first reiterated the Aronson formulation by stating that 
the business judgment rule presumption may be invoked by directors “who have both adequately 
informed themselves before voting on the business transaction at hand and acted with requisite 
care.”
270
 The court then stated: “The duty of the directors of a company to act on an informed 
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intentionally truncated substantive care and arguing that there is no need for substantive care if a decision is 
reviewed under the entire fairness standard where the business judgment rule is rebutted because after the enactment 
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basis … forms the duty of care element of the business judgment rule.”
271
 The court also stated 
various times that reaching an uninformed decision constitutes a breach of the directors’ duty of 
care.
272
 Accordingly, the court equated the standard of care in the decision-making context with 
the informational element of the business judgment rule. In Brehm, the court explicitly stated that 
there is no substantive due care requirement under the business judgment rule, and courts do not 
measure, weigh, or quantify directors’ judgment to determine its reasonableness.
273
 The court 
then stated: “Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”
274
 Therefore, 
directors’ standard of care in the decision-making context requires directors to employ an 
adequate decision-making process.
275
 
Generally, in order to exercise an informed business judgment, directors should pay 
attention and devote sufficient time to corporate matters, prepare and inform themselves on 
proposed corporate actions, and review all material information and ask questions prior to 
making a decision. These activities include reading materials and engaging in other preparation 
before meetings, asking questions to management or advisors, requesting legal or other expert 
advice if required, ensuring that all information significant to a decision is available to the board 
and has been considered, and when relevant, bringing the director’s own knowledge and 
experience to bear.
276
 In order to comply with the duty of care, the meeting of a board should be 
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informative and should encourage free exchange of ideas and active and meaningful participation 
of directors.
277
  
Nevertheless, the standard of care does not compel directors to exercise the best practices 
of corporate governance. In Disney, the Chancery Court emphasized that the best practices of 
corporate governance include compliance with fiduciary duties, but compliance with fiduciary 
duties may not be enough to satisfy the best practices of corporate governance.
278
 The fiduciary 
duty of care encourages directors to aspire to ideal corporate governance practices, but directors 
do not need to achieve perfection to comply with fiduciary requirements.
279
 As one commentator 
put it, “the duty of care is more aspirational than consequential.”
280
  
Also, the duty to be informed in a particular situation depends on a variety of factors such 
as the scale of the decision, the cost involved, and the time available to make it.
281
 What 
constitutes an informed decision can only be determined by the context of a situation.
282
 Every 
business decision is unique and there are no exact rules that must be followed in every decision-
making process. Thus, whether directors exercised a proper attention before making a corporate 
decision depends on the circumstances and facts of a particular case.
283
 
b. Oversight    
In the oversight context, the standard of care requires directors to monitor corporate 
business and affairs adequately and take actions if necessary. Corporations are large and complex 
entities, and the boards of directors are practically not able to deal with daily operation of 
businesses. While they retain the ultimate responsibility, the boards delegate many of their 
managerial functions, formally or informally, to board committees and to the officers.
284
 To the 
extent that they delegate the authority, the responsibility of the boards becomes to exercise a 
proper oversight over the delegates in managing business and affairs of the corporation.
285
 To 
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fulfill this responsibility, the board must employ appropriate information and reporting systems 
in the corporation.   
As indicated earlier, the directors’ duty to perform an adequate oversight over a 
corporation was addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Company.
286
 In Graham, the plaintiffs alleged that directors were liable for 
failure to prevent violations of federal antitrust laws by corporate employees that resulted in the 
corporation’s liability.
287
 The plaintiffs did not claim that directors had knowledge or suspicion 
of illegal conduct; rather they claimed that directors should have implemented a monitoring 
system in the corporation that would have alarmed them in advance to prevent it.
288
 Based on an 
old decision of the United States Supreme Court,
289
 the court held that “directors are entitled to 
rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on 
suspicion that something is wrong.”
290
 The court stated that if directors have no reason to suspect 
that a wrongdoing exists, they are not required to install and operate a corporate system of 
monitoring.
291
 The court found that there was no ground for director suspicion and thus 
concluded that directors were not liable for the misconduct leading to the corporate loss.
292
  
Four decades later, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed directors’ responsibilities in 
the oversight context in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.
293
 Although 
Caremark articulates a standard sounding in lack of good faith,
294
 it provides a helpful 
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 The court exonerated directors from liability in notably colorful terms by stating:  
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framework in delineating directors’ responsibilities in the oversight context. In Caremark, even 
though the board had a functioning committee charged with overseeing corporate compliance,
295
 
the plaintiffs alleged that the directors breached their duty of care by allowing a situation to 
develop and continue which resulted in corporate loss.
296
 According to the complaint, the 
directors should have known that employees of the corporation were involved in violations of the 
federal Anti-Referral Payments Law, and they should have acted accordingly to prevent it.
297
 
Reassessing the holding of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Graham, the Court of Chancery 
interpreted Graham to mean that “absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards 
nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of 
employees and the honesty of their dealings on the company’s behalf.”
298
  
The court first noted legal developments in corporate arena on state and federal level 
during decades between Graham and Caremark such as Delaware jurisprudence in take-over 
cases
299
 and adoption of Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.
300
 Accordingly, the Court of 
Chancery concluded that, in order to satisfy the obligation to be adequately informed concerning 
the corporate business and affairs, directors must assure existence of appropriate information and 
reporting systems. These systems should be designed to provide senior management and the 
board timely and accurate information respecting material acts, events or conditions within the 
corporation, including compliance with applicable statutes and regulations.
301
 Having 
implemented a reporting system, directors should follow up on the information flowing to them, 
and take necessary actions to prevent corporate wrongdoing. Also, if there are other alerting 
circumstances or unusual facts to put directors on suspicion of corporate wrongdoing, directors 
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should take appropriate action.
302
 Thus, in order to satisfy the oversight function, directors are 
under a duty to establish information and reporting systems and to review the information 
flowing through them. 
Directors’ oversight responsibility does not require them “to possess detailed information 
about all aspects of the operation” of a corporation.
303
 Courts recognized the fact that a reporting 
system employed by directors cannot totally remove the possibility of wrongdoing in the 
corporation.
304
 Directors’ responsibility is then to exercise a good faith judgment to employ a 
reporting system which the board concludes is adequate. Directors have authority to determine 
the level of details that are appropriate for information and reporting systems in a corporation.
305
 
It is also within the directors’ authority to evaluate the cost-benefit analysis of a given 
information system and to decide whether to install a reporting system on a given matter. 
Directors’ good faith, disinterested decisions concerning the specifics or suitability of a reporting 
system are subject to business judgment rule protection.
306
  
More recently, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed directors’ oversight responsibility 
in In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litigation
307
 in the context of risk-monitoring. There, 
the complaint asserted that directors had breached their oversight duty under Caremark by 
failing to monitor Citigroup’s excessive business risk in the subprime lending market which 
resulted in tremendous loss for the corporation.
308
 The court observed that, while directors have a 
responsibility to monitor a corporation’s business risk, risk-monitoring falls within the realm of 
the business judgment rule rather than Caremark standard because it is inextricably related to 
directors’ business judgment.
309
 In other words, risk-monitoring is inextricably related to 
corporate risk-taking, and corporate risk-taking is subject to the protection of the business 
judgment rule. Reviewing risk-monitoring under oversight duties would inevitably lead to a 
hindsight evaluation of directors’ business judgment, and directors’ would be held unduly 
responsible “for failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk.”
310
 Therefore, 
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director conduct that allegedly constitutes failure of risk-monitoring is not subject to oversight 
review.
311
  
When performing their functions, directors must inevitably depend on the information 
provided them by others. Directors themselves cannot perform a detailed inquiry on every 
corporate matter due to the complexity of such matters and the large-scale of corporations. The 
law recognizes this fact and protects directors’ good faith reliance on reports made by others. In 
performing their duties and functions, directors are entitled to rely in good faith on the 
information, opinions, reports, and statements of the board committees, the corporation’s officers 
and employees, and outside experts, who directors reasonably believe merit confidence, and who 
have been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.
312
  Directors’ reliance 
is protected as long as there are no “alerting circumstances or unusual facts” that suggest further 
inquiry or that should put directors on notice that such reliance is unwarranted.
313
 Thus, when 
exercising due care in performing their functions, directors’ reasonable reliance on the 
information that is provided them by others is protected. 
In Brehm, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that a board’s reliance on a report in 
performing their duty of care is not protected if: 
(a) the directors did not in fact rely on the expert; (b) their reliance was not in good faith; (c) they 
did not reasonably believe that the expert’s advice was within the expert’s professional 
competence; (d) the expert was not selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the 
corporation, and the faulty selection process was attributable to the directors; (e) the subject matter 
… that was material and reasonably available was so obvious that the board’s failure to consider it 
was grossly negligent regardless of the expert’s advice or lack of advice; or (f) [ ] the decision of 
the Board was so unconscionable as to constitute waste or fraud.
314
 
 
This section examined the development of the standard of care in the decision-making 
and oversight context in Delaware. Two other prominent resources pertinent to directors’ 
standard of care are the Model Business Corporation Act (Model Act) and Principles of 
Corporate Governance (PCG). These two resources provide frameworks for codification of 
directors’ duty of care. They also provide a well-developed explication of the standard of care. 
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The next section will provide a brief overview of the standard of care under the Model Act and 
PCG.  
2. Principles of Corporate Governance and Model Business Corporation Act 
In general, articulation of the standard of care under PCG and the Model Act is similar to 
Delaware’s early standard of care (Graham). PCG and the Model Act build directors’ standard of 
care upon the reasonableness concept and then attempt to alter it to fit the corporate context 
through different formulations and commentary.
315
  
 Under PCG §4.01(a), directors have a duty to perform their functions “with the care that 
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and 
under similar circumstances.”
316
 The Model Act §8.30(b) provides that directors, “when 
becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to 
their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position 
would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”
317
 Thus, differences exist in 
the formulation of the standard of care under PCG and the Model Act.  
In §8.30(b) of the Model Act, the phrase “ordinarily prudent person” is omitted while it is 
included in PCG.
318
 The official comment to §8.30(b) of the Model Act explains why this phrase 
is omitted as follows:  
The phrase ‘ordinarily prudent person’ constitutes a basic frame of reference grounded in the field 
of tort law and provides a primary benchmark for determining negligence. For this reason, its use 
in the standard of care for directors, suggesting that negligence is the proper determinant for 
measuring deficient (and thus actionable) conduct, has caused confusion and misunderstanding. 
Accordingly, the phrase ‘ordinarily prudent person’ has been removed from the Model Act’s 
standard of care and in its place ‘a person in a like position’ has been substituted.
 319
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Also, the Model Act provides that, in the decision-making context, directors should exercise due 
care “when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function.”
320
 With this 
formulation, the Model Act explicitly recognizes that the standard of care is applicable only to 
the decision-making process, and it has no application with respect to the substance of a 
decision.
321
 In other words, the standard of care is not result oriented and it is not related to the 
correctness of a decision.   
The Model Act and PCG require directors to exercise the amount of care that a person in 
a like position and under similar circumstances would exercise. “In a like position” indicates the 
degree of care which would be used by a person if he or she were a director of a particular 
corporation.
322
 Responsibilities of a particular director will vary depending on the tasks that have 
been imposed by law and by the corporation.
323
 For example, if a director is on a board 
committee, he or she is subject to special responsibility for the performance of that committee’s 
functions in addition to basic director responsibilities.
324
 Also, the special skills, background, or 
expertise of a director may be relevant in evaluating that director’s compliance with the duty of 
care.
325
 However, lacking general experience or personal incompetence does not excuse directors 
from exercising their responsibilities.
326
 By accepting a directorship position, a director accepts 
the duty of care responsibility for legally mandated tasks.
327
 If, for example, a prominent 
business man has a permanent illness which prevents him from being involved in director 
activities, and he still agrees to serve as a director in a corporation with the limited purpose of 
advising the corporation for certain business practices, he will not be excused from general 
director responsibilities because of his special health condition.
328
 The phrase “under similar 
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circumstances” recognizes the “circumstances” surrounding the specific conduct at issue in a 
given case.
329
 
PCG requires directors to exercise the degree of care that a person in a like position 
“would reasonably be expected to exercise,” and the Model Act requires directors to act with the 
degree of care that a person in a like position “would reasonably believe appropriate.” PCG’s 
reasonable care (reasonably be expected to exercise) does not intend to minimize special 
characteristics associated with corporate directorship, and it should be applied “with balance, 
fairness, and a realistic sense of what may be reasonably expected, in given circumstances.”
330
 In 
other words, reasonable care under PCG does not refer to a tort law-based standard of care, it 
rather points out the requisite care in the corporate context.
331
 Similarly, reasonableness (would 
reasonably believe appropriate) under the Model Act does not refer to a tort law-based standard 
of care. Rather, it indicates that a director should recognize, in terms of the appropriate degree of 
care, the array of possible options that a director with the basic director attributes would 
recognize, and make a selection from the range of options within the realm of reason.
332
 “[A] 
decision that is so removed from the realm of reason, or is so unreasonable, that it falls outside 
the permissible bounds of sound discretion … will not satisfy the standard.”
333
  
The standard of care in the Model Act and PCG requires directors to exercise due care 
when performing a general oversight over the corporation as well. Directors have an affirmative 
obligation to assure that appropriate information and reporting systems are in place to monitor 
corporate activities for the purposes of legal compliance and internal control.
334
 There are no set 
formulas for oversight procedures that can be applied in every corporation.
335
 The size of the 
corporation, the diversity of its business operations, and other similar factors may be relevant 
when determining oversight systems.
336
 In any case, directors especially should be concerned 
about appropriate and effective law compliance programs. The corporation’s record of law 
compliance in the past, its interfaces with the law, the competence and experience of corporate 
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counsel, and the cost of procedures should be considered when establishing law compliance 
programs.
337
  
In addition, directors should make inquiry when suspicious situations arise in the 
corporation.
338
 However, the duty to exercise care with respect to oversight function does not 
require directors to make “proactive inquiries searching out system inadequacies or 
noncompliance.”
339
 While directors should be attentive to their functions and obligations, they 
are not expected to detect the problems in the corporation in the absence of unusual 
circumstances that obviously require special attention.
340
 PCG §4.01(a) (1) provides that the duty 
of care “includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, an inquiry when, but only when, 
the circumstances would alert a reasonable director or officer to the need therefor. The extent of 
such inquiry shall be such as the director or officer reasonably believes to be necessary.”
341
 
While directors are under a duty of care when performing decision-making and oversight 
functions, they almost invariably have to rely on performance, judgments, and documents made 
or prepared by other persons or board committees. The Model Act and PCG recognize this point 
and provide that directors are entitled to rely on performance of board functions by persons to 
whom the functions are delegated, and rely on the information, opinions, reports, statements, 
decisions, and judgments prepared or made by delegatees.
342
 The protection of directors’ reliance 
applies to all responsibilities of the board except to the extent that delegation is expressly 
prohibited by the law.
343
 Moreover, directors who delegate their functions should carry out the 
delegation in accordance with the standard of care. “[D]irectors may not abdicate their 
responsibilities and avoid accountability simply by delegating authority to others.”
344
 Directors 
should use reasonable care in the delegation to and supervision of the delegatees.
345
 Reasonable 
care includes appraisal of the capabilities and diligence of the delegatee in light of his or her 
expertise and the review of reports concerning delegatee’s activities.
346
 Directors should also 
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338
 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a)(1) cmt. (a). 
339
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reasonably believe that the reliance on delegatees is warranted.
347
 In other words, directors 
should believe that officers or employees of the corporation are reliable and competent in the 
functions they perform and that the members of board committees merit confidence.
348
 If 
directors have actual knowledge, or if there are circumstances that should lead reasonable 
directors to have knowledge, that the reliance is unwarranted, and the reliance on delegatees will 
not be protected.
349
 Thus, a director who has responsibility for the act of others fulfills this 
responsibility if the standard of care is met with respect to delegation of the board’s functions.
350
 
C. The Standard of Review: Decision-Making; the Business Judgment Rule 
1. Statement and Effect of the Business Judgment Rule  
The business judgment rule is the primary standard of judicial review of director conduct 
in the decision-making context. The rule has been developed by judges over years, and it 
provides a broad and well-established case law concept in corporate law.
351
 The business 
judgment rule standard of review includes three distinct inquiries: a review of directors’ financial 
interest in a corporate decision, a review of directors’ subjective motivation, and an objective 
review of the process by which directors reached their decision.
352
 If the directors’ decision 
passes muster under this form of judicial review, courts will not interfere with the business 
judgment of directors as long as it can be attributable to any rational business purpose.  
The business judgment rule has two effects: first, it insulates business decisions made by 
directors from judicial intervention; and second, it immunizes directors from personal liability.
353
 
The rule upholds institutional authority of boards and protects directors from monetary liability 
                                                 
347
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348
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 The concept of the rule was expressed in judicial decisions in the United States about 180 years ago. See Arsht, 
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 See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. C.A. 8358, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *28 (Del. Ch. June 21, 
1991). 
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 1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 16. See also Branson, supra note 213, at 634 (stating that some courts and 
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of the business judgment rule, not the rule itself). See also Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the American 
Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
609, 611–12 (1984). The author makes a distinction between two functions of the rule, and provides two different 
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However, this doctrinal distinction does not imply a different application in practice as the author admits that “the 
essential elements of rule and doctrine are the same” Id. 
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for their actions “in all but most extreme circumstances” to encourage risk taking by directors. 
The rule prevents courts from examining the substantive merits of directors’ decisions if they 
make honest, informed, and unselfish business decisions.
354
  In other words, it prevents a fact 
finder from second-guessing decisions of directors in hindsight and holding them liable simply 
because their decision had unsuccessful outcomes.
355
 Even though the outcome of their decision 
may be unfortunate, directors will not be held liable in damages for honest mistakes of judgment 
or for conduct that might be seen imprudent or erroneous in hindsight, as long as the decision can 
be attributed to any rational business purpose.
356
 
When directors’ fiduciary conduct is challenged in a court, the business judgment rule 
governs judicial review of director action. In Delaware, and in most other states,
357
 the business 
judgment rule operates as a presumption that directors are “faithful to their fiduciary duties.”
358
 
Delaware law presumes that “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”
359
 The party challenging a decision has the burden to rebut the 
presumption by showing the failure of directors to comply with at least one of the rule’s 
preconditions.
360
 Accordingly, under the business judgment rule, courts examine a board 
decision only to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged and proven facts to overcome the 
presumption.
361
 If a plaintiff is able to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, the 
substantive merits of the decision are scrutinized by courts for determining directors’ liability. 
Concisely, the business judgment rule protects directors and their decisions from legal 
attack if: (1) directors made a conscious decision or judgment; (2) they were free from disabling 
conflicts of interest; (3) they made an informed decision; (4) and they acted in good faith.
362
 If 
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 Hecker, supra note 26, at 956.  
355
 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 260 (Del. 2000) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 
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 1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 18. 
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 1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 13. 
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directors’ conduct satisfies these conditions, courts examine the decision made by directors only 
to determine whether it has a rational basis.
363
 Accordingly, the business judgment rule is a 
standard which entails only slight judicial review of the substantive quality of business 
decisions.
364
 Alternatively it could be called a standard of non-review because it precludes courts 
from reviewing the merits of a business decision that directors made.
365
   
The place of the business judgment rule in the literature of corporate law is considerable. 
The concept of the rule has been invoked in countless legal decisions, and courts’ interpretations 
of the rule in these decisions have been somewhat different.
366
 Nevertheless, courts apply the 
business judgment rule generally to refrain from reviewing substantive merits of business 
decisions except in extreme circumstances. Under the business judgment rule, courts recognize 
directors’ statutory authority to manage a corporation.
367
 Judges recognize that corporate statutes 
provide directors broad discretion in making decisions; therefore, they are generally reluctant to 
substitute their own judgment or shareholders’ judgment for that of the board. Business decisions 
are best determined by the good faith judgments of disinterested directors, men and women with 
business acumen elected by shareholders for their skill at making such decisions.
368
 Hence, the 
business judgment rule aims to “protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial 
power granted” to corporate directors.
369
 
Accordingly, courts do not evaluate the substantive merits of a decision unless directors 
make an uninformed decision, have personal interest in the subject matter of the decision, do not 
act in good faith, or act in a manner that cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose.
370
 
The fact that a decision is protected under the business judgment rule does not indicate that the 
decision was correct or was the best decision for the corporation; rather, by preventing judicial 
examination of the substance of the decision, the business judgment rule reinforces the 
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institutional authority of the board of directors in corporate structure. As the court observed in 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, judges will not “control the policy or business methods of a corporation 
although it may be seen that a wiser policy might be adopted and the business more successful if 
other methods were pursued.”
371
 Thus, where the business judgment rule is applicable, the courts 
will uphold the decision of the board as long as it is within the limits of rationality.
372
 
The business judgment rule directs judicial inquiry where directors’ fiduciary conduct is 
challenged. The rule is not an abstract concept to recognize directorial authority; rather, it 
includes certain principles and procedures to assure that directors’ fiduciary liability does not 
intrude on boards’ statutory authority. The rule “operates as both a procedural guide for litigants 
and a substantive rule of law.”
373
 Thus, the business judgment rule pervades every aspect of 
director fiduciary law.  
Not surprisingly, the relationship between the business judgment rule and fiduciary duties 
of directors has been the subject of tremendous scholarly commentary. Some scholars criticized 
courts for not providing sufficient protection under the business judgment rule, while others 
criticized them for providing excessive protection. Some other scholars pointed out deficiencies 
in the formulation of the business judgment rule. For example, it has been argued that the 
presumption formulation of the rule is problematic. 
The business judgment rule concept has been in use in Delaware for about a century.
374
 
Delaware courts formulated the concept of the rule as “presumption” long before they named it 
“the business judgment rule,”
375
 and today the presumption formulation of the rule dominates 
corporate law. As a rule of evidence, it creates a presumption that directors act on informed 
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their action is in the best interests of the 
corporation.
376
 Accordingly, the burden is on the plaintiff challenging the action “to establish 
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facts rebutting the presumption.”
377
 Commentators contest the presumption aspect of the rule,
378
 
arguing that, under traditional rules of pleading, in any case that the business judgment rule 
would apply the party challenging director action would already bear the initial burden of proof 
to show the faulty performance of directors.
379
 Therefore, the business judgment rule “assigns 
plaintiff a burden it already had.”
380
 With or without the business judgment rule, a plaintiff 
alleging a fiduciary violation must carry the burden of showing the facts that result in 
violation.
381
 Some commentators concluded that the procedural aspect of the rule adds nothing to 
the burden of a plaintiff to prove a violation of a fiduciary duty.
382
 As one commentator put it, 
although the “presumption” formulation in fiduciary analysis is “a sound statement of legal 
principle,” it is debatable if this statement of principle should be regarded as the business 
judgment rule.
383
 
                                                 
presumption applies “when there is no evidence of ‘fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal 
profit or betterment’ on the part of the directors.” Id. (footnote omitted). Under this formulation, good faith, fraud 
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While some commentators completely reject the presumption formulation of the rule and 
call it trivial,
384
 other commentators state that Delaware courts use the word “presumption” to 
mean something more than the allocation of the burden of proof.
385
 According to Balotti and 
Hanks, Delaware courts use the presumption formulation to indicate that an increased amount of 
evidence is required to show directors’ failure in complying with the business judgment rule’s 
elements.
386
 A more modest explanation found in PCG commentary provides that the 
presumption formulation of the rule “correctly signifies that no inference of dereliction of duty 
can or should be drawn, for example, from the fact that a corporation has suffered a business 
reversal.”
387
 In other words, a showing of corporate loss is not sufficient for a plaintiff to satisfy 
his or her burden to prove a fiduciary violation. The presumption formulation also indicates that 
the business judgment rule is not a defense that directors should invoke to protect themselves in 
case of faulty performance; rather it is a presumption to protect them at the outset.
388
 Also, laying 
out the business judgment rule as a presumption introduces what a plaintiff must prove to 
overcome the rule’s protection.
389
 
Indeed, much of the discussions concerning the business judgment rule focus on the 
substantive aspect of the rule. The commentary on the rule’s substantive aspect has followed a 
parallel line with the historical progress of the business judgment rule. The business judgment 
rule initially developed to protect institutional authority of directors to manage a corporation. 
However, courts’ heavy emphasis on the protection afforded directors under the business 
judgment rule and the lack of consideration of the relationship between the business judgment 
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rule and the duty of care caused a misunderstanding that the rule precluded duty of care claims in 
corporate litigation.
390
 Therefore, early commentary aimed to fix the misunderstanding by 
arguing that the application of the rule did not preclude due care claims. For example, Samuel 
Arsht, a prominent member of Delaware bar, observed that directors were required to act with 
reasonable diligence and care to qualify for the business judgment rule protection.
391
 Arsht 
further observed that, the purpose of the judicial review of a decision under the business 
judgment rule is not to determine whether the decision was correct or one which courts would 
have made, but to determine whether directors exercised due care and believed, on a reasonable 
basis, that the challenged transaction was in the corporation’s best interest.
392
 Accordingly, the 
business judgment rule provided a defense to liability for honest mistakes of judgment, but it did 
not preclude a judicial inquiry in due care claims.
393
 Rather, the business judgment rule served as 
“an outline for the relevant inquiries in determining whether directors have conducted 
themselves in such manner as to be entitled to the defense.”
394
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functions as a “streamlined judicial framework” to review fiduciary performance of directors). 
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The Delaware Supreme Court, however, followed a different path in articulating the 
relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule. In 1984, the court provided 
now often-stated formulation of the business judgment rule in Aronson v. Lewis.
395
 In Aronson, 
the directors’ standard of care was not predicated upon a tort law-based ordinary care or 
reasonableness standard. Rather, the court provided a new articulation of the standard of care 
under the business judgment rule by stating that directors should “inform themselves of all 
material information reasonably available to them” to invoke the business judgment rule.
396
 The 
court also stated that applicable standard of review to determine if directors were informed was 
gross negligence.
397
 Accordingly, instead of referring to an ordinary care standard and then 
injecting some flexibility into it, the court articulated a new standard of care in the decision-
making context that was suitable in the corporate director context. In so doing, the court avoided 
doctrinal problems arising out of the incompatibility of ordinary care in the director decision-
making context. Thus, the Aronson decision was a turning point in Delaware law in terms of 
defining the relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule.
398
  
Although the Aronson formulation of the business judgment rule has dominated corporate 
law for last several decades, it did not end doctrinal controversy concerning the duty of care and 
its relationship to the rule. One commentator rejected the court’s formulation by arguing that 
there is no need for special protection for corporate directors.
399
 Another criticized Aronson for 
subsuming the duty of care under the business judgment rule and argued that the duty of care 
should be treated as an independent concept rather than as an element of the business judgment 
rule.
400
 Others criticized Delaware courts for disregarding the public policy underlying the 
business judgment rule.
401
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Professor Gevurtz, for example, argues that the business judgment rule is meaningless or 
misguided and it should be abolished.
402
 According to Gevurtz, the statement that courts will not 
interfere with decisions of disinterested and informed directors who are in good faith does not 
mean anything different than the statement that “directors are not be liable for their decisions 
unless there is a reason to hold the directors liable-such as when the directors have breached their 
duty of care.”
403
 In another words, it simply means directors will only be liable if they breach 
their fiduciary duties.
404
 Although Gevurtz acknowledges that the business judgment rule evokes 
less judicial scrutiny for the substance of directors’ decision,
405
 and that courts interpret the rule 
to employ a lax standard of culpability for the duty of care,
406
 he rejects justifications for a 
special standard for corporate directors under the duty of care,
407
 and argues that the rule should 
be completely abolished.
408
 
 Lyman Johnson criticizes Delaware courts for assigning an overarching role to the 
business judgment rule to shape judicial review of fiduciary conduct.
409
 Johnson states that the 
rule should not be seen as “a generalized liability shield” or “a presumption that directors did not 
breach their duty of care.”
410
 Rather, the business judgment rule is a “narrow-gauged policy of 
non-review,” and it precludes courts from reviewing the substantive merits of directors’ 
decisions in the duty of care context.
411
 Johnson states that, in Delaware, the business judgment 
precludes a substantive review of a decision only if directors make an informed decision.
412
 He 
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argues that the business judgment rule should preclude a substantive review of a decision even 
though directors fail to inform themselves before making a decision. As an alternative to 
Delaware version, Johnson proposes the “modest” business judgment rule under which “the 
‘substantive’ force of the business judgment rule always applies in a duty of care case, 
immunizing the quality of the business decision from judicial review whether or not care was 
exercised.”
413
 Under the modest business judgment rule, the substantive “rationality” or 
“reasonableness” or “fairness” of a decision is excluded from judicial review in the duty of care 
context.
414
 Therefore, the modest business judgment rule always applies in the duty of care cases, 
and precludes courts from reviewing the quality of directors’ decision even in the absence of a 
proper decision-making process. If directors fail to perform an informed decision-making 
process, they should be liable for damages proximately caused by their faulty action.
415
 Thus, 
Johnson argues that “failures of informedness” should be treated as independent wrong causing 
liability, and it should not be a reason for “judicial incursion” into directors’ business 
judgment.
416
  
 William Allen, a former Chancellor in Delaware, on the other hand, supports a strong 
business judgment rule which eliminates due care liability of directors.
417
 According to Allen, 
the business judgment rule precludes judicial review of the duty of care claims if directors acted 
in good faith. Allen criticizes Delaware courts
418
 for attempting to erase the strong protection of 
the business judgment rule and asserts that such erosion would be to the detriment of 
shareholders.
419
 Allen justifies the strong business judgment rule with the existence of extralegal 
forces shaping director conduct such as reputation concern, economic incentives, and 
                                                 
413
 Id. at 632 (emphasis in original). 
414
 Id. Thus, Johnson rejects Delaware’s approach that a failure to exercise proper due care leads to the application 
of an entire fairness standard (or any other standard). For a discussion of the entire fairness standard see infra Part 
C.4.b. 
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 Id. at 650. 
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 Id. at 644. A complete analysis of Johnson’s modest business judgment rule proposal requires a discussion of the 
entire fairness standard under the business judgment rule. For a discussion of the entire fairness standard and for a 
subsequent discussion of the modest business judgment rule see infra Part C.4.b. 
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 Allen, supra note 250, at 12; see also Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 87 (stating that “the rule creates a strong 
presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims”). 
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 Allen, supra note 250, at 13 (stating that Delaware courts’ “willingness to closely review the reasonableness of 
board processes and decisions” was first seen in mid 1980s and then in the Disney case). 
419
 Id.   
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shareholder pressure.
420
 In addition, shareholders’ ability to cheaply diversify their risks of loss 
in stock market provides an adequate protection for bad director judgments.
421
  
 Likewise, Stephen Bainbridge’s conceptualization of the business judgment rule as a 
doctrine of abstention excludes judicial review of director conduct in due care setting. 
Bainbridge proposes the abstention doctrine as an alternative to Delaware’s standard of review 
formulation of the business judgment rule.
422
 According to Bainbridge, Delaware’s treatment of 
the business judgment rule as a standard of review implies that judicial review of director 
conduct is the norm rather than the exception.
423
 Under the abstention doctrine, however, the 
principle is that directors’ decisions will not be subject to any kind of review in the absence of 
exacting conditions.  
To illustrate abstention doctrine, Bainbridge compares the holdings of Shlensky v. 
Wrigley
424
 and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.
425
 In Shlensky, the court stated that “courts will 
not interfere with honest business judgment of the directors unless there is a showing of fraud, 
illegality or conflict of interest.”
426
 The Delaware Supreme Court, on the other hand, defined the 
business judgment rule in Technicolor as being intended “to preclude a court from imposing 
itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.”
427
 Bainbridge argues that the 
Technicolor’s formulation wrongly suggests far less judicial deference to a board decision than 
Shlensky.
428
 Accordingly, the Delaware approach facilitates judicial review of directors’ 
decisions whereas it should principally preclude such a review.
429
   
                                                 
420
 Id.  
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 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 95.  
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 Id. at127. 
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 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
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 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
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 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 778. 
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 Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 360. 
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 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 90–100. It should be noted that the issues in these two cases were quite different. In 
Shlensky, the plaintiff contested the business policy of the board and asked the court to interfere with the board’s 
discretion claiming that the decision did not serve the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. This issue 
typically falls under the board’s authority to manage a corporation assigned by statutes, and courts are likely to 
refuse to honor such demands. In Technicolor, however, the plaintiff contested a specific wrongdoing by directors, 
not the decision itself. The plaintiff alleged that directors violated their duty of care by reaching their decision in a 
faulty process and therefore they should be liable for damages. The issue in Technicolor was not to determine 
whether board’s judgment serve the interests of shareholder, rather it was to determine whether directors sufficiently 
informed themselves prior to decision-making. Consequently, the Technicolor court applied a different analysis than 
the court did in Shlensky. It is a well-established principle in Delaware law that the authority to manage corporations 
belongs to the board of directors and courts will not interfere with it as long as the board exercise its authority within 
the limits of the law. For example, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “the 
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 The abstention doctrine reflects the doctrinal approach that directors should not be liable 
for their actions if they act in good faith. The theoretical background of the doctrine stems from 
the “director primacy” model developed by Bainbridge.
430
 Under this model, between two 
competing values of authority and accountability, deference should be given to director authority 
to facilitate central decision-making in corporations.
431
 Therefore, the main purpose that shapes 
the operation of the business judgment rule under the abstention doctrine is preservation of board 
authority rather than reduction of the personal liability risk of directors. Because “the power to 
hold to account is ultimately the power to decide,”
432
 emphasis on director accountability rather 
than authority shifts part of the board’s decision-making authority to shareholders or judges. 
 Accordingly, under the abstention doctrine, courts should refrain from reviewing 
directors’ decisions unless they are tainted by illegality, fraud, or self-interest.
433
 The abstention 
doctrine presumes that directors acted in good faith, and the good faith presumption of the 
business judgment rule protects directors from judicial review of duty of care claims.
434
 In this 
conception, “good faith does not state a standard of liability but rather establishes” the business 
judgment rule presumption.
435
 If a plaintiff cannot rebut the good faith presumption of the 
business judgment rule, courts should dismiss due care claims without further inquiry.
436
 
Consequently, in the absence of fraud, self-interest, illegality, and bad faith, there is no review of 
director conduct whatsoever, not even for rationality.
437
 
 Accordingly, the business judgment rule’s main function under the abstention doctrine is 
“to preclude courts from deciding whether the directors violated their duty of care.”
438
 To uphold 
the board’s authority, the abstention doctrine rejects the informational element of Delaware’s 
business judgment rule, and prevents courts from even asking the question: did the board 
                                                 
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to 
Delaware directors.” 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981). 
429
 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 93. Cf. Arsht, supra note 15, at 114 (stating that the business judgment rule 
“functions not to preclude [due care] inquiry, but to guide it”). 
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 See generally, BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128.  
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 Id. at 114, 130. 
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 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 103 (footnote omitted).  
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exercise some care prior to decision-making?
439
 Under the abstention doctrine, “the requisite 
questions to be asked are more objective and straightforward: Did the board commit fraud? Did 
the board commit an illegal act? Did the board self-deal?”
440
 Thus, the abstention doctrine puts a 
prophylactic barrier preventing judicial review of director conduct for a duty of care claim.
441
 
 The abstention doctrine addresses practical and legal concerns associated with directors’ 
duty of care. It is questionable, however, if these concerns should amount to create an absolute 
barrier to duty of care claims. Courts developed the business judgment rule to address very same 
concerns. The rule was initially developed to recognize directors’ statutory authority to manage a 
corporation. Under the business judgment rule, courts do not honor a shareholder demand to 
interfere with the business policy of a corporation. If the business judgment rule is applicable, 
judicial review of a decision is limited to determine if the decision is attributable to any rational 
business purpose. To invoke the business judgment rule, directors are not required to exercise a 
reasonable care; rather, they are only required to make an informed decision. Furthermore, courts 
review the informational element of the business judgment rule under lenient gross negligence 
standard. Although gross negligence is not a precise standard, it is incontestable that it requires 
worse dereliction than ordinary negligence. Therefore, unlike the abstention doctrine, Delaware’s 
business judgment rule attempts to set a fair balance between directors’ statutory authority and 
accountability under the common law duty of care. 
 The abstention doctrine ignores that authority and accountability “form a two-way 
street.”
442
 Just as the authority rationale serves to justify the need for the business judgment 
rule’s protection, the business judgment rule “serves to establish the practical limits” on the 
board’s authority “because [the rule] defines the zone in which courts and shareholders cannot 
interfere.”
443
 Samuel Arsht, who significantly contributed to Delaware corporate law,
444
 provided 
a well-considered explanation as to how the business judgment rule should function to align 
competing values in corporate law. Arsht observed as follows:  
                                                 
439
 Id. at 95. “Put another way, the whole point of the business judgment rule is to prevent courts from even asking 
the question: did the board breach its duty of care?” Id. “Whether or not the board exercised reasonable care is 
irrelevant, as well it should be.” Id. at 128. 
440
 Id. at 128. 
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 Davis, supra note 17, at 589.  
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The importance of the business judgment rule for the current deliberations over corporate 
governance does not lie only in the rule’s simple recognition that directors ought not be liable for 
honest mistakes of judgment or unpopular business decisions. Its significance lies also in the 
limitations to its availability as a defense to liability and the standard of directorial conduct those 
limitations establish. 
Far from constituting a shield from liability for fraud, mismanagement, or reckless decisions, the 
limitations on the business judgment rule’s application impose significant duties on a director in 
the performance of his or her office. 
… 
Because of the limitations placed on the directors’ discretion if they are to have the benefit of the 
business judgment rule, the rule does not preclude inquiry, but instead mandates inquiry into the 
facts and circumstances of a challenged transaction to such extent as may be necessary to enable 
the court to ascertain whether the director’s decision was an exercise of informed, reasoned 
judgment or an arbitrary or reckless decision. As the Third Circuit recently observed: ‘[w]e do not 
think that the business judgment of the directors should be totally insulated from judicial review. 
In order for the directors’ judgment to merit judicial deference, that judgment must have been 
made in good faith and independently of any influence of those persons suspected of wrongdoing. 
In addition, where the shareholder contends that the directors’ judgment is so unwise or 
unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of the directors’ sound discretion, a court 
should, we think, be able to conduct its own analysis of the reasonableness of that business 
judgment.’
445
  
  
Properly understood, the business judgment rule does not preclude judicial inquiry into 
directors’ decisions; rather it strikes a compromise between directors’ authority and fiduciary 
duties. The business judgment rule recognizes the authority of directors but also prescribes 
boundaries to that authority to assure that it is exercised within the limits of law. Samuel Arsht 
further observed: 
[T]he rule functions not to preclude inquiry but to guide it, for where a business decision of 
directors is challenged, the court must examine the evidence concerning the circumstances in 
which and the information on which the directors made their decision. This inquiry is made, not 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the decision made was correct or one which the court 
would have made, but to ascertain whether the evidence does or does not establish that the 
directors exercised due care and believed, on a reasonable basis, that the challenged transaction 
was in the corporation’s best interest.
446
 
 
Thus, the business judgment rule imposes meaningful limitations before providing a 
strong protection in favor of directors. Courts developed the business judgment rule concept over 
the years by considering different factors in the corporate mechanism. The rule, as formulated in 
Delaware, ensures that courts do not interfere with directors’ judgment in the duty of care 
context as long as they comply with the minimal due care standards when exercising their 
statutory authority. Delaware courts apply lenient standards of review under the business 
judgment rule to determine due care compliance of directors. Under the business judgment rule, 
                                                 
445
 Arsht, supra note 15, at 96, 125–26 (citation omitted). 
446
 Id. at 114. 
 
 
 67  
directors’ decision-making process is reviewed under the gross negligence standard, and the 
substance of the decision is reviewed under the waste standard. Following sections examine the 
standards of gross negligence and waste.  
a. Gross Negligence 
 As a normative matter, the duty of care requires directors to act with “the ordinary care 
expected of a reasonably prudent fiduciary.”
447
 Notwithstanding, courts purposely apply the 
lenient standard of gross negligence under the business judgment rule for determining whether 
directors employed an informative and deliberative process before making a decision. By setting 
the standard of review at the more lenient level of gross negligence, courts intend to provide 
directors a greater freedom arena to encourage them to act without undue inhibition.
448
 As 
former Chancellor Allen observed:  
Because business corporations are risk-taking institutions and because the intelligent assumption 
of risk can be impeded were courts free to second-guess questions of whether a board had enough 
information to act prudently, the legal test of whether directors are adequately informed is rather 
high: gross negligence.
449
 
 
Therefore, although directors are expected to act with ordinary care, courts will find a breach of 
the duty of care only if directors fail to reach an informed decision in a grossly negligent manner. 
Examining the relevant court decisions, one commentator nicely summarized judicial inquiry 
into the directors’ decisional processes under gross negligence as follows:  
Proof of a breach of the duty of care rests on objective facts. The court will look at the amount of 
time available to directors to prepare for the meeting, the extent of the directors’ preparation for 
the meeting, time spent by the directors at the meeting, the type and quality of the advice available 
to the directors, the directors’ participation in the meeting, and the documents the directors 
reviewed. Such proof, standing alone, is sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of care.
450
 
 
In Delaware, a clear expression of gross negligence as the applicable standard to review the 
directors’ decisional processes is found in Aronson v. Lewis.
451
 There, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that “under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts 
of gross negligence.”
452
 The court later reaffirmed the gross negligence standard in its famous 
                                                 
447
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 449. 
448
 Id. 
449
 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. C.A. 8358, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *52 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1991). 
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ruling of Smith v. Van Gorkom.
453
 The court provided a further elaboration in Van Gorkom by 
stating that gross negligence is “the proper standard for determining whether a business 
judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one.”
454
 Accordingly, in order to 
pierce the business judgment shield on the ground of the informational element in Delaware, a 
plaintiff must show that directors reached their decision by a grossly negligent process that 
includes a failure of considering all material information reasonably available.
455
  
 Defining the gross negligence standard, however, proves a more difficult job than 
determining it as the applicable standard of review. What precisely does a gross negligence 
standard mean and how exactly is this standard different from ordinary negligence? There is no 
articulate definition of gross negligence found in court decisions to supply a clear answer to 
these questions.
456
 It is incontestable that gross negligence suggests a worse dereliction than 
ordinary negligence, and courts intend to employ a lenient treatment under the gross negligence 
standard.
457
 Despite that, the concept of gross negligence is a “notoriously ambiguous” 
standard,
458
 and the ambiguous nature of gross negligence creates skepticism whether that 
standard serves the purpose for which it was designed. For example, one commentator observed 
that “it is common to find that courts that purport to apply that standard actually apply a standard 
that is either more or less demanding.”
459
 Other commentators noted that it is questionable 
whether the application of the gross negligence standard, rather than an ordinary negligence 
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 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (confirming Aronson by stating that “directors must 
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standard, would make a critical difference to the outcome.
460
 In other words, if one is under a 
duty to fulfill certain requirements, applying gross negligence or ordinary negligence may have 
little impact on the outcome when determining the fulfillment of these requirements.
461
 
 The Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Van Gorkom presents a perfect example to 
discuss the uncertain nature of a gross negligence standard. In Van Gorkom, the court found 
defendant directors to have breached their duty of care in a grossly negligent manner for 
approving the sale of the corporation in a two-hour meeting relying upon the chairman’s twenty-
minute oral presentation.
462
 The directors’ grossly negligent conduct included a failure to make 
an inquiry into the intrinsic value of the corporation, to perform an adequate market test, and to 
read and discuss the material terms of the merger agreement.
463
 However, commentators argued 
whether directors really needed to go through this process because they were high caliber 
businessmen with impeccable credentials, they were thoroughly familiar with the corporation 
and its financial status, and the agreed sale price represented a fifty percent premium over the 
stock market value of the corporation.
464
 While the majority of the court found the directors’ 
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The factors, which suggest imprudence and perhaps some others such as the differences 
that Signal Oil personnel had with the De Goyler and MacNaughton report and certain potential 
liabilities of Signal which survive the sale, do not in my judgment raise at this stage a reasonable 
probability that the plaintiff will be able to pierce the ‘business judgment’ standard. When 
considered in light of the whole case, they do not in themselves justify the conclusion that the 
‘directors acted so far without information that they can be said to have passed an unintelligent 
and unadvised judgment.’ But, and perhaps particularly on this preliminary application, the full 
circumstances surrounding the approval do relate to the overriding factual issue in the case. What 
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conduct grossly negligent, many commentators concluded that the directors’ conduct did not 
constitute even ordinary negligence.
465
 Regardless who is right or wrong as to the result of the 
case, the extensive doctrinal controversy triggered by Van Gorkom proves that a gross 
negligence standard is troublesome.
466
  
 If Van Gorkom did not, the Delaware Supreme Court’s later ruling in Cede v. 
Technicolor
467
 proved the unprincipled nature of the gross negligence standard. In Van Gorkom, 
the court found directors’ conduct grossly negligent mainly because they had failed (1) to have 
an independent valuation of the corporation or, alternatively, to perform an adequate post-
agreement market test, and (2) to receive and review the material terms of the proposed merger 
agreement. The Van Gorkom court required directors to perform a market test because they 
initially failed to obtain an independent fairness opinion concerning the agreed sale price, and an 
adequate market test would cure that initial failure.
468
 Therefore, a market test was an alternative 
requirement, not an independent one. As opposed to Van Gorkom, the defendant directors in 
Cede received an independent fairness opinion concerning the proposed sale price, they reviewed 
the material terms of the proposed merger agreement, they discussed the feasibility of other 
potential bids, and they made a conscious judgment to proceed with the proposed merger 
                                                 
was Signal Oil worth on December 21, 1973? Or to put the question in its legal context, did 
the Signal directors act without the bounds of reason and recklessly in approving the price offer of 
Burmah? 
Id. at 615 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
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in Van Gorkom, the only issue to remand was the amount of damages the Court of Chancery 
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decided before remand, in this case, a condition precedent to a finding of liability was an adverse 
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agreement.
469
 Nevertheless, the court found directors’ conduct grossly negligent mainly because 
they failed to perform a pre or post-signing market test, and they did not have reasonable basis 
not to do so.
470
 Accordingly, the Cede court applied a more demanding test under the gross 
negligence standard than Van Gorkom.
471
 William Allen, who rendered the trial court decision in 
Cede, observed in a later article, joined by two co-authors, as follows: 
If anything, the Cede II court’s language is suggestive of a ‘higher-than ordinary-care’ standard in 
cases involving a sale of the company, but in all events Cede II does not articulate a gross 
negligence standard of review, which by definition is far less exacting than ‘ordinary 
negligence.’
472
 
 
Alternatively, the Cede holding can be seen as an application of the enhanced level of 
required care in the context of a sale of a corporation.
473
 In that account, the Cede ruling 
confirms the commentators’ observation that applying the gross negligence standard, instead of 
the ordinary negligence standard, will have little impact on the outcome because the Cede 
analysis heavily focused on the lack of market test rather than giving sufficient weight to the 
other factors such as the independent fairness opinion. Therefore, what really matters is not the 
application of a gross or ordinary negligence standard; it is rather the fulfillment of the 
requirements of the duty of care in the factual context of the specific transaction at issue.  
                                                 
469
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gross negligence. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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 Thus, Delaware courts employ the concept of gross negligence to review directors’ duty 
of care because that concept contains a certain level of flexibility. A flexible standard of review 
allows courts to consider the specific circumstances related to a particular factual setting in a 
duty of care context. A flexible standard of review is necessary in the duty of care context 
because of the fact-specific characteristic of that duty. The duty of care has no fixed content, and 
its requirements vary depending on the circumstances in which a decision was made. Under the 
gross negligence standard, courts attempt to give directors certain amount of running room when 
reviewing the performance of the duty of care. One noted commentator observed:  
Courts that purport to adopt a gross-negligence standard to review the duty to monitor, the duty of 
inquiry, or the duty to employ a reasonable decision-making process, probably do so because the 
performance of these duties seldom presents a cut-and-dried issue, and the gross-negligence 
standard of review emphasizes the importance of leaving a play in the joints in determining 
whether the relevant standard of conduct was satisfied in such cases.
474
 
 
 But again, the flexibility inevitably involves uncertainty, and the uncertainty precipitates 
undesired results related to directors’ duty of care. Despite courts’ tendency to employ a lenient 
standard, the ambiguous nature of gross negligence makes it very hard to provide sufficient 
assurance to corporate directors in the context of the duty of care, especially when one considers 
the special characteristics of board service. Directors often deal with complex business matters 
under unusual circumstances and uncertain conditions, business matters necessarily involve risk, 
and directors are entitled to exercise a discretional authority when dealing with corporate 
matters. Due to the special characteristics of corporate directorship service, the ambiguity 
involved in the gross negligence standard outweighs its advantageous features in the context of 
the directors’ duty of care.     
 Furthermore, Delaware courts apply an objective test under the gross negligence 
standard.
475
 Commentators raised concern regarding the appropriateness of a pure objective test 
for evaluating directors’ decision-making process.
476
 Commentators suggested that recognizing 
the special characteristic of board service may be more helpful than employing a pure objective 
test under the uncertain gross negligence standard.
477
 One commentator noted that, “in 
                                                 
474
 Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 448–49. 
475
 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259.  
476
 See e.g., Quillen, supra note 198, at 498 (stating that “the duty of inquiry should have both an objective and a 
subjective nexus with need or desirability” and stating that Delaware’s “all material information reasonably 
available … test puts the emphasis on access rather than need or desirability”). 
477
 This approach is arguably found under PCG § 4.01(c)(2), which requires a director to be “ informed with respect 
to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate 
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information gathering, a negligence standard without the superlatives may be appropriate so long 
as courts recognize that ‘circumstances’ vary.”
478
 Another observed as follows: 
The same point can be made, without using the problematic gross negligence standard, by 
employing the terminology of due care rather than the terminology of negligence, and by making 
clear that in determining whether directors or officers acted with due care, courts should consider 
the complexities of the corporate context and give a certain amount of running room.
479
 
 
Alternatively, it can be argued that a more articulate definition of the standard of care 
may solve problems associated with the gross negligence standard. The problems associated with 
the gross negligence standard mainly stem from the fact-specific feature of the duty of care. 
Recognizing that this feature of the duty of care may be problematic in the corporate context, 
Kenneth Davis suggested the standardization of procedures that directors should employ when 
performing board service.
480
 Davis acknowledges that “the directors’ role presents significantly 
less room for standardization than the established professions.”
481
 He argues, however, at least 
two areas may be candidate for standardization: 
One area is Smith v. Van Gorkom and its progeny, which requires a target’s directors to take 
reasonable efforts to inform themselves, including obtaining and reviewing fairness opinions, 
before deciding how to respond to an acquisition offer. The other area is the authorities indicating 
the board’s duty to assure the existence of an information and reporting system regarding the 
corporation’s compliance with the law.
482
 
 
He states that, while requiring adherence to certain standard practices and procedures may be 
seen as an intrusion to the board’s sovereignty, it would improve the overall quality of the 
                                                 
under the circumstances.” PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
4.01(c)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). In contrast to Delaware’s objective gross negligence standard, § 4.01(c)(2) 
involves both an objective and subjective test. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. e. 
(“[T]he term ‘reasonably believes’ has both an objective and a subjective content.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
PCG formulation suggests an objective evaluation of the decision-making process along with the subjective factors 
(e.g., the directors’ expertise) and the special circumstances in which the directors made their decision. 
478
 Quillen, supra note 198, at 500. 
479
 Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 449. 
480
 Davis, supra note 17, at 582–86. See also Quillen, supra note 198, at 495. Former Justice Quillen observed: 
The problem exists in part because of the nature of equity. The approach is to a case as a whole, 
based on all the relevant circumstances, rather than the elemental approach employed, for 
example, in the criminal law. … But, to speak heresy, maybe a more consistent and codified 
elemental approach is needed. In the modern business world, directors are asked to make 
significant business decisions swiftly. For simple self-defense, are they not entitled to a clear 
legal standard by which to measure, at the time of decision, their personal liability for the 
necessary business risk attached to their occupation? 
Id. (emphasis added). 
481
 Davis, supra note 17, at 582.  
482
 Id. (footnotes omitted). He states that “the issue underlying the standard[ization] must recur with sufficient 
frequency—across factual settings with common elements—to give rise to a body of case law and commentary 
sufficient to support the emergence of a consensus.” Id. at 585.  
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board’s performance in the long run.
483
 In his view, insistence on standardized practices and 
procedures would facilitate the ability of directors to play an active role in corporate decision-
making and oversight, and it would make “it harder for those … directors who are unduly 
deferential to management to cover their tracks.”
484
 Accordingly, the standardization of board 
practices would assist directors in complying with the duty of care and thereby avoiding personal 
monetary liability.  
b. Waste (Irrationality) 
If a plaintiff is not able to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, courts will 
examine a decision under the exceptionally limited standard of waste.
485
 Under the waste 
standard, a plaintiff must show that directors’ decision cannot be attributed to “any rational 
business purpose.”
486
 If a decision is so egregious, irrational, or far beyond “the bounds of 
reason,”
487
 or if “directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets,”
488
 courts will not 
respect the judgment of directors. A waste of corporate assets will occur if a corporate 
transaction is so exceptionally “one-sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment 
could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”
489
 Courts will enjoin a 
transaction or hold directors liable where a decision fails to satisfy the onerous waste standard.  
As one can tell from its definition, the waste standard is extremely deferential to 
directors’ judgment. The waste standard puts “a nearly insurmountable barrier” in front of a 
                                                 
483
 Id. at 595.  
484
 Id.  
485
 Judicial review under the waste standard is also referred to as “irrationality standard.” See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra 
note 168, at 442–43; Quillen, supra note 198, at 494–95. 
486
 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (stating that the waste standard is a 
corollary of the proposition that where the business judgment rule is applicable courts will not interfere with 
directors’ decision if it can be attributed to any rational business purpose) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 
A.2d 717, 720 (Del.1971)). 
487
 Gimbel v. Signal Companies, 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Parnes v. Bally 
Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (“so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment”); Brehm 
v. Eisner, 746 A. 2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (stating that “irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule”,  
and it may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good 
faith”); see also Arsht, supra note 15, at 107 (stating that “rational business purpose” test is a correct articulation of 
one of the elements of the business judgment rule); Quillen, supra note 198, at 500 (stating that rational business 
purpose review fits corporate context because under this standard courts recognize that “there are many rational 
courses of business action, a wide spectrum, and [rationality is] not just a two-dimensional spectrum”); cf. 
Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 99 (rejecting rational business purpose review); Johnson, supra note 251, at 650 
(stating that rational business purpose review should be limited to examine a decision only to verify a linkage 
between the decision-making process and outcome). 
488
 Disney, 906 A.2d at 74.  
489
 See Brehm, 746 A. 2d at 263.  
 
 
 75  
plaintiff.
490
 It is very unlikely that directors will be held liable for corporate waste because courts 
apply a very undemanding test under that standard. Under the waste standard, courts do not 
review the overall reasonableness of a decision. Whether directors exercised a poor business 
judgment or made an unreasonably risky decision is not related to the waste inquiry.
491
 Courts 
will not evaluate the quality of a decision if there is any possibility that it was based on a 
legitimate business reason.
492
 For example, if some business people agree that the transaction is 
as a whole conceivable or imaginable, yet differ on the sufficiency of terms, the court will 
respect the judgment of directors.
 493
 In a transactional context, a court will find waste only if the 
consideration for an exchange of corporate assets is “so disproportionately small as to lie beyond 
the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.”
494
 A decision or transaction 
constitutes corporate waste only if it is “so blatantly imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense 
that no well-motivated and minimally informed person could have made it.”
495
 Under the waste 
standard, courts provide directors the widest latitude at the decisional level.
496
 The undemanding 
test that courts apply under the waste standard “preserves a minimum and necessary degree of 
director and officer accountability.”
497
 
There are very few cases in which the directors were found liable for corporate waste.
498
 
In Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, for example, the court imposed liability on 
                                                 
490
 Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties through Criminal Prosecution of 
Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 21 (2010). 
491
 See Quillen, supra note 198, at 500. Under the rational business purpose requirement, “there are many rational 
courses of business action, a wide spectrum, and not just a two-dimensional spectrum. The area of director 
discretion is enlarged in a positive vein, not limited by negative description.” Id.  
492
 See Davis, supra note 17, at 576 (“the focus is not on what the hypothetical reasonable director would have done 
but on what some rational director might have done”) (emphasis in original).  
493
 Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 478 (1992). 
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 White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 (Del. 2001). 
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 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 452. 
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 Quillen, supra note 198, at 500. 
497
 Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 443.  
498
 Those cases were decided in jurisdictions other than Delaware. See, e.g., Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of 
America, 224 A.2d 634, 423 Pa. 563 (Pa. 1966); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940); Hun v. 
Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880). See also Dooley, supra note 493, at 480 n.59 (examining Litwin and Hun); cf. Kamin v. 
American Express Co., 86 Misc.2d 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). In Kamin, American Express acquired common stock 
of another company for investment at a cost of $29,900,000. Id. at 811. After the value of the stock significantly 
decreased, the board of American Express declared a special dividend to the company’s shareholders to distribute 
depreciated shares in kind. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the board’s action constituted waste because if those 
depreciated shares were sold in the market, the company would sustain capital loss of $25,000,000 and this loss 
would result in $8,000,000 tax savings to the company. Id. at 810–11. The record before the court showed that 
directors were fully aware that the company would realize tax savings if the shares were sold in the market, but they 
avoided this option because such a sale would require the company to show a loss of $25,000,000 in the company’s 
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directors because they wasted corporate funds to utilize a plant that they knew it was very 
unsuitable for profitable production.
499
 The plant “lacked a railroad siding, a proper storage area, 
and its equipment was ‘out of phase’” for profitable commercial operation.
500
 Furthermore, 
before pouring corporate money to the unprofitable plant, the company had initiated the purchase 
of another plant that was far better suited and superior than old plant for commercial 
operation.
501
 Nevertheless, directors ignored the plans on the second plant and proceeded to 
blindly stack corporate money on the first one. In addition, the directors failed to provide any 
“satisfactory explanation” or “advance any justification” for their actions.
502
 The court concluded 
that the directors’ actions constituted waste of the corporation’s assets and held them liable for 
the consequences of their actions.
503
   
A number of Delaware cases conceptualized the waste standard in the context of good 
faith. The waste standard involves a very limited review of the substantive merits of a business 
decision.
504
 Under this substantive review, the directors’ judgment will not be respected by 
courts “in those rare cases where the decision under attack is ‘so far beyond the bounds of 
reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad 
faith.’”
505
 In Lewis v. Vogelstein, former Chancellor Allen implied that the substantive review of 
a decision under the waste standard is a way of inferring bad faith.
506
 Allen observed as follows: 
The judicial standard for determination of corporate waste is well developed. Roughly, a waste 
entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie 
beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade. Most often the claim is 
associated with a transfer of corporate assets that serves no corporate purpose; or for which no 
consideration at all is received. Such a transfer is in effect a gift. If, however, there is any 
                                                 
financial statement and that might have a negative effect on the market value of the company’s publicly traded 
stock. Id. at 813–14. The court held that it is within the board’s authority to make such a decision and dismissed the 
complaint stating that a claim “which alleges merely that some course of action other than that pursued by the board 
of directors would have been more advantageous gives rise to no cognizable cause of action.” Id. at 812. In other 
words, the directors’ decision was not inexplicable.  
499
 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966). 
500
 Id. at 639. 
501
 Id. 
502
 The court stated: “It is beyond explanation, why, in the face of such knowledge of the unsuitability of the 
Paterson plant for profitable production, the defendants continued to pour corporate money into and to utilize the 
Paterson plant.” Id.  
503
 Id. at 646. 
504
 Indeed, the exceptionally limited scope of judicial inquiry under a waste (irrationality) standard resonates the 
obligation of good faith rather than the duty of care. See Quillen, supra note 198, at 492 (“‘[A] rational business 
purpose’ [ ] seem to relate, giving normal meaning to the English language, more to a good heart rather than a sound 
mind. The phrases all emphasize a duty of loyalty rather than a quality of judgment.”). 
505
 Parnes, 722 A.2d at 1246 (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988)). 
506
 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
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substantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith judgment that in 
the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the 
fact finder would conclude ex post that the transaction was unreasonably risky. Any other rule 
would deter corporate boards from the optimal rational acceptance of risk, for reasons explained 
elsewhere. Courts are ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration under the waste 
standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business risk.
507
 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court implicitly confirmed that waste implies bad faith conduct. 
In White v. Panic, the court stated that a claim must fail under the waste standard if “there is any 
substantial consideration received by the corporation, and ... there is a good faith judgment that 
in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile.”
508
 Indeed, if directors of a corporation are 
exculpated from personal monetary liability by a charter provision pursuant to section 102(b)(7), 
a finding of director liability for corporate waste should be logically predicated upon bad faith. 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s review of a corporate waste claim in Disney, where directors 
were exculpated under section 102(b)(7), demonstrates that a waste of corporate assets 
constitutes bad faith.
509
 Professor Hecker, analyzing the Disney Court’s waste review, observed 
as follows:  
Although the court did not make the point explicitly, it is clear that waste is bad faith conduct.  
Logically, if this were not so, waste would be exculpable and there would have been no need to 
decide the merits of whether the severance package amounted to waste.  In addition, waste, as 
defined by the court, is certainly qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence and yet does 
not involve disloyalty as classically defined.  As such, it falls into that middle ground that the 
court identified as requiring proscription by means of the duty of good faith….The necessary 
conclusion is that waste constitutes bad faith conduct and thus falls outside the protection of both 
the business judgment rule and section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provisions.
510
 
 
                                                 
507
 Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 1132 (Del. Ch. 1989). There, Allen explained the relation between waste and bad faith as follows:  
As I conceptualize the matter, such limited substantive review as the rule contemplates (i.e., is the 
judgment under review ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’ or ‘so beyond reason,’ etc.) really is a way of 
inferring bad faith. I am driven to this view because I can understand no legitimate basis 
whatsoever to impose damages (or enter an injunction) if truly disinterested directors have in fact 
acted in good faith and with due care on a question that falls within the directors’ power to manage 
the business and affairs of the corporation.  To recognize in courts a residual power to review the 
substance of business decisions for ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’ or ‘rationality’ where those 
decisions are made by truly disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to 
make of courts super-directors. It might be correctly said that whether one infers bad faith from an 
‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’ decision (thus depriving it of business judgment rule protection) or 
directly strips the decision of that protection upon such a finding, is of little practical importance. 
Id. at 1156 n.13 (footnotes omitted). 
508
 White, 783 A.2d at 554 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 
at 336)). 
509
 Disney, 906 A.2d at 73–75. 
510
 Hecker, supra note 26, at 952.  
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However, it should be noted that, under the waste standard, courts do not make an initial 
inquiry into the subjective good faith of directors. When reviewing a claim of corporate waste, 
instead of inquiring into the directors’ subjective motivation or intention, the court looks at the 
outcome of a decision. If a decision is so unconscionably irrational as to constitute waste, the 
court automatically equates directors’ wasteful decision with bad faith. In other words, a decision 
does not constitute waste because it was made in bad faith; rather, a corporate waste constitutes 
bad faith. If a decision is exceptionally one sided or irrational, a court concludes that the decision 
is inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith, without making an inquiry into the directors’ 
subjective good or bad faith. Thus, as one commentator observed, the waste standard “serves as 
an objective confirmation of the critical, but entirely subjective, requirement that the directors 
have a good faith belief that their decision is in the corporation’s best interest.”
511
 
2. Preconditions for Application of the Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule applies if directors: (1) make a judgment or decision; (2) 
inform themselves of all material information reasonably available relevant to a decision; (3) are 
free from conflict of interest regarding the subject matter of a decision; (4) and act in good faith. 
Indeed, the business judgment rule operates as a presumption that directors fulfilled its 
preconditions. Accordingly, a plaintiff has the burden to rebut the presumption by showing that 
directors have failed to comply with at least one of the preconditions. If the plaintiff cannot meet 
this requirement, directors’ decision is protected by the business judgment rule so long as it can 
be attributed to any rational business purpose.    
There is a threshold requirement of director judgment or decision for application of the 
business judgment rule.
512
 The rule “operates only in the context of director action.”
513
 If 
directors “have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act,” the 
business judgment rule presumption is not available.
514
 For example, directors’ failure to make 
                                                 
511
 Davis, supra note 17, at 576. 
512
 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del Ch. 
1971) (stating that application of the rule’s presumption depends upon a showing that “directors did, in fact, make a 
business judgment authorizing the transaction under review” and “that director judgment was brought to bear with 
specificity on the transactions”); see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. to § 4.01(c) (1994) (stating that for application of the rule’s presumption “a 
decision must have been consciously made and judgment must in fact have been exercised”). 
513
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813. 
514
 Id. 
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due inquiry in the oversight context does not qualify for the rule’s presumption.
515
 If, however, 
directors made a conscious judgment or decision to refrain from acting, the business judgment 
rule presumes that the decision was disinterested, informed, and in good faith.
516
 Thus, the rule’s 
presumption applies only if there is a decision to act or not to act, but it has no application where 
“directors’ inaction was the result of ignorance.”
517
  
An “unintelligent or unadvised” decision is not protected under the business judgment 
rule.
518
 To afford the rule’s protection, directors should “inform themselves, prior to making a 
business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.”
519
 This element 
requires directors to inquire into information that is “relevant and of a magnitude to be important 
to directors in carrying out their fiduciary duty of care in decisionmaking.”
520
 Directors should 
make their judgment or decision upon considering the information they gathered. In other words, 
the informational element requires directors not only to gather material information but also to 
digest such information before making a decision. Accordingly, directors should exercise an 
informed attention on corporate matters by devoting sufficient time to gather, review, and 
discuss material information. Directors’ responsibility is not to review every fact concerning a 
corporate action; it is rather to review “material facts that are reasonably available.”
521
 There is 
“no pre-set formula that corporate boards must follow” to make an informed corporate 
decision.
522
 Therefore, the adequacy of directors’ decision-making process depends on the 
special circumstances of a particular factual setting.  
 To invoke the protection of the business judgment rule, directors should also be free of 
conflict of interest in a corporate decision or transaction. Directors are considered to be 
interested if they appear on both sides of a transaction, or if they expect to derive any personal 
financial benefit from a transaction that is adverse to that of the corporation or its 
stockholders.
523
 “A director is interested if he will be materially affected, either to his benefit or 
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 Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 441. 
516
 See e.g. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813; Nixon v. Blackwell, 26 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 
927 (Del. 1993). 
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 Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp 57 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 1986), reargument denied, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
522, 1987 WL 28434 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987). 
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 Disney, 907 A.2d at 748 (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, 167 A. 831, 833 (Del.Ch.1933)). 
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 Aronson, A.2d at 812.  
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 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 n.49 (Del. 2000). 
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 1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 309. 
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 Id. at 816 (quoting Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398, 410 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
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 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Rales, 634 A.2d at 936. 
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detriment, by a decision of the board, in a manner not shared by the corporation and the 
shareholders.”
524
 For example, a director who buys property from the corporation is interested in 
that transaction. In addition to being free of conflict of interest in a corporate transaction, 
directors should be independent of anyone having such benefit.
525
 In other words, directors 
should not be dominated or controlled by a person or entity that has material interest in the 
transaction. In those cases where directors self-deal to advance their “personal profit or 
betterment”
526
 or act under extraneous considerations or influence, the business judgment rule 
protection is unavailable.
527
  
 Finally, directors must act in good faith to be afforded the protection of the business 
judgment rule.
528
 Good faith requires “a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.”
529
 The rule does not protect director actions taken in bad 
faith.
530
 Directors are required to make their decision “in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”
531
 Directors should give priority to the 
interest of the corporation and its shareholders in their actions. Directors’ actions lack good faith 
if they are made “with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interest of the 
corporation.”
532
 Director action with intent to harm the corporation or to violate applicable 
positive law also lacks good faith.
533
 Thus, directors must be true to the best interest of the 
corporation in their actions to be afforded the protection of the business judgment rule.  
3. Policy Reasons supporting the Business Judgment Rule 
 The principal purpose of the business judgment rule is “to protect and promote the role of 
the board as the ultimate manager of the corporation.”
534
 The rule is common law recognition of 
the fundamental statutory principle that the business and affairs of a corporation are managed by 
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 Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. 1995) (citation omitted).  
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 See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816; Rales, 634 A.2d at 935. 
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 Disney, 907 A.2d at747 (quoting Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988)). 
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or under its board of directors.
535
 Under the business judgment rule, neither courts nor 
shareholders are entitled to interfere with the managerial authority of directors.
536
 The board is 
elected by shareholders to manage the corporation because of their expertise in business, and 
courts are ill-equipped to second-guess sophisticated business decisions. Every business decision 
requires individual discretion and judgment, and courts should respect directors’ judgment even 
if it turns out badly. The business judgment rule insulates directors’ decision-making authority 
from judicial review in those cases where the directors’ decision does not satisfy some 
shareholders or where the directors’ exercise of their statutory authority results in an unfortunate 
outcome to the corporation. By precluding judicial inquiry into directors’ authority on the basis 
of shareholder dissatisfaction or unfortunate outcomes, the business judgment rule ensures that 
the board’s statutory power to manage a corporation remains intact.   
 There are also a number of fairness and policy reasons underlying the rule related to 
directors’ duty of care. Although the rule was initially developed to protect directorial authority, 
over time it expanded to include judicial review of directors’ duty of care in the decision-making 
context because performance and review of that duty is to some extent related to directorial 
authority. Therefore, courts and commentators articulated a number of fairness and policy 
reasons for the business judgment rule in order to protect directors from personal liability in due 
care claims. Fairness and policy reasons also help delineate special characteristics of corporate 
directorship service. 
 Fairness and policy reasons supporting the business judgment rule are well explicated; 
directors often make risky business decisions under uncertain conditions and they should not be 
responsible for honest mistakes in judgment; judges are ill-equipped to evaluate the substantive 
merits of a business decision because they lack business expertise and they review a business 
decision with the benefit of hindsight; the disproportion between the compensation of board 
service and the potential enormous liability associated with board service may disincentivize 
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 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). Delaware courts often attribute the business judgment rule to the statutory 
authority of the board of directors to manage a corporation. See e.g. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating that “[t]he 
business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 
141(a)”); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d, at 872 (stating that “[u]nder Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the 
offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware 
corporation are managed by or under its board of directors”). See also Davis, supra note 17, at 587 (stating that 
“within the limits implicit in the business judgment rule, it is the board’s choice, not that of the judge or a 
disgruntled shareholder, that must prevail”). 
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 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994); see also Arsht, supra note 15, at 
95 (“directors are not…able to please all of the stockholders all of the time”). 
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qualified people from serving as directors; and the law should encourage directors to make risky 
decisions without fear of personal liability.
537
 
 Corporate directors often make complex business decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty.
538
 Complex business decisions require highly sophisticated judgments. Directors 
make corporate decisions by considering a wide variety of factors and under the pressure of time 
                                                 
537
 In addition, commentators justified the rule “by a desire to conserve judicial resources by not permitting every 
business decision to be reviewed in court.” Arsht, supra note 15, at 99–100. See also Branson, supra note 213, at 
632 (same). Others provided alternative justifications for the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1439–40 (1985) (stating that standard 
justifications of the rule are “helpful but not entirely satisfactory.”) Fischel explains the rationale supporting the 
business judgment rule as follows: 
My argument is that the role of liability rules is more limited in the corporate than other contexts 
because of several factors, including the cost of contracting which makes it extremely difficult to 
distinguish adequate or reasonable performance from a breach of fiduciary duty; the specialization 
of function in public corporations; the role of contractual and market mechanisms in rewarding 
good business decisions and penalizing inferior ones coupled with the absence of similar 
mechanisms to discipline judges’ decisions; and the weak incentive of small shareholders and their 
attorneys to maximize the value of the firm. 
Id. Others completely reject the justifications of the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 19, at 
304–12. By comparing board service with other professions, Gevurtz argues that the justifications of the rule are not 
unique to the corporate director context, and, therefore, there is no reason to limit the scope of judicial review of the 
directors’ decisions. Gevurtz stated:  
The difficulty with [the rule’s justifications] is generally not that they lack any truth. On the 
contrary, the primary problem is that these rationales prove too much, for they could apply with 
equal force to numerous other situations in which the rule of ordinary negligence commonly 
applies. 
Id. at 304–05. Cf. Davis, supra note 17, at 575, 580–82 (distinguishing tort law and corporate fiduciary law based on 
risk-allocation rationale, and distinguishing board service from other professions based on non-standardization 
rationale). Davis explains his non-standardization rationale as follows: 
The reason that we allow judges and juries to pass judgment on the professional actions of, say, a 
neurosurgeon is not that we assume that they have the personal expertise to make an informed 
assessment or evaluation on their own. We instead rely on expert testimony. Underlying that 
reliance is the assumption that there exists a generally accepted body of principles and procedures 
dictating how a reasonable neurosurgeon should respond in a variety of situations. Consequently, 
we are comfortable permitting the fact finder to draw inferences about what the defendant 
neurosurgeon should have done from the expert’s opinion on what he or she would have done if 
confronted with the same situation.  
The job of corporate director, in contrast, has never been governed by standardized procedures and 
protocols, for at least three reasons. First, the universe of situations facing directors is too vast and 
varied to permit the development of much in the way of uniform procedures, other than such basic 
activities as attending meetings and reviewing financial information. Similarly, the diverse 
backgrounds and experience of individual directors make it impossible to assume the existence of 
any widely shared body of training, knowledge, or professional culture. This is an inevitable 
byproduct of the law’s choice…to frame the prerequisites for service as a director in terms of 
fundamental attributes such as judgment and common sense rather than some specific level of 
business expertise. 
Id. at 581–82 (footnotes omitted). 
538
 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 121.  
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and market conditions. Business is not an exact science and it necessarily involves discretionary 
assessment based on unusual facts. When dealing with complex business matters, directors may 
make mistakes even though they act in good faith. It is not fair to hold directors responsible for 
honest mistakes in their judgment because this type of mistake is inextricably related to the very 
nature of business.
539
  
 Furthermore, judges are primarily trained for legal expertise, and they lack requisite 
expertise in business for reviewing the substantive quality of business decisions.
540
 Indeed, even 
if judges gained expertise in the business field; it would not be desirable to permit them to 
second-guess substantive merits of a business decision because shareholders elect the directors, 
not the judges, to manage the corporation. The concern here is “the perceived institutional 
impropriety of public officials evaluating the substantive quality of private sector business 
decisions.”
541
 Judges review directors’ decisions in a sterilized court room after the fact, and they 
do not face the practical difficulties related to the risky nature of a business decision. Judicial 
review of the quality of business decisions is also tainted by the benefit of hindsight.  
 When directors make their decision, there is a range of plausible alternatives to 
consider.
542
 At the same time, each alternative possesses a risk of loss.
543
 Even if directors 
exercise sound business judgment and make a careful choice among such alternatives, the 
decision might result in a loss to the corporation because the risk associated with this particular 
alternative may materialize.
544
 In this instance, the loss is not a result of the directors’ fault; 
                                                 
539
 See Arsht, supra note 15, at 99–100 (“The rule is a necessary recognition of human fallibility.”). As the court 
observed in Hodges v. New England Screw Co.,: 
[I]f the [directors’] mistake be such as with proper care might have been avoided, they ought to be 
liable. If, on the other hand, the mistake be such as the directors might well make, notwithstanding 
the exercise of proper care, and if they acted in good faith and for the benefit of the [corporation], 
they ought not to be liable. 
 1 R.I. 312, 346 (1850) (quoted from Johnson, supra note 251, at 637). 
540
 See Lynch, supra note 358, at 454; Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 119 (“Judges likely have less general business 
expertise than directors. They also have less information about the specifics of the particular firm in question.”); 
Branson, supra note 213, at 637 (“[Business] decisions often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or surmises as to 
business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic and industry trends. Business decisions 
often come down to matters of touch and feel not susceptible to systematic analysis.”). 
541
 Johnson, supra note 251, at 648.  
542
 See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 114. 
543
 See Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 444. 
544
 See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 114 (“Given the vagaries of business, moreover, even carefully made choices 
among such alternatives may turn out badly.”). 
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rather, it is a result of the risky nature of corporate business.
545
 After the loss occurred, however, 
shareholders and courts may tend to attribute the loss to the decision-makers.
546
  
Accordingly, the concern here “is that ‘[i]nstead of truly judging directors’ behavior, 
[judges] would take bad results as conclusive evidence of bad behavior.”’
547
 After the fact 
reviewers are simply inclined, with the benefit of hindsight, to assume that the loss was 
foreseeable and preventable, ex ante.
548
 Courts cannot perfectly evaluate a business decision ex 
post because “[t]he circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed 
in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably 
based on less than perfect information.”
549
 Therefore, “a reasoned decision at the time made”
550
 
may appear “in hindsight to have been made improvidently,”
551
 and, therefore, courts may 
erroneously impose liability on directors for decisions that resulted in a loss to the corporation.
552
 
The business judgment rule reduces the risk of such unfair liability by limiting judicial review of 
the substantive merits of corporate decisions.  
The business judgment rule is also necessary to attract competent individuals to serve as 
outside independent directors on corporate boards without fear of personal liability.
553
 
Reasonable persons would not serve on boards if the law imposed liability for honest mistakes in 
                                                 
545
 See Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 444 (“If the executive chooses one alternative and the associated negative risk 
materializes, the decision is ‘wrong’ in the very restricted sense that if the executive had it to do all over again he 
would make a different decision, but it is not a bad decision.”). 
546
 See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 114 (“Decision makers tend to assign an erroneously high probability of 
occurrence to a probabilistic event simply because it ended up occurring. If a jury knows that the plaintiff was 
injured, the jury will be biased in favor of imposing negligence liability even if, viewed ex ante, there was a very 
low probability that such an injury would occur and taking precautions against such an injury was not cost 
effective.”); Davis, supra note 17, at 575 (“When those losses are incurred, hindsight may introduce fresh doubts 
into the soundness of the decision.”).  
547
 Johnson, supra note 251, at 632–33 (quoting C.A. Riley, The Company Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: The 
Case for an Onerous but Subjective Standard, 62 MODERN L. REV. 697, 710 (1999)) (emphasis in original). 
548
 See Allen, supra note 250, at 12 (“The first is the obvious fact that in any subsequent shareholder attack on the 
attentiveness of the board, the judicial system cannot perfectly distinguish after the fact between business decisions 
that were negligent and those that were prudent but mistaken or unlucky.”).  
549
 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). 
550
 Id.  
551
 1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 30 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 930 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Ariz. 
1994)).  
552
 See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 115 (“Hence, there is a substantial risk that suing shareholders and reviewing 
judges will be unable to distinguish between competent and negligent management.”); Allen, supra note 250, at 12 
(“…in any subsequent shareholder attack on the attentiveness of the board, the judicial system cannot perfectly 
distinguish after the fact between business decisions that were negligent and those that were prudent but mistaken or 
unlucky.”). 
553
 See Branson, supra note 213, at 637 (“The business judgment rule now more than ever is necessary to encourage 
truly independent persons to serve as directors.”); Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 455 (“Highly qualified 
directors may also avoid service if they face liability risks that are disproportionate to the benefits of service.”). 
 
 
 85  
judgment.
554
 The liability of directors for the consequences of a failed business decision would 
likely be far out of proportion compared to the incentives associated with the directorship.
555
 
Directors of public corporations typically receive a small compensation for their board service.
556
 
Likewise, directors’ ownership interests in their corporations are usually very small.
557
 
Corporations’ losses from failed business decisions and resulting director liability, however, may 
be in excess of millions of dollars.
558
 Therefore, while directors benefit very little from 
successful business decisions, they might face enormous liability because of failed corporate 
projects.
559
 This disjunction between personal risk and reward could deter competent people 
from serving as corporate directors.
560
 The business judgment rule eliminates this “disproportion 
between directors’ upside and downside risks” by protecting them from liability for errors in 
judgment.
561
 The rule’s liability shield encourages qualified people to serve on corporate boards, 
which is in the interest of the corporation and its shareholders.
562
  
Furthermore, the business judgment rule encourages directors to pursue risky business 
strategies that potentially provide greater profit for shareholders.
563
 Shareholders invest in 
corporations with an expectation of profit, and “potential profit often corresponds to the potential 
                                                 
554
 See Arsht, supra note 15, at 97 (“The business judgment rule grew principally from the judicial concern that 
persons of reason, intellect, and integrity would not serve as directors if the law exacted from them a degree of 
prescience not possessed by people of ordinary knowledge.”); see also Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 (“shareholders to a very 
real degree voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment.”). 
555
 Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 445. 
556
 See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
557
 Id. (“[T]hey enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion of any ‘upside’ gains earned by the 
corporation on risky investment projects.”). 
558
 Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 445. 
559
 See Allen, supra note 250, at 12 (“…given the scale of modern business corporations losses from investment 
decisions may be very large while directors individual proportion of gains from a wise decision will be 
comparatively small...”).  
560
 See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (“Given the scale of operation of modem public corporations, this stupefying 
disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens undesirable effects.”). 
561
 Allen, supra note 250, at 12. 
562
 See Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 445 (“…in the absence of some brake on such liability, it might become more 
difficult to attract qualified candidates as non-management directors…”). 
563
 See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 455. The authors observed as follows: 
That deference furthers important public policy values and underscores the social utility of 
encouraging corporate directors to make decisions that may create corporate wealth but that are 
also risky. If law-trained judges are permitted to make after-the-fact judgments that 
businesspersons have made ‘unreasonable’ or ‘negligent’ business decisions for which they must 
respond in monetary damages, directors may, in the future, avoid committing their companies to 
potentially valuable corporate opportunities that have some risk of failure. 
Id.  
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risk.”
564
 It is in the interests of shareholders that directors engage in risky business investments 
because, over time, riskier investments produce higher return.
565
 Accordingly, rational 
shareholders do not want, or should not want, directors to be risk averse.
566
 If directors were to 
be held responsible for consequences of failed business decisions, however, they would simply 
be disinclined to make risky business decisions.
567
 Why would directors make risky decisions if 
they might be responsible for the losses, while the profits would flow to the shareholders if 
successful?
568
 Absent protection from personal liability for unfortunate outcomes of risky 
projects, directors would be unduly risk averse and overly cautious, and that would defeat the 
profit-seeking purpose of shareholders.
569
  
Therefore, the business judgment rule protection is necessary to promote informed risk-
taking by directors, which is essential to business success.
570
 Directors should minimize the risk 
of loss by exercising informed and good faith business judgment, but they should not be afraid to 
make risky business decisions.
571
 Overall, corporations’ losses from inactivity and hesitancy 
                                                 
564
 Joy, 692 F.2d at 885.  
565
 See Hecker, supra note 26, at 937 (“Over time, riskier decisions produce greater profit, even after factoring 
losses, than do more conservative decisions.”); Davis, supra note 17, at 575 (“Risky investments generally involve 
larger potential profits in exchange for the enhanced risk of loss.”); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (“Shareholders’ 
investment interests, across the full range of their diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if corporate 
directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted 
returns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital.”). 
566
 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052. 
567
 See Allen, supra note 250, at 12 (“…absent protection from later liability, we might expect directors to be 
disinclined to accept much risk in new projects.”); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (“…directors will tend to deviate 
from this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to undertake a risky investment, the 
directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative liability for any 
resulting corporate loss.”); Disney, 907 A.2d at 698 (“Should the Court apportion liability based on the ultimate 
outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful directors or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily 
take decisions that minimize risk, not maximize value.”). 
568
 See Davis, supra note 17, at 575; Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 445.  
569
 Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 115 (“If liability results from bad outcomes, without regard to the ex ante quality of 
the decision or the decision-making process, however, managers will be discouraged from taking risks.”); Davis, 
supra note 17, at 575 (“If corporate directors face personal liability in such circumstances they may steer away from 
risky courses of action, even though the course of action is, on the whole, in the best interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders.”); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS cmt. c. to § 
4.01(c) (1994) (“For efficiency reasons, corporate decision makers should be permitted to act decisively and with 
relative freedom from a judge’s or jury’s subsequent second-guessing. It is desirable to encourage directors and 
officers to enter new markets, develop new products, innovate, and take other business risks.”). 
570
 See Branson, supra note 213, at 637. 
571
 See Lynch, supra note 358, at 454. The Joy court explained this point as follows: 
Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the 
diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the best choice since 
great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in others.... A rule which 
penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may not be in the interest of 
shareholders generally. 
 
 
 87  
would be greater than the losses arising from risky investments.
572
 The business judgment rule 
facilitates corporate risk-taking by protecting directors from being liable for unfortunate 
outcomes of their decisions.
573
 The rule’s protection ensures that directors do not deviate from 
rational acceptance of risk-taking because of the fear of personal liability. Once directors have 
made an informed, honest, and disinterested decision, the business judgment rule requires courts 
to respect the directors’ judgment and prevents them from imposing liability for the bad 
outcomes of such decisions. Thus, the rule creates a safe environment for directors to make “bold 
but desirable decisions.”
574
  
4. The Business Judgment Rule as a Presumption in Delaware 
a. Methods of Rebutting the Presumption 
 In Delaware, the business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”
575
  As a procedural guide 
for litigants, “the business judgment presumption is a rule of evidence that places the initial 
burden of proof on the plaintiff.”
576
 A plaintiff shareholder has the burden to rebut the 
presumption by establishing facts showing that a board decision lacks at least one element of the 
business judgment rule.
577
 The party challenging the decision must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the presumption of the business judgment rule is inapplicable either because the 
directors made an “unintelligent or unadvised judgment” or acted in bad faith, or that the 
directors had a financial interest in the subject matter of the decision.
578
  
 A plaintiff attacking the informational element of the business judgment rule must show 
that the directors failed to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to 
                                                 
Joy, 692 F.2d at 885–86. 
572
 See Lynch, supra note 358, at 454; see also Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 (“…it is very much in the interest of 
shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions ....”). 
573
 See Hecker, supra note 26, at 937 (“The business judgment rule … attempts to free directors from the fear of 
personal liability if a decision that appeared to be a reasonable risk at the time turns out badly.”); Davis, supra note 
17, at 575 (“The BJR responds to this problem of perverse incentives by assuring directors that courts will not delve 
too deeply into the soundness of their decisions.”); Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 445 (“…directors might tend to be 
unduly risk-averse, because if a highly risky decision had a positive outcome the corporation but not the directors 
would gain, while if it had a negative outcome the directors might be required to make up the corporate loss. The 
business judgment rule helps to offset that tendency.”). 
574
 Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 445.  
575
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
576
 Cinerama Inc. v. Technicolor Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995). 
577
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
578
 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 756 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
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them before making the decision.
579
 A plaintiff must show the directors’ failure to make a 
reasonable effort to prepare themselves to make a decision. For example, a plaintiff may rebut 
the informed business judgment presumption by establishing that the directors approved a major 
corporate transaction without receiving and reviewing any expert advice, without receiving and 
reviewing a written summary of the proposed transaction, and without discussing and 
considering material facts or terms related to the transaction.
580
   
 To establish a failure to act in good faith, a plaintiff may prove the directors acted with 
subjective bad faith: an actual intent to harm the corporation; a purpose other than advancing the 
best interests of the corporation; or the intent to violate applicable positive law. Alternatively, the 
plaintiff may show that the directors intentionally failed “to act in the face of a known duty to 
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.”
581
 Such conduct constitutes obvious, but 
not exclusive, examples of bad faith. As the Delaware Chancery Court stated, “there may be 
other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged.”
582
 
 The plaintiff may also rebut the business judgment presumption by proving the existence 
of “the adverse self-interest of the directors or of related persons to the interest of the 
corporation.”
583
 The plaintiff must show either that a director stands on both sides of a 
transaction or that a director receives a personal benefit from a transaction not received by the 
shareholders generally.
584
 Also, a plaintiff may rebut the business judgment presumption by 
showing lack of director independence. In order to do so, a plaintiff must to show that a director 
receives a substantial benefit from supporting a transaction or that the director’s judgment is 
based on personal or extraneous considerations rather than the corporate merits of the 
transaction.
585
 If the plaintiff can prove the existence of self-dealing or the lack of independence, 
                                                 
579
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
580
 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). 
581
 Disney, 907 A.2d at 755. 
582
 Id. at 756. 
583
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
584
 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993). 
585
 Id. at 362. See also Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1167. The Cinerama court stated that, to rebut the presumption of 
director independence in an arms-length transaction, the plaintiff must show that the personal benefit the director 
receiving is material. The test of materiality involves a subjective “actual person” standard. Accordingly, under the 
test of materiality, “[it] would be required to determine not how or whether a reasonable person in the same or 
similar circumstances ... would be affected by … [the personal benefit], but whether this director in fact was or 
would likely be affected.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
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and if the transaction in question is not approved by a majority of the disinterested directors or 
shareholders, the business judgment presumption will not apply.
586
   
b. Effect of Rebutting the Presumption: Entire Fairness Standard 
If the party challenging the directors’ decision succeeds in rebutting the business 
judgment rule presumption, the burden shifts to the defendant directors to demonstrate that the 
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
587
 If the directors’ conduct 
failed to satisfy at least one element of the rule, they will lose the substantive protection attached 
to the business judgment presumption.
588
 Accordingly, courts will review the directors’ decision 
under the strict standard of entire fairness when the business judgment rule is rebutted. In an 
entire fairness review, courts exercise a thorough examination of both the process and substance 
of a decision.
589
 
The rebuttal of the business judgment presumption and subsequent application of the 
entire fairness standard along with the shifting of the burden of proof “does not create per se 
liability on the part of directors.”
590
 Still, it places a difficult burden on the part of directors to 
convince the court that the decision in question is entirely fair to the corporation. Under the 
business judgment rule, the substance of a decision is immunized from judicial review. The 
entire fairness standard, on the other hand, includes a searching review of the substantive merits 
of a decision as well as the process by which that decision was reached. The entire fairness 
standard requires an “exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction [or the decision] is 
entirely fair to the stockholders.”
591
 Thus, as the business judgment rule is a difficult obstacle for 
a plaintiff to overcome, the entire fairness standard creates equal difficulties for the directors 
seeking to avoid personal monetary liability.  
                                                 
586
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a). See also Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1168. A material interest of one or more 
directors less than a majority of those voting would rebut the application of the business judgment rule if the 
plaintiff proved that “the interested director controls or dominates the board as a whole or [that] the interested 
director fail[ed] to disclose his interest in the transaction to the board and a reasonable board member would have 
regarded the existence of the material interest as a significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed transaction.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
587
 Disney, 906 A.2d at 52; Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. 
588
 Cede, 634 A.2d at 368.  
589
 Id. at 361. 
590
 Id. at 371. 
591
 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994). 
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The entire fairness standard has two basic components; fair dealing and fair price.
592
 The 
fair dealing component relates to “how the board action was initiated, structured, negotiated, and 
timed.”
593
 The fair price component concerns “the economic and financial considerations of the 
proposed decision.”
594
 Under the entire fairness standard of review, “the defendant directors 
must establish to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair 
dealing and fair price.”
595
 In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court explained 
the entire fairness standard as follows: 
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces 
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed 
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The 
latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed 
merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any 
other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. However, the test 
for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must 
be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness. However, in a non-fraudulent 
transaction we recognize that price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other 
features of the merger.
596
  
 
 The entire fairness standard was originally designed to review self-dealing corporate 
transactions in Delaware law. In Cede v. Technicolor, the Delaware Supreme Court expanded the 
realm of the entire fairness standard to include judicial inquiry where the business judgment rule 
is rebutted for reasons other than adverse financial interest. The court held that, if a plaintiff 
overcomes the business judgment rule by proving that “directors, in reaching their challenged 
decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due 
care,”
597
 the burden shifts to defendant directors to prove the entire fairness of the transaction.
598
 
Therefore, in the decision-making context, there are two applicable standards of review: the 
business judgment rule and entire fairness. Thus, a directors’ challenged decision is initially 
subject to business judgment review, but if the business judgment rule is rebutted, the decision is 
reviewed under the entire fairness standard.  
Accordingly, if a plaintiff shows that directors made a decision in a grossly negligent 
manner, the process and the substance of the decision are both subject to judicial review under 
                                                 
592
 Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, 766 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 2000). 
593
 In re Digex, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1207 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
594
 Id. 
595
 Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  
596
 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
597
 Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. 
598
 Id. 
 
 
 91  
the entire fairness standard. To rebut the business judgment rule, a plaintiff is not required to 
show damages and the proximate cause between the grossly negligent conduct and the damages. 
A showing of grossly negligent conduct is sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule. In 
Cede, the Chancery Court rejected the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had the burden 
of proving the proximate cause and injury and had failed to do so.
599
 The Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed. Relying on Van Gorkom, the court stated that a showing of a breach of the duty 
of care by a grossly negligent process is sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule.
600
 The 
court observed: “Requiring a plaintiff to show injury through unfair price would effectively 
relieve director defendants found to have breached their duty of care of establishing the entire 
fairness of a challenged transaction.”
601
 Therefore, the directors’ decision is subject to judicial 
scrutiny under the fairness standard if it is made by a grossly negligent process without more. 
The Cede court’s holding that required the entire fairness standard in reviewing a 
disinterested decision or transaction where the business judgment rule is rebutted has been 
extensively criticized by commentators.
602
 Commentators stated that before Cede, alleged 
breaches of the duty of care and duty of loyalty were reviewed under different standards, and if 
there was a breach of the duty of care, the burden of proof fell upon the plaintiff to show 
resulting injury.
603
 The Cede court “changed [the] clear demarcation by which duty of care and 
duty of loyalty claims are reviewed.” After Cede, “all a plaintiff need show is a breach of the 
duty of care, irrespective of any resulting harm, to trigger the far more liability threatening 
procedural consequences of changing the review standard to the more exacting entire fairness 
                                                 
599
 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *57 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1991) (relying on 
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F.614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (involving a tort action)). 
600
 Cede, 634 A.2d at 367–68 (“The Chancellor’s restatement of the rule—to require Cinerama to prove a proximate 
cause relationship between the Technicolor board’s presumed breach of its duty of care and the shareholder’s 
resultant loss—is contrary to well-established Delaware precedent, irreconcilable with Van Gorkom, …”) (emphasis 
in original).  
601
 Id. at 369. 
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 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 251, at 638, 644, 648–49; Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, 460–63. But see 
EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 623. Professor Eisenberg took a moderate approach with respect to the Cede 
court’s application of the entire fairness standard in the duty of care context. He observed as follows:  
If the conditions of the business judgment rule are not satisfied, then the standard by which the 
quality of a decision is reviewed is comparable to the standard of conduct for making the 
decision—that is, the standard of review is based on entire fairness or reasonability. This is nicely 
illustrated by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., in 1993. 
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
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 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 460.  
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scrutiny.”
604
 The entire fairness standard not only shifts the burden from the plaintiff to the 
defendant directors, but it also entails an exacting judicial review into the substance of a 
decision. One commentator stated: “Cede punctures the protective shelter of the business 
judgment rule by invasively scrutinizing for fairness the substance of director decisions in a duty 
of care case involving the exercise of business judgment.”
605
 Therefore, “[t]he ex post judicial 
review standard of fairness … is more demanding than the ex ante duty to act with care.”
606
 
Commentators also stated that the entire fairness standard would have no utility in reviewing 
care cases not involving a specific transaction, because “due care cases in non-transactional 
settings … do not involve discrete market-based events that lend themselves to a fairness 
analysis.”
607
 
An alternative reading of the Cede holding may suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court 
in Cede attempted to reframe Delaware’s duty of care law in accordance with the harsh criticism 
concerning the court’s previous ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkom.
608
 In Van Gorkom, the court 
found that defendant directors’ decision-making process was grossly negligent, and therefore 
they were liable for the resulting damages.
609
 Commentators criticized Van Gorkom holding for 
putting too much emphasis on process and disregarding substance.
610
 Commentators further 
criticized Van Gorkom holding for disregarding subjective factors in the case, such as the 
business experience of directors or their familiarity with the corporation’s financial status.
611
 
In Cede, the court decided to put an intermediate step between the grossly negligent 
conduct and the resulting liability. The court held that a decision that is reached by a grossly 
                                                 
604
 Id. at 462. 
605
 Johnson, supra note 251, at 638. 
606
 Id. at 649. 
607
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 462. 
608
 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  
609
 Id. at 893. 
610
 See, e.g., Quillen, supra note 198, at 498. Former Justice Quillen observed as follows:  
If the price in Trans Union had been $110 instead of $55, then most reasonable decision makers 
would have been comfortable with less information. The same is of course true with a $55 cash in 
hand price instead of a $45 price. Thus the particular decision option facing the decision maker 
has some bearing on the threshold issue. This connection plus the presumed business expertise of 
the director suggest that the duty of inquiry should have both an objective and a subjective nexus 
with need or desirability. The ‘all material information reasonably available’ test of Trans Union 
puts the emphasis on access rather than need or desirability. 
Id. See also Branson, supra note 213, at 632 (“By placing a premium upon the process that directors follow to reach 
a decision, rather than the resulting decision itself, the business judgment rule serves as a vibrant illustration of 
process engineering and the attorney’s role in it.”) . 
611
 See infra Part E.1.a. 
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negligent process should be subject to fairness review before courts impose liability for damages. 
The entire fairness standard includes certain flexibility for courts to review directors’ conduct in 
the decision-making context.
612
 In fairness review, courts examine both the decision-making 
process and the resulting decision in its entirety. Cede II analysis shows that, the entire fairness 
standard includes an examination of the decision-making process along with the special 
circumstances of the case and the subjective factors related to the defendant directors. For 
example, in Cede II, the court considered the factor that the CEO of the company, who led the 
negotiations in the merger process, was an experienced CEO, and he was highly familiar with the 
prospects of the company.
613
 Accordingly, the entire fairness standard requires an examination of 
all aspects of a decision, including the individual experience of directors and the special 
circumstances under which they made their decision. Furthermore, courts in fairness review give 
substantial weight to directors’ judgment if they acted in good faith to further the best interests of 
the corporation.
614
 Similarly, courts give substantial weight to directors’ judgment if the 
transaction in question was initiated in arms’-length bargaining.
615
 
Accordingly, fairness review gives directors an opportunity to avoid liability even though 
their decision-making process is grossly negligent. In other words, if the decision-making 
process does not satisfy the objective gross negligence standard, directors are provided a chance 
to convince the court under substantive (and subjective) fairness review. Therefore, lending an 
ear to the criticism concerning the Van Gorkom holding, the Cede court gave directors an 
opportunity to discuss different aspects of their decision-making process and the resulting 
decision in its entirety. Instead of automatically imposing liability for grossly negligent conduct, 
the court employed the entire fairness standard for determining whether directors’ grossly 
negligent conduct nevertheless may be subject to judicial deference under the special 
circumstances of the case.
616
 
                                                 
612
 See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1381 (Del.1993) (stating that entire fairness review is “not in the 
nature of a litmus test that lends itself to bright line precision or rigid doctrine”); Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1179 
(‘“perfection is not possible, or expected’ as a condition precedent to a judicial determination of entire fairness”’ 
because “the entire fairness standard is not even applied unless the presumption of the business judgment rule has 
been rebutted”); Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 F.Supp.2d 610, 629 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“No inflexible rule has been 
established by which to test the ‘fairness’ of a transaction.”). 
613
 Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1178. 
614
 Id. at 1174. 
615
 Id. at 1172. 
616
 Nevertheless, the Cede court put a difficult burden on the defendant directors to prove the entire fairness of a 
decision. Furthermore, the entire fairness standard includes a review of the substantive merits of a decision, and such 
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 Alternatively, the Cede holding may be seen as an attempt by the Delaware Supreme 
Court to reframe Delaware’s fiduciary analysis under the business judgment rule after legislative 
developments in the field of the duty of care. As a response to Van Gorkom, the Delaware 
legislature amended its corporation law to add section 102(b)(7).
617
 This section allows 
corporations to adopt charter provisions eliminating directors’ monetary liability for due care 
violations. After the enactment of section 102(b)(7), corporations quickly adopted charter 
provisions to eliminate directors’ personal liability for duty of care breaches. Therefore, the duty 
of care no longer provided a legal basis for director liability. In the presence of an exculpatory 
provision, directors may be held monetarily liable only for loyalty or good faith breaches.  
Accordingly, it was expected that the plaintiffs’ bar would modify its approach and 
litigate due care claims either under good faith or the duty of loyalty.
618
 In that environment, the 
Cede court held that the applicable standard is entire fairness where the business judgment rule is 
rebutted by a showing that directors breached any one of their fiduciary duties—good faith, 
loyalty, or due care.
619
 In so holding, Cede unified the judicial standard of fiduciary review under 
the business judgment rule. Therefore, if a plaintiff rebuts the business judgment rule 
presumption by showing a breach of any of the duty of care, good faith, or loyalty, the applicable 
standard is entire fairness with the burden on the defendants to demonstrate that their decision 
was made in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. Professor Hecker explained 
this point as follows:  
[The Cede court] held that if the business judgment rule is rebutted because that process was 
grossly negligent, the case would be tried under the entire fairness standard with the burden of 
proof on the directors to establish that their decision was made in good faith and in the best 
interests of the corporation. In so holding, the Cede court was amazingly prescient, because after 
Disney and Stone, monetary liability is predicated on lack of good faith, which sounds in loyalty. 
In the decision-making context, if the plaintiff rebuts the business judgment rule in any of the 
three applicable ways, the case appropriately is tried under the entire fairness loyalty standard. If 
the business judgment rule is not rebutted the plaintiff must show waste, which is a decision so 
                                                 
review may not be desirable in the duty of care context. Alternatively, it may be suggested that the judicial review of 
directors’ decision-making process should include an examination of the special circumstances of the case. For 
example, PCG Section § 4.01(c)(2) requires directors to be “informed with respect to the subject of the business 
judgment to the extent the director … reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances.” PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c)(2) (1994). Here, the term 
“reasonably believes” refers to both an objective and subjective content. Accordingly, “[i]n evaluating what is a 
reasonable belief in a particular situation, the ‘informed’ requirement in § 4.01(c)(2) should be interpreted 
realistically and with an appreciation of the factual context in which the business judgment was made.” PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 cmt. e to § 4.01(c). 
617
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). For a detailed explanation of section 102(b)(7) see infra Part E.2.a. 
618
 See infra Chapter IV.B.2. 
619
 Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1179. 
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reckless and irrational that it is explainable only on the basis of bad faith, which again is a loyalty 
breach….If, on the other hand, the factual situation is one of oversight, it has been clear since 
Caremark that the standard is lack of good faith, which after Stone, also is the duty of loyalty.
620
 
 
Thus, the Cede court unified the standard of review under which courts examine a director 
decision where the business judgment rule is rebutted.  
D. The Standard of Review: Monitoring/Oversight 
 The business judgment rule protects only director action; it has no application “where 
directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act.”
621
 A 
deliberate decision not to act may enjoy the rule’s protection, but simple inaction resulting from 
ignorance is not within the scope of the rule.
622
 The purpose of the rule’s protection is to 
encourage directors to act and perform their functions without fear of personal liability. 
Protecting directors from dormancy or from failure to act would not serve that purpose. Thus, as 
Judge Winter stated, “the business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify 
its existence”,
623
 and it is inapplicable to cases that involve unconsidered director inaction. 
 Accordingly, the business judgment rule is not applicable to cases in which directors have 
failed to exercise oversight over corporate affairs. In the oversight context, director liability may 
arise “from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention 
would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”
624
 The alleged fiduciary breach in that context 
involves director nonfeasance rather than a business judgment, and there is no policy or fairness 
reason which justifies business judgment rule protection for this type of director conduct.
625
 If, 
for example, directors received but did not review financial reports over a period of time, and 
thus allowed corporate funds to be looted by executives, the protection of the rule would be 
                                                 
620
 Hecker, supra note 26, at 954–55.  
621
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813. 
622
 Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp. 57 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. Ch. 1986), reargument denied, 1987 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 522, 1987 WL 28434 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987). 
623
 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). 
624
 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (emphasis in original). 
625
 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) cmt. c. (1994) 
(“There is, however, no reason to provide special protection where no business decision making is to be found. If, 
for example, directors have failed to oversee the conduct of the corporation’s business, by not even considering the 
need for an effective audit process, and this permits an executive to abscond with corporate funds, business 
judgment rule protection would be manifestly undesirable.”); Arsht, supra note 15, at 112 (“Where the charge is that 
by reason of inexcusable unawareness or inattention the directors failed to take corrective or preventive action 
toward matters about which something should have been done to prevent harm to the corporation or its stockholders, 
the business judgment rule provides no defense. Such a charge involves the failure to act, not the exercise of any 
judgment...But having made no deliberate decision, the defense that directors are not liable for honest mistakes of 
judgment is not available in such cases.”). 
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undesirable.
626
 However, the board’s decisions “as to the specifics regarding implementation of 
its oversight functions” are subject to the business judgment presumption.
627
 For example, if 
directors exercised a judgment to employ a reporting and information system to ensure legal 
compliance within the corporation, the adequacy of such system will be reviewed under the 
business judgment rule.  
 The question arises then, in the absence of the business judgment rule, what standard of 
review is applicable to determine liability for alleged director inaction. A single Delaware 
Chancery opinion answered this question by concluding that “ordinary negligence is the 
appropriate standard of liability in director neglect claims.”
628
 Likewise, the American Law 
Institute adopted ordinary negligence as the appropriate standard to review director conduct in 
situations of “omission.”
629
 The idea behind this position is that if directors’ conduct does not 
qualify for the rule’s protection, it should be subject to the default due care standard of ordinary 
negligence rather than the lenient standard of gross negligence, which is afforded to directors in 
reviewing the decision-making process under the business judgment presumption.
630
   
The prevalent view in Delaware, however, appears to suggest that gross negligence is the 
appropriate standard in the oversight context as well. In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
                                                 
626
 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. c. 
627
 Hecker, supra note 26, at 938. See also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969 (“Obviously the level of detail that is 
appropriate for such an information system is a question of business judgment.”); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. c. (stating that the directors’ informed decision not to install an oversight program on a 
specific matter is protected by § 4.0l(c)). 
628
 Rabkin, 1987 LEXIS 522, at *10. 
629
 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. c. (stating that in omission situations, the directors’ 
conduct would be reviewed under the reasonable care standards of § 4.01(a) and not protected by § 4.0l(c)). 
630
 The Rabkin court explained this point as follows: 
The question remains whether the standard of care applied to directors who attempt to exercise 
their business judgment also applies to those who abdicate their managerial responsibility in whole 
or in part. I think not. As I read Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra and the cases cited therein, the gross 
negligence standard is really a corollary to the business judgment rule. As the Court noted in Van 
Gorkom, ‘[t]he business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of 
the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.’ Consistent with the wide latitude granted to 
them under the business judgment rule, directors who undertake their decision making 
responsibility will not be held liable either for a fault in the decision making process or the 
decision itself unless they were grossly negligent. It does not seem logical to accord the same 
deference to directors who abdicate their managerial responsibilities. There would be little 
meaning to the business judgment rule if, in cases not implicating the duty of loyalty, directors 
were given the same protection from liability whether it applies or not. 
Rabkin, 1987 Lexis, at *9-10 (citations omitted); see also Arsht, supra note 15, at 112 (“In such cases, the 
appropriate inquiry is simply whether the directors acted with the degree of care required of them in the 
discharge of their duties.”). 
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Manufacturing Company,
631
 decided long before Rabkin, the Delaware Supreme Court 
prescribed a lenient standard to review alleged oversight failure of directors. In Graham, the 
plaintiff claimed director liability for damages which company suffered as a result of antitrust 
violations.
632
 The plaintiff asserted that directors were liable due to failure to take reasonable 
steps to discover and prevent the unlawful conduct.
633
 The Graham court began its analysis by 
stating that directors are required to exercise ordinary care in managing corporate affairs.
634
 The 
court added: “[W]hether or not by neglect [directors] have made themselves liable for failure to 
exercise proper control depends on the circumstances and facts of the particular case.”
635
 While 
the court’s statement of the directors’ duty of care suggested the ordinary negligence standard, its 
subsequent analysis indicated that something more than ordinary negligence was necessary to 
hold directors liable in an oversight failure. The court stated: 
In the last analysis, the question of whether a corporate director has become liable for losses to the 
corporation through neglect of duty is determined by the circumstances. If he has recklessly 
reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to 
perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious 
danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the burden of liability upon him.
636
 
 
In several cases after Graham, with one exception,
637
 Delaware courts held that gross 
negligence is the appropriate standard to determine liability in claims of director inaction or lack 
of oversight.
638
 Similarly, commentators who examined Delaware case law in the oversight 
context observed that:  
With or without the business judgment rule (including its presumption), in order to recover money 
damages from a director for violation of the duty of care, the plaintiff must carry the burden of 
                                                 
631
 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see also Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961) (finding non-affiliated 
directors liable for abdicating their responsibilities in a grossly negligent manner by paying no average attention to 
their duties). 
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 Graham, 188 A.2d at 127. 
633
 Id.  
634
 Id. at 130  
635
 Id. (emphasis added). 
636
Id. But see Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.7 (stating that Graham and Lutz do not present issues of business 
judgment although director liability in those cases have been adjudicated upon the business judgment rule); Cede & 
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 n.31 (Del. 1993) (stating that the Graham formulation is quite confusing 
and unhelpful because it speaks of prudent man standard but then it requires a reckless conduct for liability).  
637
 See supra notes 628–30 & accompanying text.   
638
 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that appropriate standard 
for determining liability for director inaction is widely believed to be gross negligence); Seminaris v. Landa, 662 
A.2d 1350, 1355 (Del. Ch. 1995) (stating that to hold directors liable the plaintiff is required to demonstrate that 
they were grossly negligent in failing exercise oversight); In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. S’holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 
1270 (Del. Ch. 1995) (implicitly accepting gross negligence standard by citing Graham and stating that plaintiff’s 
claim in the oversight context did not meet the standard in Graham). 
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proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, (i) the elements of violation of the duty of care and 
(ii) gross negligence.
639
 
 
The policy reason underlying these decisions is that a demanding test of liability in the 
oversight context, as well as decision-making context, is necessary to encourage qualified 
persons to assume directorships in corporate boards.
640
 
  Nevertheless, if one considers the effect of exculpatory charter provisions for the duty of 
care, there remains little importance of a “negligence” standard in determining director liability 
in either the oversight or decision-making context.
641
 Exculpatory provisions eliminate personal 
liability of directors for due care breaches in the oversight context as well as in the decision-
making context. If a corporation’s charter includes an exculpatory provision, the directors will 
only be responsible if their unconsidered inaction or lack of oversight reaches the level of failure 
to act in good faith. Accordingly, although directors are required to assure that an adequate 
information and reporting system exists within the corporation, a failure to do so may result in 
director liability only if it amounts to lack of good faith. The test of liability to determine a good 
faith breach in the oversight function is articulated in Caremark. There, the Delaware Chancery 
Court stated that “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight” will 
establish the lack of good faith.
642
 The Delaware Supreme Court approved the Caremark 
formulation in Stone v. Ritter and further explained the conditions that predicate director liability 
in the oversight context. The court stated that a lack of good faith can be found in the oversight 
context if:  
(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) 
having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its 
operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention. In either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they 
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.
643
 
 
                                                 
639
 Balotti & Hanks, supra note 378, at 1346; see also Veasey & Manning, supra note 460, at 928 (stating that the 
language of Delaware cases “supports the conclusion that the Delaware standard is gross negligence”). 
640
 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. Professor Hecker explains this point as follows: 
These decisions are supported, explicitly or implicitly, by the view that the policy of the law 
should be to encourage qualified people to assume directorships by freeing them from fear of 
liability for all but the grossest breaches of the duty of care. 
Hecker, supra note 26, at 939. See also Davis, supra note 17, at 576 (stating that under “strong risk allocation 
rationale,” the business judgment rule applies to director inattention as well).  
641
 See infra Part E.2.a. (examining exculpatory provisions). 
642
 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
643
 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). The court also stated that the Caremark test is fully consistent 
with the Delaware Supreme Court’s good faith test defined in Disney. Id. at 369. 
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Thus, since the advent of exculpatory charter provisions Delaware law has required a very 
demanding test of liability in the oversight context. 
E. Exculpatory Charter Provisions 
1. The Genesis: Smith v. Van Gorkom and Its Effects 
a. The Case  
 Smith v. Van Gorkom
644
 is possibly the most famous Delaware case in the history of 
corporate fiduciary law. The Delaware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom held that, despite the 
absence of bad faith, fraud, illegality, or self-dealing, defendant directors were not protected by 
the business judgment rule because they failed to adequately inform themselves for their decision 
to approve the sale of the company.
645
 In so holding, the court exposed directors to catastrophic 
personal liability. The court’s holding shocked the business world. The Delaware legislature 
swiftly responded by enacting section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
646
 
Section 102(b)(7) permits certificates of incorporation to contain a provision that exculpates 
directors from personal liability for monetary damages for a breach of the duty of care. The 
overwhelming majority of Delaware corporations have amended their charters to include such a 
provision. Thus, the holding of Van Gorkom resulted in the demise of the duty of care.  
 In Van Gorkom, the plaintiff shareholders claimed that the directors of Trans Union 
Corporation breached their duty of care in approving the cash-out merger of the company.
647
 
Jerome Van Gorkom, the chairman and chief executive officer of Trans Union, initiated the 
merger without informing or consulting other board members or senior management.
648
 Van 
Gorkom approached his friend, Jay Pritzker, a famous corporate takeover specialist, with a 
proposal to sell the company at a price of $55 per share.
649
 The price of $55 per share—a 
premium of approximately $20 over the company’s market price—was based on rough 
calculations for the feasibility of a leveraged buy-out.
650
 Pritzker showed interest in Van 
Gorkom’s proposal and made a cash-out merger offer at $55 per share on the condition that the 
                                                 
644
 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
645
 Id. at 881. 
646
 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). For a detailed explanation of section 102(b)(7) see infra Part E.2.a. 
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 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 863. 
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 Id. at 866. 
649
 Id. 
650
 Id. 
 
 
 100  
Trans Union Board act on his offer within the following three days.
651
 Pritzker also agreed to 
permit Trans Union to accept higher offers within 90 days, but he imposed substantial limitations 
on that extension.
652
  
 To obtain board approval, Van Gorkom called a special meeting without notifying the 
other directors concerning the subject matter of the meeting. He also called a meeting of senior 
management prior to the board meeting. No members of the board or senior management, except 
two officers, had any prior knowledge of the proposed merger. Most of the senior management, 
and especially the chief financial officer, responded negatively to the offer. The chief financial 
officer stated that price was too low, the timing was wrong, and the conditions of the offer would 
inhibit competing offers.
653
 Notwithstanding objections by the senior officers, Van Gorkom 
proceeded to the board meeting. 
  Van Gorkom began the board meeting with a twenty-minute oral presentation explaining 
his efforts and Pritzker’s subsequent offer. The chief financial officer attended the meeting to 
inform the board concerning his previous studies of a leveraged buy-out. He explained that his 
study was primarily prepared for a feasibility of a leveraged buy-out, and the study did not 
indicate a valuation for the company. He further explained that the study indicated a price of 
$50-$60 and $55-$65 per share, and the proposed price of $55 for the cash-out merger was “in 
the range of a fair price,” but “at the beginning of the range.”
654
 Van Gorkom stated that the 90 
day market test would indicate if $55 was a fair price.
655
 An outside legal counselor, hired by 
Van Gorkom, advised the board that they might be sued if they did not accept the offer and that a 
fairness opinion was not required as a matter of law.
656
 The board members did not receive and 
review the merger agreement or a written summary of it.
657
  Without any further inquiry, the 
board approved the merger in that meeting upon two hours of consideration.
658
 
                                                 
651
 Id. at 867. 
652
 Id. Trans Union directors were permitted to accept higher offers within 90 days. However, the offer included the 
condition that Trans Union would permit Pritzker to buy 1,000,000 shares of Trans Union stock at $38 which would 
deter higher bidders. The offer also included prohibitions against furnishing nonpublic information to other bidders 
and soliciting bids. Id. 
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 Id. at 867–68. 
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 Id. at 869. 
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 Id. at 868. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at 874. 
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 Id. at 869. The board added to the proposed merger agreement the provision that the acquirer “acknowledges that 
Trans Union directors may have a competing fiduciary obligation to the shareholders under certain circumstances.” 
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 Subsequently, the company made a public announcement of the proposed merger. Soon 
after, a dissent arose over the merger agreement among senior management.
659
 Van Gorkom met 
Pritzker to modify merger agreement to address the concerns of the senior management. 
Accordingly, Pritzker agreed to permit Trans Union to actively seek other offers, however, with 
serious constraints on the company’s ability to negotiate with the potential bidders and to 
withdraw from the proposed merger agreement.
660
 In a subsequent meeting, without receiving 
and reviewing the actual copy, the board approved the amended agreement upon oral 
discussion.
661
 Therefore, the board failed to discover the actual implications of the amended 
agreement. Trans Union’s efforts to solicit higher offers proved fruitless due to the constraint 
included in the amendment.
662
 The board held a final meeting and voted to proceed with the 
proposed merger, which was approved in the subsequent shareholder meeting by 69.9 percent of 
the outstanding shares.
663
  
 The Van Gorkom court began its analysis by explaining the business judgment rule and 
the necessity of an informed business judgment for the protection of the rule. The court also 
emphasized that under section 251(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law the defendant 
directors had a special duty to act in an informed and deliberate manner in the specific context of 
a merger.
664
 The court concluded that the directors failed to reach an informed business judgment 
in a grossly negligent manner because they did not make an inquiry regarding intrinsic value of 
the company or  regarding the adequacy of $55 per share price, they did not review the merger 
agreement or any written summary of it, and they approved the merger only upon two hours’ 
consideration relying on Van Gorkom’s twenty minute oral presentation, without prior notice, 
and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.
665
  
                                                 
Id. at 879. The defendant directors claimed that this provision meant that they reserved the right to accept better 
offers and share nonpublic information with potential bidders. Id. at 869. 
659
 Id.at 869. 
660
 Id. at 870. The amendment included the condition that Trans Union could accept better offers from a third party 
only if the parties entered into a definitive agreement, not conditioned on financing or any other contingency. Id. at 
884.   
661
 Id. at 870. 
662
 Id. General Electric Company showed interest in Trans Union; however they first requested the company to 
withdraw from Pritzker agreement. When Pritzker refused, General Electric terminated further discussions with 
Trans Union. Id. at 886 n.30. 
663
 Id. at 870. 
664
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b).  
665
 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874. 
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Furthermore, Van Gorkom and the other directors ignored the red flags raised by the 
chief financial officer against Pritzker’s offer in the senior management and board meetings.
666
 
The price of $55 included a substantial premium over the market price. However, that alone was 
not a sufficient parameter to rely on because the directors knew that the market had consistently 
undervalued the worth of Trans Union’s shares.
667
 The court did not require the board to have an 
outside valuation study or to shop the company among competing bidders to exercise an 
informed business judgment.
668
 Rather, the court simply required the board to have a credible 
basis for the adequacy of the proposed sale price. An inside or outside study concerning the 
intrinsic value of the corporation, or alternatively, an unfettered market test, would have 
provided a sound basis for determining the fair value of the company.
669
 The Trans Union 
directors, however, approved the offer based on Van Gorkom’s understanding of the substance 
of the merger agreement, which Van Gorkom himself had never read.
670
  
 Considering all these factors, the court held that the Tran Union directors failed to reach 
an informed business judgment to approve the proposed merger agreement.
671
 The court further 
held that subsequent actions by the board, including the amendment of the original agreement to 
permit solicitation of other bids, did not cure the initial failure because the amendment included 
serious constraints of which directors were not aware.
672
 Finally, the court held that the directors 
breached their duty of complete candor to shareholders by failing to disclose all material facts 
they knew, or should have known, and therefore, the shareholder approval did not cure the 
board’s defective approval process.
673
 The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
                                                 
666
 Id at 877. The court stated that if the board had made an inquiry of the chief executive officer, they would have 
discovered the inadequacy of the $55 per share price and other disadvantages of the offer. Id.  See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Smith v. Van Gorkom, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 
08-13, at 17 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130972 (supporting the court’s 
position by stating that disagreement among senior management raised questions about the fairness of the 
transaction). But see Quillen, supra note 198, at 479 (criticizing the court for drawing no inferences from the 
continuing interest of the senior management).       
667
 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876 (“the adequacy of a premium is indeterminate unless it is assessed in terms of 
other competent and sound valuation information that reflects the value of the particular business”). 
668
 Id.  
669
 Bainbridge, supra note 666, at 20–21. 
670
 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874. 
671
 Id. at 881. 
672
 Id. at 884. 
673
 Id. at 893. 
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trial court for a determination of damages based on “the extent that the fair value of Trans Union 
exceeds $55 per share.”
674
 
The court’s holding received harsh commentary from prominent corporate scholars.
675
 
Even one of the dissenting justices of the case attacked the decision by labeling it as “comedy of 
errors.”
676
 The court’s holding was often criticized for focusing on negative elements of the 
facts.
677
 Commentators stated that the court did not give sufficient weight to the positive facts 
that the defendant directors were high caliber business persons with impeccable credentials;
678
 
they were acutely aware of the company’s financial status and its prospects; Van Gorkom was 
highly familiar with the corporate environment, merger procedures, and valuation methods;
679
 
and the proposed sale price included a substantial premium over the market value. A former 
leading Delaware judge stated that “the opinion does not point to essence and is burdened by 
                                                 
674
 Id. 
675
 See, .e.g., Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. 
LAW. 1 (1985) (“The corporate bar generally views the decision as atrocious.”); Fischel, supra note 537, at 1455 
(“…Smith v. Van Gorkom, surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law…”); Leo Herzel & Leo 
Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187, 1188 (1986) (“To 
most the court’s decision seems misguided and Trans Union’s actions entirely proper.”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, 
Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 478 (2000); Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 458. 
676
 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894. 
677
 See, e.g., Quillen, supra note 198, at 479 (“… negative inferences are drawn from superficial facts—such as the 
presence or absence of documents or the execution of documents at a social event”). 
678
 Id. at 469. “[I]t is essential, even in major business judgment decisions, to permit knowledgeable directors…to 
apply their general knowledge of the corporation’s business and affairs to a specific transaction. In a real sense that 
is precisely why they are paid.” Id. 
679
 See Herzel & Katz, supra note 675, at 1188 (“Van Gorkom was a seasoned chief executive officer and substantial 
stockholder. He was well placed and motivated to strike a good deal, even when acting by himself.”). Professor 
Fischel extensively criticized the court’s negative emphasis on Van Gorkom’s role in the transaction as follows:  
Several reasons existed for the directors to defer to Van Gorkom's advice concerning the merger. 
First, although all the directors were knowledgeable about Trans Union, Van Gorkom as its 
chairman and chief executive officer was presumably the most knowledgeable. Second, Van 
Gorkom had strong incentives to negotiate the best deal possible. The transaction was negotiated 
at arm’s length; moreover, Van Gorkom was himself a large shareholder. The better the deal that 
Van Gorkom negotiated, the more money he made himself. Third, Van Gorkom was one year 
away from retirement and thus had no reason to block a merger in the interest of keeping his 
job…. 
The court’s discussion of Van Gorkom’s actions in dealing with Pritzker is, if anything, even less 
persuasive than its criticism of the other directors. The court’s decision implies that Van Gorkom 
did something wrong in bringing a complete sale and financing package to Pritzker rather than 
simply soliciting interest. But why does this conduct not instead demonstrate Van Gorkom’s skill 
as a negotiator in putting together a deal and convincing the other party that the deal made sense 
from his perspective as well? Indeed, the facts as recited by the court demonstrate that Van 
Gorkom got Pritzker to accept a deal that Van Gorkom’s own advisers told him was problematic 
for the purchaser and successfully resisted Pritzker’s proposal of a lower price and certain other 
requested concessions. 
Fischel, supra note 537, at 1445–46. 
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overkill and by needless, and often erroneous, legal and factual excess.”
680
 Daniel Fischel and 
Bayless Manning were highly critical of the courts’ emphasis on the intrinsic (or fair) value of 
the company.
681
 The court was also criticized for applying a strict standard to review the 
defendant directors’ decision-making process.
682
 According to commentators, the court, “while 
purporting to apply the gross negligence standard of review, in reality (but not explicitly) applied 
an ordinary negligence standard.”
683
 Commentators further criticized the Van Gorkom court for 
disregarding long-standing Delaware corporate policy to defer to the business judgment of 
directors who act in good faith.
684
 Finally, commentators criticized the court for its lack of 
understanding of how businesses operate
685
 and stated that the Van Gorkom holding in general 
will decrease the amount of risk-taking by corporate directors.
686
  
Despite the harsh criticism, one would agree that the defendant directors in Van Gorkom 
acted with undue haste in approving the sale of the company, a transaction which possibly carries 
the greatest magnitude of importance in a corporation. On the other hand, the points that the 
critiques made would lead one to wonder if the defendants, who were attentive directors in 
general and acted in good faith to approve the sale of the company in particular,
687
 deserved to be 
exposed to a potentially catastrophic personal liability. The unusual facts of the case, the 
disagreement concerning the court’s holding, and the discomfort in resulting potential director 
liability leave no doubt that Van Gorkom was a difficult corporate law case. A long discussion 
                                                 
680
 Quillen, supra note 198, at 474; see also Hamermesh, supra note 675, at 478 (criticizing the opinion on the same 
ground). 
681
 Fischel, supra note 537, at 1451 (arguing that “the intrinsic value standard is vacuous”); Manning, supra note 
675, at 4 (criticizing the concept of intrinsic value and naming it “as-if market value”); Bainbridge, supra note 666, 
at 17–18 (“The court’s analysis in this regard is seriously flawed. As with any other asset, a company is worth only 
what somebody is willing to pay for it.”). 
682
 See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 458; Bainbridge, supra note 666, at 22. 
683
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 458. 
684
 Id. at 449. 
685
 Herzel & Katz, supra note 675, at 1189; Fischel, supra note 537, at 1455. 
686
 Fischel, supra note 537, at 1453 (“Because the decision increases the probability that managers will be sued and 
held personally liable for damages, managers will naturally want to minimize their exposure by avoiding activities in 
which they are likely to be sued. They will be less willing to serve (the best protection against getting sued), and 
when they do serve, will overinvest in information and be less entrepreneurial.… Liability rules that reinforce this 
incentive will operate to shareholders’ detriment.”) (citations omitted). 
687
 Put it another way, if there was a hypothetical Van Gorkom before the actual Van Gorkom case, and if the 
defendant directors knew that the court would closely review their decisional process concerning a disinterested and 
good faith decision, they would probably have been more careful in their decisional process. The directors, however, 
relying on the ambiguity surrounding the duty of care law before the 1980s, had confidence that their decision would 
have been protected by the business judgment rule. The Van Gorkom holding is often justified on the court’s earlier 
ruling in Aronson, which required an informed decision for business judgment rule protection. However, Aronson 
was decided after the defendant directors in Van Gorkom completed the sale of the corporation. 
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concerning who was right or wrong as to the result in such a case may be fruitless. As the former 
Delaware justice, who wrote the majority opinion in the Van Gorkom case, observed in a later 
article:  
In the field of corporate law, a tough corporate case presents a fertile field for disagreement–in 
terms of a judge’s goal of reaching what appears to be the correct result and then defining a means 
and course for attaining it.
688
 
 
 Perhaps, rather than focusing on the right-wrong aspect of the result, an analysis of Van 
Gorkom, along with the legal environment preceding the case, may be helpful in understanding 
the court’s holding. In the duty of care context, Delaware’s pre-Van Gorkom tradition “was 
highly deferential to decisions made by well-motivated corporate directors who acted without 
any conflicting self-interest.”
689
 Court decisions in cases that did not involve self-dealing 
suggested that the imposition of fiduciary liability would require a showing similar to bad 
faith.
690
 The concept of the business judgment rule provided directors strong protection in the 
absence of bad faith and self-dealing. Furthermore, Delaware courts employed the business 
judgment rule concept often without providing a considered articulation of the relationship 
between the duty of care and the business judgment rule.
691
 The abstract nature of the duty of 
care, strong protection provided directors under the business judgment rule, and the scarcity of 
Delaware decisions that required an informed decision under the business judgment rule created 
an ambiguity surrounding the duty of care.
692
 This ambiguity caused a misconception that 
Delaware’s business judgment rule overrode directors’ fiduciary duty of care and, therefore, led 
many commentators to observe that Delaware courts “announced but did not enforce the duty of 
care.”
693
 
 The misconception about Delaware’s business judgment rule was accompanied by great 
dissatisfaction. Many commentators raised concerns regarding Delaware’s highly-deferential 
corporate policy. Delaware courts were criticized for providing directors excessive protection 
under the business judgment rule and for not enforcing the duty of care.
694
 Commentators 
increasingly called for federal chartering of corporations law to address Delaware’s pro-
                                                 
688
 Horsey, supra note 230, at 972.  
689
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 450. 
690
 Id. 
691
 Horsey, supra note 230, at 981. 
692
 See supra notes 246–53 & accompanying text.  
693
 Allen, supra note 250, at 11. 
694
 See supra notes 247–49 & accompanying text. 
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management corporate policy.
695
 Furthermore, there was an increasing public trend toward 
director accountability, and corporate governance issues were receiving increasing attention from 
corporate shareholders.
696
 The criticism of Delaware courts reached the point that prominent 
members of Delaware corporate bar reacted to defend Delaware law. Samuel Arsht, for example, 
stated that the business judgment rule was misunderstood, and the misunderstanding stemmed 
from Delaware courts’ language.
697
 Arsht attempted to address the misconception by explaining 
that the business judgment rule did not preclude judicial inquiry into due care; rather, directors 
were required to exercise due care to be afforded the rule’s protection.
698
 Similarly, the 
influential members of the General Corporation Law Committee of the Delaware State Bar 
Association issued a “Resource Document on Delaware Corporation Law” to address the 
criticism in a broader context, including Delaware decisional law in the field of the duty of 
care.
699
 The authors of the document gave examples from Delaware decisions to explain that 
Delaware law required directors to pay “informed attention to their duties”, and that “unadvised 
and unintelligent business judgment” was not protected under the business judgment rule.
700
  
 The Delaware Supreme Court did not delay to in responding doctrinal concerns regarding 
Delaware law. In Aronson v. Lewis, which provided the keystone for the Van Gorkom holding, 
the court expressly stated that, before making a decision, directors should inform themselves of 
all material information to invoke the protection of the business judgment rule.
701
 Soon after, the 
court in Van Gorkom held that the directors’ decision did not qualify for the protection of the 
business judgment rule due to their failure to make an informed judgment. Having lost business 
judgment rule protection, directors were exposed to multi-million dollar personal liability. In that 
environment, the Van Gorkom court may have been acting with a purpose to address increasing 
doctrinal and public concern regarding Delaware’s duty of care law.
702
 Accordingly, the Van 
                                                 
695
 See Horsey, supra note 230, at 991–92 (summarizing the commentary which suggested corporate chartering 
under federal law); Arsht, supra note 15, at 100–01(same). 
696
 See Stacy D. Blank, Delaware Amendment Relaxes Directors’ Liability, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 118 
n.60, 119, 128 (1987).  
697
 Arsht, supra note 15, at 102.  
698
 Id. at 114. 
699
 See generally Resource Document, supra note 246.  
700
 Id. at 186. 
701
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
702
 See Horsey, supra note 230, at 996. Former Justice Horsey’s overall evaluation of Delaware’s duty of care law 
reflects this point. Horsey first examines Delaware decisional law before the 1980s and points out the lack of 
judicial consideration of the relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule. Horsey 
subsequently goes through the criticism of Delaware law and the Delaware bar’s reaction. Horsey then implies that 
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Gorkom holding may be viewed as an attempt to revive the dormant duty of care of corporate 
directors. Van Gorkom sent corporate actors a clear message that uninformed business decisions 
would not be respected by Delaware courts.   
Considering the aftermath of Van Gorkom, one may argue that a smooth transitional 
process would have been preferable to revive the dormant duty of care.
703
 For example, after a 
finding of grossly negligent conduct, the court could somehow exonerate directors from 
catastrophic personal liability.
704
 Indeed, directors’ general sophistication in business, their 
                                                 
the Van Gorkom decision was made as a response to doctrinal concerns regarding Delaware’s duty of care law. For 
example, Horsey states: “Had Arsht’s analysis of the shortcomings of the Delaware business judgment rule been 
heeded earlier, the decision of the supreme court in Smith v. Van Gorkom may have been more foreseeable.” Id.  
703
 See Thomas C. Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the 
Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 249 (1988) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court appeared to go out 
of its way to use this case as a vehicle to revitalize the dormant duty of care doctrine.”). 
704
 In the common law, the general rule is that court decisions have retroactive effect. In other words, when courts 
make new law by deciding a case a certain way, that change is necessarily retroactive as to the parties involved in 
the case that makes the change, unless the court expressly says in the opinion that the new rule (or revived 
application of a dormant rule) will only apply prospectively to cases in the future. Although courts rarely make an 
exception to the general rule of full retroactivity, this is possible under certain circumstances. Lederman examined 
Michigan case law and gave examples of court decisions with limited retroactive or prospective effect. See 
HOWARD YALE LEDERMAN, JUDICIAL OVERRULING: TIME FOR A NEW GENERAL RULE, September 2004 
Michigan Bar Journal 22 (2004), available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article740.pdf. He observed: 
“For decades, [Michigan] appellate courts have applied certain decisions with limited or no retroactivity.” Id. at 23. 
In Pike v. City of Wyoming, the Michigan Supreme Court noted: “In 1932, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the federal constitution does not inhibit state courts in determining whether their own law-changing 
decisions should be applied retroactively or prospectively.”  431 Mich. 589, 603; 433 N.W.2d 768 (1988) (citing 
Great Northern R Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932)). Subsequently, the Pike court 
recognized a prospectivity exception and adopted a test, which was initially developed by the United States Supreme 
Court, to determine whether an overruling decision should apply prospectively. Id. at 603–4 (citing Chevron Oil Co 
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106–107 (1971)). In Michigan law, the test to determine retroactivity or prospectivity is not 
rigid: Michigan appellate courts “may also incorporate into [their] analysis any other facts or considerations relevant 
to the instant dispute that may affect the fairness of [the] determination.” Sturak v. Ozomaro, 238 Mich. App. 549, 
560; 606 N.W.2d 411, 418 (2000). “[R]esolution of the retrospective-prospective issue ultimately turns on 
considerations of fairness and public policy.” Michigan Educational Employees Mutual Insurance Co. v. Morris, 
460 Mich 180, 190; 596 N.W.2d 142, 147 (1999) (citation omitted). In Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held its decision prospective. 465 Mich. 675, 696–97; 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002). Lederman supports 
Michigan courts’ approach and argues that “[f]ull retroactivity should not be the rule but the exception.” 
LEDERMAN, supra, at 22. He observed as follows:  
The power to define the law implies the power to change the law. The power to change the law 
implies the power to define the new law’s scope of application. The U.S. Constitution does not 
mandate any particular state law [prospective-retroactive] decisionmaking. For decades, appellate 
courts have applied certain decisions with limited or no retroactivity. Appellate courts have always 
performed two different functions: deciding cases and establishing and changing the rules 
governing and guiding future conduct. Accordingly, the Court’s authority to decide how to apply 
its changes is broad. 
Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, in the common law, it is possible for courts to hold their decisions 
prospective. This would have been an appropriate situation for the Van Gorkom court to have done so. Or, 
alternatively, Van Gorkom could have pointed out the deficiencies in the defendant directors’ decisional process but 
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familiarity with the corporation’s financial status, the substantial premium over the market price, 
and shareholder’s approval could provide a sound basis to do so. In that way, while maintaining 
Delaware’s corporate policy, the court could send a message to directors to make informed 
business decisions, and that at the behest of shareholders Delaware courts will closely review the 
directors’ decisional process to determine whether they made an informative and deliberative 
decision. In the absence of the resulting liability, the court’s holding would not attract such harsh 
criticism. Nevertheless, the court probably did not predict the potential effects of its holding in 
the duty of care law. Regardless who is right or wrong as to the ultimate holding, Van Gorkom 
took its place in Delaware corporate law history as possibly the most controversial case.    
b. Aftermath of Van Gorkom: Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crises and 
Director Unavailability.  
 As one could predict from the harsh commentary,
705
 the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
holding in Van Gorkom shocked the corporate world. The court’s holding showed that directors 
really could face personal liability for catastrophic corporate damages for the lack of due care 
even if they acted in good faith and had no conflict of interest. According to many, the decision 
significantly increased the liability risk of corporate directors.
706
 The common feeling in the 
corporate world was that directors had become very susceptible to personal liability after Van 
Gorkom. Moreover, rising numbers of shareholder derivative suits and takeover claims increased 
the probability of adverse judgments and settlements.
707
 As a result, a crisis arose in the director 
and officer (D&O) liability insurance market, and a sharp decrease in the availability of outside 
directors that followed this crisis.
708
   
                                                 
nevertheless could have not found them grossly negligent due to the special circumstances of the case. In this way, 
without imposing personal liability, the court could have telegraphed to the directors of Delaware corporations that 
at the behest of shareholders Delaware courts would closely review the directors’ decisional process to determine 
whether they made an informative and deliberative decision.   
705
 Prominent scholars’ harsh commentary may have contributed to the corporate chaos that allegedly the Van 
Gorkom holding caused. For example, instead of advising directors to be more attentive on corporate affairs, the 
commentary on Van Gorkom often focused on negative elements of the decision and predicted that the holding 
would have devastating effects in the corporate world. Although critiques might have valid reasons, these 
predictions may have had negative impact on corporate directors and the corporate environment. See e.g., Manning, 
supra note 675, at 1 (“Commentators predict dire consequences as directors come to realize how exposed they have 
become.”); Fischel, supra note 537, at 1453–54 (listing negative effects that the Van Gorkom holding will cause). 
706
 See Manning, supra note 675, at 1; Fischel, supra note 537, at 1453. 
707
 Blank, supra note 696, at 118. 
708
 See Lee, supra note 703, at 254–55 (rejecting the popular view that legal system was the cause of D&O liability 
insurance crisis and arguing that the competition in the insurance market and mismanagement of the insurance 
companies caused the crisis); Stephan A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years after Smith v. Van 
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The perception of increased liability threat for directors led dramatic changes in D&O 
insurance market.
709
 It became very hard to obtain D&O liability insurance either because 
polices were not affordable or simply were not available at any price.
710
 Many insurance 
companies terminated their D&O coverage or substantially altered their policies to limit the 
availability and scope of their coverage.
711
 Premiums of available D&O policies skyrocketed and 
deductible amounts increased at an extraordinary rate.
712
 Policy durations became shorter, and 
the number of restrictions and exclusions in the policies increased.
713
 Many policies included 
early cancellation provisions
714
 and excluded coverage for takeover violations and shareholder 
derivative claims.
715
 Thus, the crisis in D&O insurance market was undoubtedly devastating. 
Declining availability of D&O liability insurance increased the likelihood of director 
liability exposure even more. The shortage of adequate D&O coverage, which was a traditional 
means for directors to avoid personal liability,
716
 put directors in an unduly risky position. In 
addition, there was a considerable growth in the number of shareholder derivative suits and 
                                                 
Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 745 (1988) (stating that the Van Gorkom holding was one major but not the only 
cause of D&O insurance crisis).  
709
 See E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-
Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 400–01 (1987); Lee, supra 
note 703, at 240–41; Bainbridge, supra note 666, at 2; Radin, supra note 708, at 745; Blank, supra note 696, at 117–
18. 
710
 Bainbridge, supra note 666, at 20; Lee supra note 703, at 253 (giving examples of extensive media news 
covering of D&O insurance liability crisis). 
711
 See Veasey, Finkelstein, & Bigler, supra note 709, at 400–01; Blank, supra note 696, at 117; Radin, supra note 
708, at 745; Lee supra note 703, at 253. 
712
 Radin, supra note 708, at 745; Blank, supra note 696, at 117–18 (stating the premium rates of available D&O 
policies became fifteen to twenty times more expensive than previous rates); One commentator gives examples of 
the crisis as follows: 
By one account, prior to 1985, D&O premiums for large companies were often less than $200,000 for as 
much as $100 million of coverage. But in less than a year, premiums rose in some cases to $1 million for 
about half that coverage. A comparison study showed that in September, 1984, D&O insurance was available 
for losses not actually indemnified by the corporation, for a term of three years, at a premium rate which 
rarely exceeded 25% of the policy limit. It was a buyer's market. By contrast, in September 1986, D&O 
insurance was available only for nonindemnifiable losses, whether or not indemnified in fact, for a term of 
twelve months, at a premium rate of 5% of the policy limit, with higher levels demanded in higher-risk 
industries; indeed, it was a seller’s market. 
Lee, supra note 703, at 253 (citations omitted).  
713
 Radin, supra note 708, at 745; Lee supra note 703, at 253. 
714
 Radin, supra note 708, at 745 (stating that insurers imposed early cancellation provisions to bail out of difficult 
situations).  
715
 Blank, supra note 696, at 118; Lee supra note 703, at 253. 
716
 See Blank, supra note 696, at 118; Lee supra note 703, at 255 (discussing and criticizing the propriety of D&O 
liability insurance).  
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takeover claims, and courts arguably became more willing to scrutinize director decisions.
717
  In 
the absence of liability protection in such a litigious corporate environment, directors basically 
assumed all responsibility for potential corporate losses resulting from their faulty decisions. 
Considering the potentially catastrophic amounts of corporate damages, and probability of 
unintended wrongdoing when making complex business judgments, directors were under serious 
threat of loss of their personal wealth.  
Not surprisingly, the fear of personal liability soon became widespread among corporate 
directors. Many incumbent directors resigned or refused to extend their directorships.
718
 
Prestigious board positions became very burdensome and many qualified individuals were 
unwilling to serve as corporate directors.
719
 The potential consequences of being a director in 
large public corporations deterred competent candidates from accepting board memberships. 
This was especially true of potential outside directors, who refused to serve on boards because 
they had to risk their personal assets in exchange for small directorship fees.
720
 Outside director 
unavailability raised serious concerns regarding the functionality of monitoring boards. 
Moreover, the lack of adequate protection naturally caused many directors who remained on 
boards to behave with unprecedented caution and, therefore, to avoid risky business activities.
721
 
Thus, imaginary or real, the increased judicial threat of director liability resulted in undesired 
difficulties in the corporate world.   
2. The Legislative Response: Section 102(b)(7) and Its Interpretation by the Courts 
a. Charter Provisions Exculpating Directors from Liability for Money Damages for 
Breach of Duty of Care but Not for Acts or Omissions Not in Good Faith 
The Delaware legislature responded to the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Van 
Gorkom, and to the subsequent D&O liability insurance crisis and director depletion problem, by 
amending its corporate law to add section 102(b)(7).
722
 This section allows Delaware 
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 Blank, supra note 696, at 118; Roberto Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation? 7 J.L. 
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 See Radin, supra note 708, at 745; Blank, supra note 696, at 118. 
719
 See Radin, supra note 708, at 745; Blank, supra note 696, at 118. 
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 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). The Delaware Supreme Court in Emerald Partners v. Berlin described 
section l02(b)(7) as “a thoughtfully crafted legislative response to [the] holding in Van Gorkom.” 787 A.2d 85, 96 
(Del. 2001); See also Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A. 2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (“Section 102(b)(7) was adopted by 
the Delaware General Assembly in 1986 following a directors and officers insurance liability crisis and the 1985 
Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”); see also Blank, supra note 696, at 118 (stating that, in 
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corporations to include a provision in their certificate of incorporation limiting or eliminating 
directors’ liability for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty, but excluding: (1) any 
breach duty of loyalty; (2) acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (3) unlawful payment of dividends or unlawful stock 
purchases or redemptions; and (4) transactions from which the director derived an improper 
personal benefit.
723
 In other words, the statute authorizes shareholders to adopt a provision in the 
certificate of incorporation to free directors from personal liability for money damages for breach 
of the duty of care.
724
 The statute applies only to directors of a corporation, not to officers or 
other employees of the corporation.
725
 
 More specifically, the statute immunizes directors from grossly negligent conduct.
726
 
Prior to the statute, the business judgment rule protected directors from ordinary negligence in 
exercise of the duty of care.
727
 However, under the business judgment rule, directors remained 
liable for breach of the duty of care arising from grossly negligent conduct. After the enactment 
of section 102(b)(7), directors are protected from all negligence.
728
 Furthermore, directors are 
protected from monetary liability for due care breaches arising from unconsidered inaction or 
failure to perform their oversight function. Thus, where the business judgment rule protection is 
unavailable, directors will be protected from liability by an exculpatory charter provision so long 
as their action does not fall within one of the exceptions contained in section 102(b)(7).
729
  
                                                 
addition to addressing insurance crisis, the enactment of new section was a part of the Delaware legislature’s 
continuous efforts to relax corporate liability of businesses and managements); Lee, supra note 703, at 256 
(criticizing Delaware’s response to the crisis as inappropriate).  
723
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
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 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006). 
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 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1275 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“Though an 
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provision); see also Radin, supra note 708, at 747 (noting that drafters did not believe that D&O liability insurance 
crisis was sufficient to cause officers to resign or refuse to serve). 
726
 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1094–95 (“[E]ven if the plaintiffs had stated a claim for gross negligence, such a well-
pleaded claim is unavailing because defendants have brought forth the Section 102(b)(7) charter provision that bars 
such claims.”). 
727
 See supra Part C.1.a 
728
 See Blank, supra note 696, at 119. 
729
 Id.  
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Regardless of exculpatory provisions, directors are personally liable “for wrongful 
conduct going beyond duty of care violations.”
730
 Section 102(b)(7) expressly excludes a loyalty 
breach and lack of good faith from exculpable conduct. A charter provision may exculpate 
directors from monetary liability for breach of the duty of care but not for acts or omissions not 
in good faith. Accordingly, section 102(b)(7) allows elimination of director liability only for 
“conduct undertaken in good faith, but which nevertheless constitutes breach of the duty of 
care.”
731
 If a breach of the duty of care is so egregious that it amounts to the level of bad faith, it 
will not be protected by a section 102(b)(7) charter provision. For example, a director will likely 
be liable for knowing violation of the duty of care regardless of an exculpatory charter provision 
because intentional dereliction of a duty constitutes bad faith. Thus, section 102(b)(7) maintains 
a minimal level of fiduciary conduct even though directors are exempted from due care liability. 
 Technically, section 102(b)(7) permits only limitation or elimination of the monetary 
damage remedy, not the duty of care itself.
732
 Equitable remedies such as injunctive relief remain 
untouched.
733
 However, nonfinancial remedies “have only limited applications and thus cannot 
serve as an adequate substitute for financial liability, in part because due care suits typically arise 
well after the event.”
734
 Injunctive remedies normally are not effective means to enforce the duty 
of care.
735
 Without financial liability, directors may tend to ignore their due care responsibilities 
because all that shareholders can ask a court to do is to stop or rescind the offending transaction. 
Indeed, shareholders rarely seek to enjoin a corporate transaction claiming a breach of the duty 
of care.
736
 Therefore, practically, the duty of care without financial liability has greatly reduced 
importance.
737
  
                                                 
730
 Arnold, 678 A.2d at 541–42.  
731
 Radin, supra note 708, at 744. 
732
 See Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 92 (“[A] Section 102(b)(7) provision does not operate to defeat the validity of 
a plaintiff’s claim on the merits,” but “it can operate to defeat the plaintiff’s ability to recover monetary damages.”); 
Hecker, supra note 26, at 941 n.103; Radin, supra note 708, at 747. 
733
 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (“Such a charter provision, when adopted, would not 
affect injunctive proceedings based on gross negligence.”). 
734
 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.19 Rep.’s note 2. (1994).  
735
 See Lee, supra note 703, at 274 (discussing that injunctive remedies are inadequate due to their lack of deterrence 
value). 
736
 See Hecker, supra note 26, at 941 n.103 (“As a practical matter, one would not expect to encounter many cases in 
which a plaintiff sought to enjoin a breach of the duty of care.”). 
737
 Some commentators stated, however, the duty of care remains “vitally important in injunction and rescission 
cases and may well be relevant in elections, proxy contests, resignations, and removal contexts.” Veasey, Finkelstein 
& Bigler, supra note 709, at 403. Similarly, the Delaware Chancery Court in Disney observed as follows: 
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 Despite its eradicating effect on the duty of care, section 102(b)(7)’s democratic nature is 
appealing.
738
 As an enabling statute, the section applies to a corporation only if shareholders 
approve a charter amendment to include an exculpatory provision.
739
 A favorable vote of a 
majority of the outstanding voting shares is required for a corporation to adopt such a provision. 
Therefore, the section permits shareholders, to whom directors ultimately owe the fiduciary 
duties, to decide whether to exculpate directors from due care liability. Commentators raised 
concerns regarding the democratic nature of exculpatory provisions by questioning whether 
shareholders fully comprehend the importance of the vote on exculpatory provisions.
740
 
Nevertheless, shareholders’ failure to make an informed decision before voting on corporate 
matters as residual owners should not be an excuse for imposing personal liability on directors 
due to a failure to make informed decisions. Moreover, the point proves too much because it 
denies the basic premise of corporate democracy—the efficacy of the shareholder franchise.  
A charter provision authorized by section 102(b)(7) is in the nature of an affirmative 
defense
741
 and it must be affirmatively raised by defendant directors seeking exculpation under 
                                                 
‘[S]ection 102(b)(7) does not eliminate the duty of care that is properly imposed upon directors. 
Directors continue to be charged under Delaware law with a duty of care in the decision-making 
process and in their oversight responsibilities. The duty of care continues to have vitality in 
remedial contexts as opposed to actions for personal monetary damages against directors as 
individuals.’ 
Disney, 907 A.2d at 752 n.444 (citation omitted).  
738
 See Arnold, 678 A.2d 541–42. The Delaware Supreme Court in Arnold observed as follows:  
While it is often thought to be axiomatic that a wrong must have a correlative remedy, this is not 
always the case. The stockholders of [the corporation] voted to enact the charter provision which 
now limits recovery against the directors. Thus, the absence of a remedy for monetary damages is 
directly attributable to the decision of the stockholders of [the corporation] to enact the charter 
provision authorized by 8 Del.C. § 102(b)(7) exempting directors from liability. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Blank, supra note 696, at 122 n.95, 131 (discussing democratic nature of the 
provision and concluding that “the amendment results in a lower standard of director responsibility that is not 
excused by the amendment’s alleged democratic nature”). 
739
 Also, a majority of the original incorporators may include an exculpatory provision in the certificate of the 
incorporation prior to any receipt of payment for its stocks. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101, 102(b)(7). 
740
 See, e.g., Blank, supra note 696, at 129–32 (“Forced to consider the liability provision as one topic in a proxy 
vote, shareholders will not understand the import of the vote. Corporations will encourage shareholders to approve 
the provisions. Shareholders, however, often will not realize that they are forfeiting a significant right.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
741
 Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1223; Malpiede, 780 A.2d at1095. Emerald Partners and Malpiede establish the 
rules governing the procedural posture of exculpatory provisions. The court in Malpiede observed as follows: 
There are several methods available to the defense to raise and argue the applicability of the bar of 
a Section 102(b)(7) charter provision to a due care claim. The Section 102(b)(7) bar may be raised 
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (with or without the filing of an answer), a motion for 
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such a provision.
742
 A failure to assert the protection under an exculpatory provision amounts to 
a waiver.
743
 In Malpiede, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “any claims for money damages 
                                                 
judgment on the pleadings (after filing an answer),
 
or a motion for summary judgment (or partial 
summary judgment) under Rule 56 after an answer, with or without supporting affidavits. 
Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092.The court stated, under the second option, “the charter provision could be asserted in 
and attached to the answer. The Court may or may not order a full or partial reply to the answer, which reply 
would optimally focus on the section 102(b)(7) charter provision. This would probably be the best practice to 
employ in these situations.” Id. at 1092 n.56.  For a detailed examination of the decisions see John L. Reed & Matt 
Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 114–19 (2004); 1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 720. 
742
 Cf. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 463 (“A section 102(b)(7) defense is more properly viewed—and 
should be treated—as a statutory immunity rather than as an affirmative defense.”). It should be noted that 
Delaware’s affirmative defense approach with respect to section 102(b)(7) is confusing. In 1999, the Delaware 
Supreme Court stated that “[d]efendants seeking exculpation under such a provision will normally bear the burden 
of establishing each of its elements.” Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1223–24. However, in 2001, the court stated: 
Although an exculpatory charter provision is ‘in the nature of an affirmative defense’ under 
Emerald Partners, the board is not required to disprove claims based on alleged breaches of the 
duty of loyalty to gain the protection of the provision with respect to due care claims. Rather, 
proving the existence of a valid exculpatory provision in the corporate charter entitles directors to 
dismissal of any claims for money damages against them that are based solely on alleged breaches 
of the board’s duty of care. 
Malpiede, 780 A.2d at1095 n.71. Then, the court stated in Emerald Partners:  
The rationale of Malpiede constitutes judicial cognizance of a practical reality: unless there is a 
violation of the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness is 
unnecessary because a Section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director defendants from paying 
monetary damages that are exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of care. The effect of 
our holding in Malpiede is that, in actions against the directors of Delaware corporations with a 
Section 102(b)(7) charter provision, a shareholder’s complaint must allege well-pled facts that, if 
true, implicate breaches of loyalty or good faith. Otherwise, in those cases that begin with the 
presumption of the business judgment rule, ab initio, our holding in Malpiede establishes that the 
proper invocation of a Section 102(b)(7) provision can obviate a trial pursuant to the entire 
fairness standard, even if the presumption of the business judgment rule is successfully rebutted by 
a duty of care violation, since liability for duty of loyalty violations or violations of good faith are 
not at issue. 
Emerald Partners II, 787 A.2d at 92. Although this decision provided some clarity with respect to a section 
102(b)(7) provision’s procedural effect, the court again muddied the water in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). There, the court’s analysis included the “due care determinations” section even 
though the defendant directors were protected by a section 102(b)(7) provision. Id. at 52.  The court did not 
specifically discuss whether the rebuttal of the business judgment rule on the ground of the duty of care required the 
defendant directors to prove the entire fairness of the transaction. Nevertheless, after Disney, one may argue that the 
court’s examination of the informational element of the business judgment rule implies that directors are required to 
prove the entire fairness of the challenged decision where the business judgment rule is solely rebutted on the 
ground of the duty of care even though they are protected by an exculpatory provision. The question then arises 
what would happen if the directors fail to satisfy the entire fairness standard. Currently, it is not clear whether 
directors of a corporation with a section 102(b)(7) provision are required to satisfy the entire fairness standard where 
the business judgment rule is solely rebutted on the basis of duty of care. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di 
Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance From 1992–2004? A Retrospective on 
Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1432–36 (2005) (discussing the “theoretical awkwardness of the 
‘affirmative defense’ concept” with respect to section 102(b)(7) and supporting statutory immunity approach);  
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against directors that are based solely on alleged breaches of the board’s duty of care” are 
dismissible once the corporation’s section 102(b)(7) provision is properly invoked.
744
 If, 
however, the shareholder complaint alleges a successful (classic) duty of loyalty (pecuniary 
interest) or good faith claim sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule, directors must prove 
the entire fairness of the transaction.
745
 
b. The Ubiquitous Nature of Section 102(b)(7) Provisions 
Considering potential counter-effect of exculpatory provisions on director conduct, one 
might think that shareholders would be reluctant to adopt such provisions, and therefore, section 
102(b)(7) would not have a substantial effect on due care liability of corporate directors. Reality, 
however, worked exactly the opposite way. The overwhelming majority of Delaware 
corporations amended their certificates of incorporation to include exculpatory provisions soon 
after the enactment of section 102(b)(7). Therefore, exculpation practically became a default rule 
governing due care liability of corporate directors in Delaware.  
 Delaware’s section 102(b)(7) was the first of the statutes that allowed exculpatory 
provisions in corporate charters. The State of Delaware added section 102(b)(7) to its General 
Corporation Law in 1986.
746
 Other states quickly followed Delaware’s lead and enacted similar 
exculpatory statutes,
747
 some of which provided greater protection than section 102(b)(7).
748
 
Within two years, forty-one states, including those with largest corporations, had already adopted 
                                                 
Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 67–68 
(2003). Johnson observed as follows:  
The [S]upreme [C]ourt clearly needs to readdress how the protection of section 102(b)(7) meshes 
with procedural burdens and existing standards of review. This is important because of judicial 
efficiency concerns and because burdens and standards of review often are outcome determinative.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
743
 Hecker, supra note 26, at 942.  
744
 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at1095 n.71. 
745
 Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 92.  
746
 Radin, supra note 708, at 746. 
747
 See id. at 747–48 (comparing and explaining statutory provisions enacted in other states); Douglas M. Branson, 
Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate 
Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 381–82 (1989); Johnson, supra note 742, at 31 n.11. 
748
 See Radin, supra note 708, at 751. For example, instead of enacting enabling statutes that permit director 
exculpation, Florida, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and Wisconsin enacted self-implementing statutes that increase the 
standard of culpability for director liability. Id.  See also Branson, supra note 747, at 381 n.31 (“Indiana and 
Wisconsin, for example, simply abolished director liability for duty of care violations. These provisions are self-
implementing: no amendment of articles of incorporation need be undertaken, although individual corporations may 
reinsert a duty of care in articles of incorporation or bylaws.”) (citations omitted). 
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these statutes.
749
 Today, all American jurisdictions except the District of Colombia have either 
charter-option or self-implementing statutes that provide directors some form of protection from 
personal liability for breach of the duty of care.
750
 
 Similarly, corporations followed a fast track to eliminate director liability for due care 
violations. Corporate boards have not found any difficulty in obtaining shareholders’ approval to 
add a section 102(b)(7) provision to their certificates of incorporation, and such provisions 
became routine in new corporations. According to a study that examined a random sample of 180 
Delaware stock companies, over ninety percent had adopted an exculpatory provision within a 
year of section 102(b)(7)’s enactment.
751
 A more recent study showed that every Delaware 
corporation in a sample of one hundred “Fortune 500” companies has adopted such a 
provision.
752
 Thus, “exculpatory provisions [virtually] became standard features in Delaware 
certificates of incorporation.”
753
 The pervasive nature of exculpatory provisions was subject to 
judicial comment as well. The Delaware Chancery Court in Disney observed that “[t]he vast 
majority of Delaware corporations have a provision in their certificate of incorporation that 
permits exculpation to the extent provided for by § 102(b)(7).”
754
 
 The number of non-Delaware corporations that adopted exculpatory provisions is very 
high as well. The study that examined one hundred “Fortune 500” companies showed that only 
two non-Delaware corporations’ certificates of incorporation lacked an exculpatory provision.
755
 
                                                 
749
 See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 
1160 (1990). By the end of 1987, over thirty states had enacted liability-limiting statutes. See also Radin, supra note 
708, at 747–48; Branson, supra note 747, at 376 (same).  
750
 The formulation of statutes varies. While Delaware’s charter-option provision approach is most popular, a few 
statutes include self-implementing liability-limiting provisions. See Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: 
Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45 
WASHBURN L.J. 307, 313 (2006) (stating that forty-four of states have some form of charter-option statute, six 
states have self-implementing statutes that impose mandatory provisions limiting director liability, Utah and 
Louisiana have both a self-implementing liability limitation and a charter-option provisions); Bryn R. Vaaler, 
2.02(B)(4) or Not 2.02(B)(4): That is the Question, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 82 n.19 (2011) (examining the 
statutes of 49 states). 
751
 Romano, supra note 749, at 1160, 1061 n.11.  
752
 Hamermesh, supra note 675, at 490, 497–99.  
753
 Vaaler, supra note 750, at 82. 
754
 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 752 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also Emerald Partners, 787 
A.2d at 90 (“the shareholders of many Delaware corporations approved charter amendments containing these 
exculpatory provisions”); Malpiede, 80 A.2d at 1095 (“[o]nce the statute was adopted, stockholders usually 
approved charter amendments containing these provisions”). 
755
 Hamermesh, supra note 675, at 490, 497–500. The actual number of corporations that lacked an exculpatory 
provision in their certificate of incorporation was six. Three of them were incorporated in states that had self-
implementing liability-limiting statutes (Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida). One corporation was incorporated in a state 
that did not allow exculpatory provisions at the time study was performed (Missouri). Therefore, only two 
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The same study examined another sample of one hundred small to mid-size companies, and 
among these companies only one corporation’s certificate of incorporation lacked an exculpatory 
provision.
756
 As a result of this high adoption rate, charter-option provisions mostly govern the 
duty of care of directors today. Therefore, directors of most corporations are freed from 
monetary liability for duty of care violations both in and outside Delaware. Thus, the legal 
process that began with a case in which the directors with impeccable credentials were found 
liable for an uninformed business decision concluded with practical elimination of the duty of 
care in the whole nation.  
c. Section 102(b)(7) Exculpatory Provisions Apply to Oversight/Monitoring Cases 
 Judges developed the business judgment rule over years to balance the special 
circumstances associated with board service and directors’ fiduciary liability. In that regard, the 
business judgment rule provided directors adequate protection from fiduciary liability. The 
Delaware legislature took one step forward and enacted section 102(b)(7) to allow corporations 
to provide directors stronger protection in the duty of care context. Where directors’ action falls 
short the business judgment rule protection due to lack of due care, a section 102(b)(7) provision 
protects directors from monetary liability. Therefore, if an exculpatory provision is available, 
protection equivalent to the business judgment rule is applicable even directors’ conduct does not 
qualify for the rule’s protection due to a pure due care violation.  
 The realm of protection of exculpatory provisions is broader than the decision-making 
context. Section 102(b)(7) applies in the monitoring context as well. Accordingly, directors are 
protected from monetary liability for duty of care breaches due to their inaction or failure to 
monitor. Traditionally, the business judgment rule applies only if directors make a decision or 
judgment, and it has no role where directors abdicate their duties. In other words, the business 
judgment rule does not apply if directors failed to perform adequate oversight over the company. 
However, if an exculpatory provision is available, protection equivalent to the business judgment 
rule applies to director conduct which constitutes a breach of the duty of care due to inaction or 
oversight failure. Accordingly, a section 102(b)(7) provision extends the effect, if not literal 
application, of the business judgment rule to the oversight context as well.   
                                                 
corporations that were incorporated in states allowing for exculpatory charter provisions lacked exculpatory 
provisions in their certificates of incorporation (New York and North Carolina). Id. 
756
 Id. at 500–03 (ironically, it was a Delaware corporation).  
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d. Rationale/Policy Reason Supporting Section 102(b)(7) Provisions 
The purpose of section 102(b)(7) is to attract qualified persons to serve as corporate 
directors and to encourage them to make risky, good faith business decisions without fear of 
personal liability.
757
 The risk of personal liability arising from due care violations may deter 
many qualified persons from serving on corporate boards and cause over-cautiousness by those 
who do serve on boards. Section 102(b)(7) allows shareholders to avoid such potential adverse 
effects of due care liability by adopting exculpatory provisions.  
Exculpatory provisions provide directors the freedom to pursue risky business strategies 
as well as the stimulus to act in good faith.
758
 Shareholders include such provisions in corporate 
charters to assure that directors focus on business ventures and profitability rather than worrying 
about due care liability threating their personal wealth. At the same time shareholders are assured 
that their interest is protected by directors who are acting in good faith to comply with their 
responsibilities. The statute thus gives corporate shareholders an option to exchange their 
potential monetary due care claims based on corporate losses with an expectation that competent 
directors will make bold but good faith decisions to further their interest.  
Thus, the policy behind section 102(b)(7) is “an extension of that underlying the business 
judgment rule.”
759
 Shareholders adopt exculpatory provisions to “encourag[e] capable persons to 
serve as directors of corporations by providing them with the freedom to make risky, good faith 
                                                 
757
 See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NET Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 793 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that exculpatory 
provisions encourage “capable persons to serve as directors of corporations by providing them with the freedom to 
make risky, good faith business decisions without fear of personal liability”); Disney, 907 A.2d at 752( stating that 
purpose of section 102(b)(7) is “to encourage directors to undertake risky, hut potentially value-maximizing, 
business strategies, so long as they do so in good faith”); Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90 (stating that section 
102(b)(7) frees directors to take business risks without worrying about negligence lawsuits); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 
1095 (same); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971(stating that a demanding test of liability is necessary in the oversight 
context, as well as in the decision making context, “since it makes board service by qualified persons more likely”); 
Arnold, 678 A.2d at 541 n.20 (“Importantly, the law, while indulging a presumption that effective remedies should 
be available, also considers values other than individual redress when fashioning a system of remedies.”); Blank, 
supra note 696, at 120 (“By relaxing personal liability standards, the amendment provides incentive for individuals 
to accept again positions as directors.”); E. Norman Veasey, Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 693–94 (1998) (“[T]he investor’s expectation is that it is fine to have directors 
who are risk-takers, unencumbered by concepts of tort liability for failure to do all their homework, an innocent 
failure to disclose material facts, or even a sustained inattention not rising to the level of bad faith. These investors 
want to attract good, honest, independent, business-like directors. They do not want timid, risk-averse people 
managing the firm.”). 
758
 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (stating that exculpatory provisions act as “a stimulus to good faith performance of 
duty by … directors”) (emphasis in original).  
759
 Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 975, 990 (2006); see also 
Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 91 (“The statutory enactment of Section 102(b)(7) was a logical corollary to the 
common law principles of the business judgment rule.”). 
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business decisions without fear of personal liability.”
760
 Exculpatory provisions exonerate 
directors from personal liability where their decision falls short of business judgment rule 
protection due to grossly negligent decisional process. Furthermore, exculpatory provisions 
insulate directors from personal liability for due care breaches arising from oversight failures. 
Where a corporate charter includes an exculpatory provision, directors face no threat of personal 
liability for a grossly negligent action or failure to take action.  
Nevertheless, some commentators were critical of the enactment of section 102(b)(7).
761
 
According to critiques, the enactment of section 102(b)(7) served to further the pro-management 
policy of Delaware.
762
 Traditionally, Delaware’s business friendly corporate law attracted many 
corporations to incorporate in that state.
763
 Delaware courts generally supported this policy of 
state by rendering business friendly decisions.
764
 The courts, however, also paid considerable 
attention to protect shareholder interests by establishing and developing legal standards.
765
 In 
addition, Delaware courts have been sensitive to the public demand for director responsibility.
766
 
In the 1980s, an increasing public trend for greater director accountability arose.
767
 Shareholders 
increasingly sought to hold directors liable for careless conduct through derivative litigation.
768
 
Accordingly, Delaware courts started to examine the fiduciary conduct of directors more closely. 
The Van Gorkom holding demonstrated that Delaware courts would not only scrutinize the 
fiduciary conduct of directors but would also hold them liable for a breach, regardless of the pro-
corporate policy of the state. However, the Delaware Supreme Court’s emphasis on fiduciary 
conduct at the expense of the state’s pro-corporate policy was unwelcome. The holding, at the 
minimum, threatened Delaware’s position as the dominant state for incorporation.
769
 The 
Delaware legislature swiftly enacted section 102(b)(7) and permitted corporations to limit the 
types of fiduciary conduct that courts could scrutinize. Thus, the Delaware legislature limited the 
                                                 
760
 Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 793. 
761
 See, e.g., Blank, supra note 696, at 118–31 (describing the enactment of the exculpatory provision as a part of 
continuous effort to relax the corporate liabilities of business and management by Delaware legislature).  
762
 Id. 
763
 See Veasey, supra note 757, at 681–84 (describing the historical development of Delaware law and Delaware’s 
dominant position as the state of incorporation).  
764
 Blank, supra note 696, at 125.  
765
 Id at 131. 
766
 Id. 
767
 Id. at 119. 
768
 Id.  
769
 See Honabach, supra note 750, at 313 n.47.  
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trend toward greater director accountability by preventing possible further development of due 
care litigation
770
 and secured the state’s pro-management policy.
771
 
 Commentators further criticized section 102(b)(7) for lowering the standard of director 
responsibility and limiting the courts’ ability to protect shareholder interests.
772
 Exculpatory 
provisions limit shareholders’ ability to bring derivative suits which is an important mechanism 
to control director behavior.
773
 Section 102(b)(7) primarily aimed to attract qualified to people to 
serve as directors, however, reduced director liability may also cause corporate boards to be 
filled with persons unwilling to give necessary attention to corporate matters.
774
 One 
commentator observed on that point as follows: 
The need to attract corporate directors that are willing to accept the responsibilities of the position 
is a serious problem. Outside directors provide valuable independent scrutiny of corporate affairs. 
One desire of the drafters of the amendment is to encourage individuals to serve as outside 
directors. Yet if the amendment, in an effort to attract directors, relieves directors of liability for 
failures to perform responsibly, the amendment eliminates the benefit of an outside director 
because outside directors need not scrutinize diligently the affairs of the corporation. Thus, the 
amendment divests the role of outside director of the primary function and obligation of providing 
corporate oversight.
775
 
 
                                                 
770
 Blank, supra note 696, at 119 (stating that the enactment of the exculpatory provision will also prevent the 
progress of the public desire for greater director accountability). 
771
 See Lee, supra note 703, at 257; Blank, supra note 696, at 134 (stating that with the enactment section 102(b)(7) 
Delaware protects its leading position as the state of incorporation and continue to generate high income from 
corporate taxes and fees). 
772
 Blank, supra note 696, at 130–31. According to the author, “the Delaware amendment is a substantial obstacle to 
corporate responsibility.” Id. at 134.   
773
 Id. at 132. 
774
 Id. at 134. 
775
 Id. at 133.  The author argues that responsibility should be attached to directorships. The author explains this 
argument as follows: 
Directors should not escape liability for breaches of the duty of care resulting from gross 
negligence. Directors should be accountable for failures to accept the responsibility that 
accompanies a position on a board. Careful and dedicated directors should not enter a directorship 
assuming in advance the need for protection from liability for inattentiveness and lack of 
preparation. Supporters of the statute contend that directors generally are dedicated persons and 
will not take advantage of the relaxation of the standard of care. This rather naive supposition fails 
to recognize that if directors truly were dedicated to performing their jobs thoroughly, the 
insurance shortage would not have generated fear in directors. The criticism of directors does not 
imply that directors are unethical or opportunistic. The public, however, is demanding that boards 
take a more active role as overseers of the corporation. While increased responsibility will leave 
directors that serve on multiple boards insufficient time to satisfy all responsibilities, the demand 
for greater accountability suggests a need for a new role for directors. Directors should accept 
fewer board positions and dedicate more attention to the responsibilities accompanying the 
positions.  
Id. at 132–33. 
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Thus, although there may be valid reasons behind the enactment of section 102(b)(7), 
critiques raised serious concern regarding the potential adverse effects of exculpatory provisions 
on director behavior. The real effects of exculpatory provisions on director behavior in 
particular, and on corporate governance in general, are yet to be discovered. 
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CHAPTER IV. DUTY OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH 
A. Traditional Duty of Loyalty: Pecuniary Conflicts of Interest 
1. Three Periods of Common Law Development 
 The duty of loyalty requires directors to act honestly and loyally in their relationships 
with the corporation. The duty of loyalty represents the moral conduct that is essential in any 
legal organization: one should not abuse his or her position of trust to further self-interest at the 
expense of others. Directors are elected and empowered to advance the best interests of a 
corporation and its shareholders, and they should subordinate their self-interest (or a related 
person’s or institution’s interest) to the interest of the corporation and its shareholders when 
these two conflict. The duty of loyalty requires that the best interest of the corporation and its 
shareholders take precedence over any personal interest of a director that is not shared by the 
stockholders generally.
776
 More than a half century ago, the Delaware Supreme Court explained 
the loyalty concept and the underlying public policy as follows: 
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to 
further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to 
the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from 
a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands 
of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of 
his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, 
but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it 
of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make 
in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and 
unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest.
777
 
 
 Traditionally, the duty of loyalty concerns situations in which “a director … has 
pecuniary, self-dealing conflict of interest with the corporation.”
778
 A duty of loyalty issue arises 
where directors appear on both sides of a transaction or where they receive an exclusive personal 
financial benefit from a transaction that is not available to the corporation and to its shareholders 
generally.
779
 Similarly, a director is considered to be interested “if he will be materially affected, 
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either to his benefit or detriment, by a decision of the board, in a manner not shared by the 
corporation and the shareholders.”
780
 In a self-dealing transaction, a director’s judgment is likely 
to be affected by his own interest. Furthermore, self-dealing transactions are isolated from 
market competition because they typically involve discrete and non-arms-length bargaining. In 
these situations, “the transaction is inherently suspect as one in which the fiduciary may be 
profiting at the expense of the corporation or other shareholders.”
781
 Therefore, where directors 
have an exclusive personal interest or engage in self-dealing in their fiduciary capacity, the law 
imposes certain requirements to assure that the interests of the corporation and its shareholders 
are protected.  
 The law governing self-dealing director transactions made a gradual progress in corporate 
law history. Self-dealing transactions were addressed in the common law as early as nineteenth-
century.
782
 In the early common law, the perception of directors’ fiduciary status was heavily 
affected by the law of trusts.
783
 Accordingly, a strict legal regime was adopted against interested 
director transactions. In that early period, any director self-dealing transaction was literally 
condemned if it was subject to a fiduciary litigation. Transactions between a corporation and one 
or more of its directors were absolutely voidable at the instance of the corporation or its 
shareholders, regardless of fairness or unfairness of the transaction.
784
 A corporation or its 
shareholders had the litigious power to nullify an interested director transaction solely because a 
director appeared on both sides of the transaction.
785
 Thus, under the early common law, 
directors’ self-dealing in their fiduciary capacity was not tolerated by courts at the suit of the 
corporation or its shareholders.  
 In the course of the early twentieth century, the strict common law rule evolved into a 
relatively more lenient rule. Beginning circa 1910, a self-dealing transaction was not absolutely 
voidable; rather, it was subject to rigid procedural and substantive requirements to be upheld in a 
court room.
786
 Within this transition period, which preceded the third and more lenient common 
law period, courts required two conditions to uphold a self-dealing director transaction at a 
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lawsuit; first an approval of the transaction by a disinterested majority of the board; and second, 
the fairness of the transaction itself.
787
 As a threshold matter, the transaction had to be approved 
by the disinterested majority of the board. In other words, the majority of the board must have 
been free of conflict of interest with respect to the challenged transaction, and if so they must 
approve it. Only after such an approval could a self-dealing transaction be subject to judicial 
scrutiny under the strict fairness standard. For example, a transaction between the majority of a 
board and the corporation was automatically voidable at the instance of the corporation or its 
shareholders, without regard to its fairness or unfairness. Such a transaction was not subject to 
judicial fairness review because it inherently lacked the disinterested majority approval 
precondition. If, however, interested directors were able to obtain the approval of a disinterested 
majority of a board, they were then required to convince the court that the self-dealing 
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders. A transaction was not 
voidable solely for the reason of self-interest if directors met these two conditions.   
By the middle of the twentieth- century, courts dropped “disinterested majority approval” 
precondition, and the common law rule evolved into the fairness rule.
788
 The fairness rule of the 
third period is the modern common law rule governing self-dealing director transactions. Under 
this rule, a self-dealing transaction is subject to rigid judicial scrutiny under the entire fairness 
standard at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders. The burden is on interested 
directors to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction. Courts closely scrutinize all aspects 
of a self-dealing transaction to determine its fairness. The entire fairness standard has two basic 
components: fair dealing and fair price.
789
 Interested directors must demonstrate that both the 
process and result of the self-dealing transaction are fair to the corporation. If the interested 
directors fail to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction, it will not be respected by 
courts. Therefore, in that period, self-interest director transactions were voidable only upon a 
failure of interested directors to satisfy the entire fairness standard.  
The reason behind the evolution of the strict “absolutely voidable” common law rule into 
the “conditionally voidable” rule is the recognition that an interested director transaction may not 
always be detrimental to the corporation.
790
 In the twentieth century, transactions between 
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directors and corporations were increasingly subject to litigation. In reviewing those transactions, 
courts recognized that a self-dealing director transaction may well serve the best interest of the 
corporation if directors act fairly. There is a possibility that an interested director may have 
prioritized the corporation’s interest in a self-dealing transaction. As mentioned before, a self-
dealing transaction is potentially harmful to the corporation because an interested director’s 
judgment may have been affected by her own interest adversely to the corporation’s interest, and 
it lacks market competition due to non-arms-length bargaining. Under the fairness standard, 
directors are required to demonstrate that they have in fact acted in good faith in advancing the 
corporation’s interest, and their self-interest did not adversely affect their judgment and harm the 
corporation. Courts closely scrutinize the fairness of an interested director transaction as an 
independent, neutral party. If the court finds that the transaction was entirely fair to the 
corporation; the directors’ self-interest does not harm the corporation, and therefore, there is no 
reason to invalidate the transaction. Furthermore, a self- interested transaction may carry 
potential benefit for the corporation where the interested directors act fairly and offer the 
corporation more favorable terms than the market. Accordingly, a strict rule against interested 
director transactions may work against a corporation’s best interest.
791
 
One Delaware common law exception to the fairness rule is disinterested shareholder 
ratification.
792
 If the interested director transaction is submitted to a shareholder vote, and if, 
after disclosure of all material facts, the majority of shareholders who are not interested in the 
transaction voted to approve it, the transaction is not subject to judicial review under the entire 
fairness standard solely because of directors’ self-interest. In other words, after full disclosure, 
the ratification by the majority of disinterested shareholders removes the self-interest cloud from 
an interested director transaction. The policy underlying this exception to the fairness review of a 
self-dealing transaction is quite understandable. As residual owners of a corporation, 
shareholders are the ultimate beneficiaries to whom directors owe their fiduciary duties. 
Accordingly, the fairness rule is in place to protect the ultimate interest of shareholders. If the 
majority of disinterested shareholders, after full disclosure of all material facts, approve a self-
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dealing transaction, there is no reason for courts to engage in a lengthy fairness process to protect 
the interest of the shareholders.
793
 Thus, shareholder ratification negates the need for the entire 
fairness review of a self-dealing director transaction.  
 The strict common law regime governing self-dealing transactions in the nineteenth-
century gradually relaxed throughout the first half of the twentieth century. In the second half, 
states’ legislatures furthered the relaxation by adopting statutory provisions that extended the 
exceptions to the fairness rule. In Delaware, the statutory provision regulating self-dealing 
transactions was adopted in the recodification of its corporation law in 1967. The next section 
examines the Delaware statutory provision and its relationship with the common law rule of 
fairness.    
2. The Fourth Period: Section 144 and “Fairness” As a Process of Review by a Fully 
Informed Decision-Maker 
 The Delaware legislature enacted section 144 when it recodified its corporation law in 
1967. Section 144 provides a limited safe harbor “to prevent director conflicts of interest from 
voiding corporate action.”
794
 Generally, the section codifies the common law fairness rule and 
adds one more exception to judicial fairness review. Under section 144(a), an interested director 
transaction is not voidable on the ground of self-interest if (1) the majority of fully-informed and 
disinterested directors approve the transaction, or (2) fully informed (and disinterested) 
shareholders ratify the transaction, or (3) the interested directors demonstrate the fairness of the 
transaction before a court. Section 144 provides: 
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, 
or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization 
in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, 
shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present 
at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or 
transaction, or solely because any such director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such purpose, 
if: 
(1) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or interest and as to 
the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, 
and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative 
votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less 
than a quorum; or 
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(2) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or interest and as to 
the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the stockholders entitled to vote thereon, 
and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the stockholders; 
or 
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, 
approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the stockholders. 
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at 
a meeting of the board of directors or of a committee which authorizes the contract or 
transaction.
795
 
 
 Under section 144(a), an interested director transaction is not subject to fairness review 
solely because of self-interest if, upon full disclosure of all material facts, a majority of the 
disinterested directors or shareholders approve the transaction. An approval either by a majority 
of the disinterested directors or shareholders removes the self-interest taint from the transaction 
and precludes judicial fairness review. In the absence of such approval, the interested transaction 
is subject to judicial review under the entire fairness standard, and it is not voidable only if 
interested directors demonstrate that the transaction is fair to the corporation. Thus, section 
144(a) provides three alternative methods to shelter an interested director transaction from 
invalidation on the ground of self-interest.  
Section 144(a)(2) recognizes the common law exception to the fairness rule: shareholder 
ratification. Indeed, shareholder ratification under section 144(a) is not identical to the common 
law exception. Section 144(a) only requires an approval by the majority of shareholders, not by 
the majority of disinterested shareholders. However, Delaware courts interpret section144(a)(2) 
in accordance with the common law exception to the fairness rule, and they require the 
shareholder vote to be disinterested under section 144(a)(2).
796
 Furthermore, a recent Delaware 
decision added uncertainty with respect to shareholder ratification of interested director 
decisions.
797
 In Gantler v. Stephens, the Delaware Supreme Court made a distinction between a 
shareholder vote solely for the purpose of approving an interested transaction and a shareholder 
vote that is statutorily required to authorize a specific corporate action or transaction.
798
 This 
raised the question whether a statutorily required shareholder vote would also cleanse the self-
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dealing aspect of a transaction if it includes the favorable votes of the majority of disinterested 
shareholders. This distinction was not outcome determinative in the case, and therefore, it is not 
clear if Delaware courts require a distinct shareholder vote for an interested transaction which is 
also subject to a statutorily required shareholder vote for authorization.
799
 To resolve the 
uncertainty created by Gantler, Professor Hecker suggested as follows:  
A … possible reading [of Gantler] that reconciles the conflict would distinguish between 
statutorily-required shareholder votes that coincidentally achieve approval by a majority of the 
voting shares held by disinterested persons (as was the case in Gantler) and those in which the 
transaction, in addition to the statutory vote, is also specifically targeted and conditioned on 
approval by a majority of the disinterested shares.  In the latter case, the ‘classic’ ratification 
feature of a voluntary additional layer of independent shareholder approval would be present, 
albeit in the broader context of a statutorily required vote. This reading preserves the ultimate 
cleansing effect of long-standing doctrine, while responding to the court’s concern that, to be 
effective, ratification must be specifically focused.
800
 
 
Section 144(a) extends common law exception to the fairness rule by adding another 
category: disinterested director approval. Under section 144(a)(1), an approval by a majority of 
the disinterested directors cures the self-interest as long as the approving directors are fully-
informed of the self-interest and all material facts, and they act in good faith to further the best 
interests of the corporation.
801
 Such an approval protects an interested transaction from 
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shareholder challenge on the ground of self-interest and therefore precludes fairness review of 
the transaction by courts. In other words, a good faith approval by a majority of the disinterested 
and informed directors substitutes for judicial fairness review.   
 Accordingly, under section 144, the fairness of an interested transaction is viewed as a 
process of review by fully informed and neutral decision-makers.
802
 An approval by a majority 
of the fully informed disinterested directors or shareholders substitutes for strict judicial review 
of an interested transaction under an entire fairness standard. As the Delaware Supreme Court 
observed in Oberly v. Kirby, “[t]he key to upholding an interested transaction [under section 
144(a)] is the approval of some neutral decision-making body.”
803
 An interested director 
transaction is not voidable as long as the interested party “has [not] deprived stockholders of a 
‘neutral decision-making body.’”
804
 An independent and informed decision-making body, 
whether it be courts, disinterested directors, or shareholders, neutralizes the self-interest aspect of 
a transaction.   
 The business judgment rule, which is the primary standard of review in the decision-
making context, presumes that directors act in good faith and make informed and disinterested 
decisions. Under the business judgment rule, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to 
demonstrate that the defendant directors have self-interest in a transaction or that they are 
dominated or controlled by an interested party. If the plaintiff is able to demonstrate the 
existence of director self-interest or other extraneous considerations concerning a corporate 
decision or transaction, the burden then shifts to the defendant directors to show the approval of 
the transaction under section 144. If the defendant directors are unable to show such approval, 
the transaction is subject to strict judicial review with the burden on defendant directors to prove 
the fairness of the transaction. If, however, the defendant directors show that the transaction is 
approved under section 144(a)(1) or (2), the transaction is protected under the business judgment 
rule, and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction constitutes corporate 
waste. If one considers the difficulty of proving the onerous standard of waste, plaintiffs have 
little chance to succeed in their claim once the transaction is protected under the business 
judgment rule.  
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B. The Duty to Act in Good Faith 
1. Section 102(b)(7) Exculpatory Provisions Focus the Interest of Scholars and the 
Plaintiffs’ Bar on Conduct Not in Good Faith 
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law allows a certificate of 
incorporation to include a provision eliminating directors’ monetary liability for due care 
violations. Section 102(b)(7) explicitly excludes a breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith 
from exculpable conduct. Even if a certificate of incorporation includes an exculpatory clause, 
directors are liable for duty of loyalty and good faith violations. The duty of loyalty traditionally 
concerns self-dealing transactions. Accordingly, good faith has significant importance in 
defining the scope of non-exculpable conduct that does not involve director self-interest. In 
situations where directors are exculpated from due care liability and are free from conflict of 
interest, they may be held liable only if the alleged fiduciary violation amounts to the lack of 
good faith. Therefore, after widespread adoption of exculpatory provisions, good faith has 
become vitally important in determining director liability, and the focus of the plaintiffs’ bar 
shifted from the duty of care to the duty of good faith in litigating nonpecuniary director 
misconduct.  
The duty of good faith has long been an element of the business judgment rule, requiring 
directors to exercise an honest judgment seeking to advance the best interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders. Despite that, as one commentator observed, Delaware courts employed the 
concept of good faith “as something of a rhetorical grace note; it has never provided the basis for 
the court to decide the matter before it.”
805
 Accordingly, the duty of good faith was not a well-
developed area of corporate fiduciary law.
806
 The uncharted territory of good faith presented a 
fertile field for plaintiffs to re-characterize their fiduciary claims to hold directors liable for 
alleged director misconduct that did not involve conflict of interest. As one commentator nicely 
illustrated, in the post-exculpatory era good faith has become “the Achilles heel of both the 
business judgment rule and statutory exculpation.”
807
 
The implications of section 102(b)(7) in the pre-trial context of a derivative action also 
explain why plaintiffs moved away from litigating due care claims and focused on the duty of 
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good faith instead.
808
 In Malpiede v. Townson, the Delaware Supreme court held that a section 
102(b)(7) provision “bars a claim that is found to state only a due care violation.”
809
 A 
shareholder complaint that asserts only a duty of care claim is dismissible once the corporation’s 
section 102(b)(7) provision is properly invoked.
810
 Not surprisingly, after the Malpiede decision, 
plaintiffs have framed the fiduciary claims to state a breach of the duty of good faith in order to 
circumvent the exculpation of section 102(b)(7) provisions.  
In the post-exculpatory era, the duty of good faith has started to receive increasingly 
more attention from scholars as well. The shift in the plaintiffs’ bar’s focus from the duty of care 
to the duty of good faith in litigating fiduciary misconduct raised the question to what extent 
could a plaintiff “transform an act or omission that violated the duty of care into a claim that 
would support the imposition of personal liability by showing that the careless act or omission 
was ‘“not in good faith?”’
811
 Before the enactment of section 102(b)(7), the classic duties of 
loyalty and care provided an adequate legal framework to address director misconduct, and good 
faith served as an important yet spare concept under the business judgment rule. The elimination 
of due care liability changed this traditional picture and brought good faith to the forefront in 
corporate fiduciary law.  
Arguably, the introduction of exculpatory provisions into the corporate law disrupted the 
fiduciary law doctrine that was developed by judges over a century. Under the traditional 
fiduciary analysis, where director conflict of interest was not at issue, a shareholder complaint 
alleging director misconduct would be typically litigated under the duty of care. The procedural 
and substantive effect of exculpatory provisions changed this traditional legal framework and 
created a legal gap to address egregious director misconduct which did not involve conflict of 
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interest yet was worse than lack of due care. Therefore, a doctrinal vehicle was needed to address 
this type of misconduct,
812
 and the duty of good faith was a potential candidate because of its 
uncharted content. Moreover, the dismantlement of due care liability from fiduciary law created 
a discomfort among corporate scholars because the conduct that falls within the realm of the duty 
of care represents a fundamental aspect of board service. Although exculpatory provisions 
eliminate due care liability, they do not diminish the importance of the conduct expected of 
directors under the duty of care. Accordingly, after the elimination of due care liability, 
directors’ good faith effort to comply with their due care responsibilities has become especially 
important. Scholars turned to good faith to define the contours of fiduciary obligations of 
directors and have extensively argued the relationship between the conduct expected of directors 
under the duty of care and good faith.  
a. The Scope of Good Faith 
The concept of good faith represents the subjective aspect of the fiduciary conduct 
required of directors in corporate law. Directors must act in the honest belief that they are acting 
in the best interests of the corporation.
813
 In the corporate context, good faith requires “a true 
faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”
814
 To comply 
with the duty of good faith, directors “must act at all times with an honesty of purpose and in the 
best interests and welfare of the corporation.”
815
 Put it another way, the honest belief and the best 
interests of the corporation must guide every action of corporate directors.
816
 Directors are 
elected to further the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and the duty of good faith 
ensures that they truly act for this purpose. Directors should a make a good faith effort to comply 
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with their responsibilities when they act in their fiduciary capacities. Good faith “includes not 
simply the [classic] duties of care and loyalty, … , but all actions required by a true faithfulness 
and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”
817
 In sum, good faith 
requires an honest and positive subjective motivation and a genuine effort in advancing the 
welfare of the corporation.  
The duty of good faith represents a broad concept in corporate fiduciary law, and it is 
very difficult to provide a complete definition that would prescribe the contours of good faith. As 
the Chancery Court observed in Disney: 
To create a definitive and categorical definition of the universe of acts that would constitute [lack 
of good faith] would be difficult, if not impossible. And it would misconceive how … the concept 
of good faith operates in our common law of corporations.
818
 
 
Furthermore, the business judgment rule presumes that directors act in good faith.
819
 The burden 
is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that directors’ action or omission lacked good faith. In other 
words, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of evidence that directors acted in bad faith.
820
 
Accordingly, Delaware courts explicated the scope of good faith by giving examples of bad faith 
conduct. If directors act with an actual intent to harm the corporation, or they knowingly violate 
applicable positive law, their conduct will constitute bad faith.
821
 Bad faith occurs when directors 
intentionally act in a manner “unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation’s best interests.”
822
 For 
example, directors’ conduct lacks good faith if they act with a purpose other than a genuine 
attempt to further the interests of the corporation or if they act with a subjective motivation that 
is adverse to the interests of corporation. The Chancery Court in Disney explained that “[b]ad 
faith can be the result of ‘any emotion [that] may cause a director to [intentionally] place his own 
interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of the corporation,’ including greed, ‘hatred, 
lust, envy, revenge, … shame or pride.’”
823
 The court added that a systematic or sustained 
shirking of a duty may also constitute bad faith.
824
  
                                                 
817
 Id. 
818
 Id.  
819
 See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
820
 Disney, 907 A.2d at 755. 
821
 Id. 
822
 Id. (citation omitted). 
823
 Id. (citation omitted). See also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The reason for the 
disloyalty (the faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be it venal, familial, collegial, or nihilistic) for 
conscious action not in the corporation’s best interest does not make it faithful, as opposed to faithless.”). 
824
 Disney, 907 A.2d at 755. 
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 Indeed, in the real world, it is unlikely that directors would intentionally act to harm the 
corporation or act with a purpose other than the best interests of the corporation unless they have 
a pecuniary conflict of interest. The situations that involve pecuniary conflicts of interest are 
addressed under the classic duty of loyalty. Therefore, the practical importance of good faith is 
not related to pure subjective motivations of directors; rather, it is related to the discharge of 
directorial responsibilities.
825
 In other words, the duty of good faith is especially important in 
situations in which an inference of bad faith may be drawn from directors’ conduct, or lack 
thereof. For example, intentional dereliction of directorial responsibilities may implicate bad 
faith regardless of directors’ subjective motivation. This later facet of good faith, which requires 
a genuine attempt to discharge directorial responsibilities, emerged after the enactment of section 
102(b)(7). In the last decade, corporate scholars extensively discussed the relationship of good 
faith with the classic fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and questioned whether good faith was 
a third, independent duty. The next section briefly examines scholarly discussions concerning 
good faith. Afterwards, Disney and Stone, the cases in which Delaware courts addressed the 
relationship between good faith and the duties of care and loyalty, are examined.  
b. Is It a Third, Independent Duty? 
Traditionally, fiduciary obligations of directors are classified under two main duties; 
loyalty and care. Although good faith has long been part of directors’ fiduciary duties, courts had 
not explicitly articulated good faith as either an independent duty or as a component of duties of 
loyalty or care. Under the business judgment rule, good faith served as a third, independent 
element. To afford the protection of the business judgment rule, directors should make (1) an 
informed, (2) disinterested, and (3) good faith decision. Despite being an independent element of 
the business judgment rule, good faith had not been conceptualized as a freestanding fiduciary 
duty.  
In 1993, the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede v. Technicolor stated that, to rebut the 
business judgment rule, a plaintiff must prove that directors “breached any one of the triads of 
their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due care.”
826
 The court repeated the notion of good 
faith being part of a triad of fiduciary duties in several other decisions without specifically 
                                                 
825
 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24 (2006) (“In 
corporate law, as in law generally, the objective elements of good faith are far more important in practice than the 
subjective elements.”). 
826
 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
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discussing whether it is a third, independent fiduciary duty.
827
 It was not clear whether the court 
by employing a triad fiduciary analysis intended to upgrade good faith into an independent, 
separate fiduciary duty. Interestingly, while the Delaware Supreme Court decisions arguably 
signaled the emergence of an independent duty of good faith, the Delaware Chancery Court in 
numerous opinions conceptualized good faith as a component of the duty of loyalty.
828
 
Therefore, until recently, Delaware decisional law was “far from clear with respect to whether 
there is a separate fiduciary duty of good faith.”
829
  
 The ambiguity concerning the status of good faith in corporate fiduciary law generated 
extensive scholarly commentary.
830
 The doctrinal question whether good faith was an 
independent duty received attention with the increasing recognition of the importance of good 
faith after the widespread adoption of exculpatory provisions. Accordingly, the academic debate 
over this issue is closely tied to the content of the emerging good faith concept. Those who 
suggested a freestanding duty of good faith tended to assign an expansive role to the emerging 
concept in defining fiduciary liability of directors.
 831
 Others conceptualized good faith under the 
duty of loyalty and argued that it should play a more limited role with respect to directors’ 
liability.
832
   
                                                 
827
 See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (“The directors of Delaware corporations have 
a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.”); Malpiede 780 A.2d at 1086 (“the board’s 
fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty”). 
828
 See, e.g., Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“By definition, a director cannot simultaneously 
act in bad faith and loyally towards the corporation and its stockholders.”). In Emerald Partners v. Berlin, the Court 
of Chancery observed as follows:  
Although corporate directors are unquestionably obligated to act in good faith, doctrinally that 
obligation does not exist separate and apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Rather, it is a subset 
or ‘subsidiary requirement’ that is subsumed within the duty of loyalty, as distinguished from 
being a compartmentally distinct fiduciary duty of equal dignity with the two bedrock fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and due care. 
2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, *86 n.63 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2001); see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. C.A. 9700, 
2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, *138 n.33 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003) (“Good faith is a fundamental component of the duty 
of loyalty, as the Supreme Court recognized in [Cede & Co. v.] Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 368, n.6…”). 
829
 Disney, 907 A.2d at 753. 
830
 See, e.g., Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 742, at 1439–53 (discussing but not necessarily concluding 
whether good faith is an independent duty).  
831
 See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004); Eisenberg, supra note 825, 
at 17–18.  
832
 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty's Core 
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (arguing that the duty of 
good faith is a fundamental aspect of the core duty of loyalty and the duty of loyalty is not limited to self-dealing 
situations).  
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Hillary Sale, for example, focusing on court decisions at the early stage of the Disney 
case,
833
 argued that the concept of good faith was moving toward a separate duty in Delaware.
834
 
Good faith was assuming a new role as an independent duty to address the indifference or 
egregiousness
835
 of directors in performing their oversight or decision-making functions.
836
  
According to Sale, a freestanding duty of good faith was desirable because it would be 
“potentially more expansive, requiring fiduciary compliance in its own right and encouraging 
fiduciary parties to comply with their obligations.”
837
 Strong enforcement of an independent, 
separate duty of good faith would create an incentive to prompt directors to better behavior.
838
 In 
Sale’s view, a free-standing duty of good faith “creates its own incentives for fiduciaries to make 
thoughtful decisions ex ante” and deters directors from the abdication of their responsibilities.
839
 
In her formulation, “[a]lthough a breach of good faith need not be intentional or conscious, it 
does require some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure.”
840
 Sale argued that, although 
good faith may overlap other duties of loyalty and care to some extent, it should be a separate 
duty from loyalty and care because good faith involves “not only process or conflicts of loyalty, 
but also the circumstances, or lack thereof, surrounding the substantive outcome.”
841
 
A robust argument that the duty of good faith is a free-standing duty and an 
unconventional proposal with respect to its content came from learned Professor Melvin 
Eisenberg.
842
 Examining the concept of good faith in the statutory and case law, he has argued 
that the domain of good faith should be distinct from the duty of loyalty and care in the corporate 
fiduciary context.
843
 Eisenberg states that the free-standing duty of good faith “includes objective 
                                                 
833
 Sale, supra note 831, at 471–82 (examining Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) and In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 825, A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
834
 Id. at 471. See also Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 742, at 1452 (stating that Sale convincingly argues that 
good faith is an independent, separate fiduciary duty). 
835
 See Sale, supra note 831, at 488–91(proposing the application of federal scienter standards from the Rule 10b-5 
for determining bad faith in cases that involve allegations based on directors’ deliberate indifference); cf. Cristopher 
M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1131, 1180–82 (2006) (criticizing Sale’s proposal for application of the scienter standard).  
836
 Sale, supra note 831, at 484.  
837
 Id. at 464. 
838
 Id. at 495. 
839
 Id. at 469.  
840
 Id. at 493.  
841
 Id. at 494. (“Although good faith may exist as a component of care and loyalty, confining it to those situations 
would diminish its power as a prophylactic tool or incentive for good fiduciary conduct.”). 
842
 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 825.  
843
 Id. at 6–10.  
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as well as subjective elements,”
844
 and “the objective elements of good faith are far more 
important in practice than the subjective elements.”
845
 The subjective element requires subjective 
honesty, and the objective elements include (1) an obligation not to violate generally accepted 
standards of business, (2) an obligation not to violate basic corporate norms, and (3) fidelity to 
office and faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation.
846
 Accordingly, Eisenberg rejects the notion 
that good faith is an element of the fundamental duty of loyalty and that it should be confined to 
subjective belief or state of mind of directors.
847
 Rather, directors’ subjective belief should be 
based on, and reviewed under, general corporate and business practices.
848
 Eisenberg proposes 
“substantial disregard of responsibilities” as the appropriate standard for determining whether 
directors have acted in good faith.
849
 According to Eisenberg, however, lack of good faith does 
not constitute a basis for liability; it rather operates as a condition.
850
 Basically, substantial 
disregard of responsibilities constitutes a violation of both the duty of care and good faith. The 
violation of the duty of care provides the basis for director liability; and the violation of good 
faith operates to lift the liability shield of exculpatory provisions.
851
 
 John Reed and Matt Neiderman, on the other hand, argued that good faith, as a broad and 
flexible concept, served as a bridge between the duties of loyalty and care.
852
 Focusing on 
several Chancery Court opinions,
853
 they conceptualized good faith under the duty of loyalty, 
while recognizing that certain due care violations or other egregious misconduct would implicate 
the lack of good faith.
854
 In their view, the disloyal conduct is not necessarily confined to self-
                                                 
844
 Id. at 23.  
845
 Id. at 24.  
846
 Id. at 24–25.  
847
 See id. at 12–21 (criticizing Delaware Chancery Court opinions that employed the notion of good faith as being 
an element of the duty of loyalty).  
848
 See id. at 23 (“[G]ood faith in law . . . is not to be measured always by a man’s own standard of right, but by that 
which [the law] has adopted and prescribed as a standard for the observance of all men in their dealings with each 
other.”) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. F.C. Trebein Co., 52 N.E. 834, 837 (Ohio 1898)).  
849
 Id. at 62–74.  
850
 Id. at 73.  
851
 Id.  
852
 Reed & Neiderman, supra note 741, at 123.  
853
 Id. at 119–22. 
854
 Id. at 123. The authors observed as follows: 
The ‘good faith’ standard, especially in the abdication context (as set forth more fully below), acts 
almost as a bridge between the concepts of due care and loyalty, transforming what might 
otherwise be deemed certain violations of the former into violations of the latter, even in the 
absence of an adverse pecuniary interest. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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dealing situations, and it might take many forms including bad faith conduct.
855
 For example, an 
egregious failure to exercise an informed business judgment or reckless indifference to the 
substance of a material corporate action would constitute bad faith conduct, and therefore, it 
would implicate disloyalty. Accordingly, they argued that the duty of loyalty is broader than 
classic financial self-interest context and categorized good faith as a component of this broader 
loyalty concept.  
 Likewise, Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine, with three other colleagues, argued that 
good faith is not a separate, free-standing fiduciary duty; rather, it is a “fundamental aspect of the 
core duty of loyalty.”
856
 They stated that “the basic definition of the duty of loyalty is the 
obligation to act in good faith to advance the best interests of the corporation,” and the duty of 
loyalty is much broader than the financial conflict of interest context.
857
 According to the 
authors, good faith in corporate fiduciary law represents the state of mind with which directors 
must act to comply with the duty of loyalty.
858
 They criticized advocates of an independent duty 
of good faith for attempting to convert grossly negligent conduct to bad faith conduct and 
diminishing the liability protection permitted under section 102(b)(7).
859
 They explicitly rejected 
the view that the duty of good faith includes objective elements or that some objective criteria 
should play a role for determining bad faith conduct.
860
 In their view, directors may only be held 
                                                 
855
 Id. 
856
 See Strine et al., supra note 832, at 640–73 (employing a historical, etymological, and policy-oriented analysis in 
discussing that good faith is an element of the duty of loyalty).  
857
 Id. at 629 (emphasis added).  
858
 Id.  
859
 Id. at 696. The authors stated as follows: 
There are plausible arguments that can be made that well-paid independent directors hired mostly 
to be monitors ought to be subject to liability if they commit an act of gross negligence. Rather 
than push that argument directly, though, some advocates had used the Technicolor-inspired 
notion of a free-standing duty of good faith to pursue that argument in a less-than-overt way, by 
infusing the new duty with the spirit of Van Gorkom and pushing it away from a more rigorous 
standard dependent on a showing that the director acted in subjective bad faith. Stone v. Ritter 
made plain that opponents of section 102(b)(7) provisions had to make their case in forums other 
than courts by pushing boards to amend charters to repeal exculpatory provisions or pushing the 
Delaware General Assembly to repeal section 102(b)(7). That is, these advocates had to make the 
straightforward argument that the duty of care ought to be enforceable through a damages award 
and prevail on that argument at the ballot box or in the legislature. 
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and 
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 574 (2008) (criticizing proponents of a free-standing fiduciary duty of 
good faith). 
860
 Strine et al., supra note 832, at 632. According to the authors, this argument undermines the protection of 
exculpatory provisions:   
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liable if a court finds that a particular director acted with subjective bad faith by consciously 
failing to make a good faith effort to comply with directorial responsibilities.
861
  
 Thus, the increasing recognition of the importance of good faith in the post-exculpatory 
era triggered the academic debate regarding its status and role in defining directors’ liability in 
the non-self-dealing context. The key question in this debate is whether courts should employ a 
subjective or objective standard in reviewing directors’ good faith. The Delaware Supreme Court 
addressed this question and the status of good faith in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.
862
 
and Stone v. Ritter.
863
 In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court explicated the concept of good 
faith and its interaction with the duty of care. Soon after, in Stone the court resolved the doctrinal 
question concerning whether good faith was a separate, independent fiduciary duty. The next 
sections examine the duty of good faith in Disney and Stone. 
2. Disney and Stone 
a. Disney  
The duty of good faith and a board’s decision-making process (the duty of care) played 
an eminent role in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.
864
 In that case, several 
                                                 
In particular, advocates and scholars who opposed the passage of section 102(b)(7) saw room to 
argue that a director could be held liable, not because a fact-finder ultimately found her to have 
acted in subjective bad faith, but because she had fallen below some ‘objective’ standard of good 
faith. In other words, the kind of objectivity that is reflected in tort law’s requirement that a person 
act in the manner that a reasonable person would in the same or similar circumstances would be 
poured into the free-standing duty of good faith, and directors would be held liable if they fell 
short of this objective standard.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
861
 Id. at 629–30.  
862
 906 A.2d 27, 34 (Del. 2006). 
863
 911 A.2d 362 (Del.2006). 
864
 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). The procedural history of the case is as follows: Several shareholders of the Walt 
Disney Company brought a derivative complaint against its directors without making a pre-suit demand on the 
board. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 353 (Del. Ch. 1998) [hereinafter Disney I]. The 
complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendant directors breached their fiduciary duties with respect to the hiring of 
Michael Ovitz as the president of the company and his subsequent termination with a large severance package after 
a brief tenure. The key element in the complaint was that directors failed to compute the potential cost of the large 
severance package resulting from no-fault termination, and they approved it without being aware of its magnitude. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it failed to comply with Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, 
which requires plaintiffs either to make a demand on the board or to plead particularized facts that excuse such 
demand.  Id. The Chancery Court concluded that the complaint failed the Aronson demand excuse test because it did 
not create a reasonable doubt with respect to the directors’ independence or absence of self-interest and the 
applicability of the business judgment rule. Id. at 361, 365. The Chancery Court observed: “It is the essence of the 
business judgment rule that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to second guess a board's decision, except ‘in rare 
cases [where] a transaction may be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the test of business 
judgment.’ Because the Board’s reliance on [the expert] and his decision not to fully calculate the amount of 
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shareholders of the Walt Disney Company brought derivative actions against the directors of the 
company.
865
 The plaintiff shareholders alleged that the board’s compensation committee and the 
full board breached their respective fiduciary duties in the decisional process concerning the 
employment and subsequent no-fault termination of Michael Ovitz as the president of the 
company.
866
 The employment contract of Ovitz included a non-fault termination provision with a 
large severance package. After fourteen months of Ovitz’s unsuccessful service as the president 
of the company, his employment was terminated without cause, and he was granted a large 
severance package: approximately $130 million in cash and stock options.
867
 The complaint 
included factual allegations asserting that the directors’ decision-making process regarding 
Ovitz’s employment and termination involved egregious failures, and, therefore, they failed to 
discover the potential large severance package under the non-fault termination provision of the 
agreement.
868
 The Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss after concluding that the facts 
alleged in the complaint, if true, suggested that the defendant directors “failed to exercise any 
business judgment and failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties,”
869
  
and that they “knew that they were making material decisions without adequate information and 
                                                 
severance lack ‘egregiousness,’ this is not that rare case. I think it a correct statement of law that the duty of care is 
still fulfilled even if a Board does not know the exact amount of a severance payout but nonetheless is fully 
informed about the manner in which such a payout would be calculated. A board is not required to be informed of 
every fact, but rather is required to be reasonably informed. Here the Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts giving rise 
to a reasonable doubt that the Board, as a matter of law, was reasonably informed on this issue.” Id. at 362. 
Accordingly, the Chancery Court dismissed the complaint for failure to make a demand on Disney board. Id. at 380. 
The Delaware Supreme Court refused to take such a deferential position and reversed the Chancery Court’s 
dismissal of fiduciary duty and waste claims to the extent that it was with prejudice, affording the plaintiffs “a 
reasonable opportunity to file a further amended complaint” on remand to the Chancery Court. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000) [hereinafter Disney II].The Delaware Supreme Court observed: “This is potentially a very 
troubling case on the merits. On the one hand, it appears from the Complaint that: (a) the compensation and 
termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to Ovitz’ value to the Company; 
and (b) the processes of the boards of directors in dealing with the approval and termination of the Ovitz 
Employment Agreement were casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory.” Id. at 249. The plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint, and the Chancery Court concluded that the new complaint sufficiently pleaded a breach fiduciary duty to 
withstand a motion to dismiss under Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6) and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed to 
discovery on the merits of their claims. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
[hereinafter Disney III]. At the trial, the Chancery Court concluded that the defendant directors did not breach their 
fiduciary duties or commit waste and entered judgment in favor of the defendants as to all claims in the complaint. 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 779 (Del. Ch. 2005) [hereinafter Disney IV]. The Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006) [hereinafter Disney 
V].  
865
 Disney III, 825 A.2d at 277–78.  
866
 Id. 
867
 Disney V, 906 A.2d at 34.  
868
 Disney III, 825 A.2d at 278. 
869
 Id. at 278. 
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without adequate deliberation.”
870
 Allegedly, directors “did not care if the decisions caused the 
corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss,”
871
 and they “consciously and 
intentionally disregarded their responsibilities.”
872
 
At its heart, Disney is a duty of care case because it primarily relates to directors’ 
(allegedly) deficient decision-making process. Directors’ self-dealing or subjective motivation 
did not play a major role in the case. However, the plaintiffs characterized their claims so as to 
state a breach of the duty of good faith because the certificate of incorporation of Disney 
included a section 102(b)(7) provision.
873
 Section 102(b)(7) enables corporations to exculpate 
directors from monetary liability for due care breaches, but it explicitly excludes “actions or 
omissions not in good faith” from exculpable conduct.
874
 Although a board’s decision-making 
process traditionally falls within the realm of the duty of care, the plaintiffs, in order to 
circumvent the exculpation provision barrier, alleged that directors did not act in good faith in 
approving the employment contract of Ovitz.
875
 In other words, “the plaintiffs contended that 
gross negligence (care) was on a continuum and that at some point, a board’s lack of care could 
become so egregious that it constituted bad faith.”
876
 The exceptionally generous severance 
package afforded to Ovitz under the non-fault provision of the employment contract, and the 
casual decision-making process of the defendant directors provided a fertile ground for the 
plaintiffs to characterize their claims under the duty of good faith. The plaintiffs argued that the 
defendant directors should be held personally liable because their decisional process implicated 
“a knowing or intentional lack of due care,”
877
 therefore, a breach of the duty of good faith. 
According to the complaint, the defendant “directors abdicated all responsibility to consider 
appropriately an action of material importance to the corporation.”
878
 That allegation gave rise to 
the question “whether the board’s decision-making processes were employed in a good faith 
                                                 
870
 Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).  
871
 Id. 
872
 Id. (emphasis in original). 
873
 Id. at 286. 
874
 See supra Chapter III.E.2.a. 
875
 See, e.g., Strine et. al., supra note 839, at 688, 692. See also Furlow, supra note 450, at 1075 (observing that the 
Disney “plaintiffs sought to extend Caremark’s abdication-of-duty theory from the oversight context to the 
decisionmaking context”). 
876
 Holland, supra note 10, at 695.  
877
 Disney III, 825 A.2d at 278.  
878
 Id. 
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effort to advance corporate interests.”
879
 In sum, the plaintiffs conflated due care and good faith 
claims and alleged that directors acted in bad faith by making a material decision without either 
adequate information or deliberation. After concluding that the complaint raised doubt 
concerning the applicability of the business judgment protection, the Chancery Court denied the 
defendant directors’ motion to dismiss.
880
  
  At the trial, the Court of Chancery concluded that, while being far from the best practices 
of ideal corporate governance,
881
 the defendant directors’ decision-making process did not 
constitute a breach of the duty of care.
882
 The court found that, despite the irregularities in the 
decisional process, the board’s compensation committee acted on an informed basis in approving 
the employment contract and the no-fault termination provision.
883
 The court’s factual analysis 
indicated that, the members of the compensation committee held a meeting to decide Ovitz’ 
employment and compensation, they had prior knowledge of the agenda of the meeting, they 
were provided a term sheet that explained key terms of Ovitz’s employment contract, and they 
made their decision upon reasonably relying on the expert opinion.
884
 Although the members of 
                                                 
879
 Id. 
880
 Id. 
881
 Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 697.  
882
 Id. at 760.  
883
 See id. at 760–71.  
884
 See id. The Court of Chancery employed the Van Gorkom analysis to determine whether the defendant directors’ 
decisional process was grossly negligent. It is arguable, however, whether the Disney directors’ decisional process 
should have passed muster under the Van Gorkom analysis. First, although the compensation committee was 
informed about the agenda of the meeting, Ovitz’s employment was decided and announced by the management 
prior to the meeting. Id. at 798. Second, the meeting lasted only one hour and included the discussion of other issues. 
Id. It is questionable whether the directors spent sufficient time in reviewing the term sheet and discussing the issue. 
The decisional process in Disney was arguably perfunctory and it was far from providing directors a meaningful 
opportunity to deliberate on the issue. In Disney, Delaware courts arguably relaxed judicial scrutiny of a decisional 
process under gross negligence in favor of directors. For example, in Disney, the Chancery Court noted that, 
although the directors had failed to compute the actual numbers concerning the severance package, they were aware 
of its magnitude. Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis implied that the defendant directors would have 
reached the same decision had they followed “a ‘best practices’ scenario.” Disney V, 906 A.2d at 56 (comparing the 
defendant directors’ decisional process with a best case scenario). Accordingly, the Disney courts considered the 
subjective elements of the case in determining whether the directors were grossly negligent with respect to the 
decisional process. In other words, the Disney courts did not employ a strict objective test with an exclusive focus on 
the decisional process. In contrast, the Van Gorkom court’s exclusive focus under the gross negligence analysis was 
the challenged decisional process, and the court did not consider the subjective elements of the case (e.g. the 
directors’ familiarity with the financial status of the corporation). See supra Chapter III.E.1.a. (examining Van 
Gorkom and scholarly criticism). See also Balotti & Hanks, supra note 378, at 1344. The authors observed with 
respect to Van Gorkom as follows:  
Thus, failure to gather and weigh sufficient information and acting with undue haste has resulted 
in personal liability for directors. This is true even though the same decision might have been, or 
likely would have been, reached if an adequate process had been followed. 
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the compensation committee had not actually computed the numbers concerning the non-fault 
severance package, they were aware of the magnitude of it because they knew that Ovitz’s 
compensation arrangements were comparable to other executives of the company, and they were 
highly familiar with the other executives’ compensation arrangements. Accordingly, they 
approved Ovitz’ employment contract while being aware of the large severance package, and 
that it was necessary to convince Ovitz to give up his lucrative position and earnings in his 
privately owned business. Ovitz had a reputation, experience and skills in the entertainment 
industry, and he was potentially valuable to Disney. The employment agreement and the non-
fault termination provision were designed and approved upon the consideration of these factors, 
and they were not simply a result of directors’ ignorance or faulty decision-making process. 
Accordingly, the members of compensation committee were informed of all material information 
reasonably available to them, and, despite its unfortunate consequences, their decision to approve 
Ovitz’s employment contract was a product of sound business judgment.
885
  
The court then determined that, under the bylaws of Disney, it was the board’s 
compensation committee’s responsibility to establish and approve Ovitz’s compensation 
arrangements, and the full board was only responsible to elect (or reject) Ovitz as the president 
of the company.
886
 The court found that the full board was informed of key elements of the 
employment contract, and it had reasonably relied on the compensation committee’s decision 
concerning the employment and compensation of Ovitz when it appointed him as the president of 
the company.
887
 The court held that the defendant directors (the full board and the compensation 
committee) did not act in a grossly negligent manner in their decisional process, and, therefore, 
they did not breach their duty of care.
888
 Thus, the plaintiffs failed to rebut the business judgment 
rule presumption on the ground of the duty of care.  
                                                 
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, in Disney, Delaware courts employed a more flexible approach 
by expanding the gross negligence test to include the subjective factors. 
885
 Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 760. See also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural 
Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 846–48 (2007) (criticizing the Chancery Court’s approach in analyzing the facts of the 
case). 
886
 Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 771–72. 
887
 Id.  
888
 Id. at 772. The court also held that the compensation arrangements of Ovitz, including the non-fault severance 
package, did not constitute waste because the employment contract was not “so one sided that no business person of 
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.” Id. at 759. The 
court also stated that the non-fault termination of Ovitz did not constitute waste because he could not be terminated 
for cause given his performance as the president of the company. Id.  
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The plaintiffs also failed to rebut the business judgment rule on the ground of lack of 
good faith.
889
 The Court of Chancery began its analysis by explaining the concept of good 
faith
890
 and providing examples of bad faith conduct. The court stated: 
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts 
with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the 
fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally 
fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. 
There may be other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are the most 
salient.
891
 
 
Among these examples, the bad faith conduct arising from “intentional dereliction of a duty, a 
conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities”
892
 captured the good faith claims in the case. The 
Chancery Court provided this definition as “an appropriate (although not the only) standard for 
determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith.”
893
 Under this definition, it was hardly 
surprising that the court found no bad faith in directors’ decisional process. The defendant 
directors’ due care compliance a fortiori eliminated the possibility of conscious disregard or 
intentional dereliction of their procedural responsibilities. The court further found that, despite 
the high cost of Ovitz to the company, the directors believed that his employment was in the best 
interests of the corporation.
894
 The court held that directors acted in good faith and their 
decisional process did not represent an intentional dereliction or conscious disregard of their 
fiduciary responsibilities.  
 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court’s definition of bad faith as 
“intentional dereliction of a duty, a conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities” was 
substantively wrong.
895
 According to the plaintiffs, “directors violate their duty of good faith if 
they are making material decisions without adequate information and without adequate 
deliberation.”
896
 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that “a failure to 
act in good faith requires conduct that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable than, the 
conduct giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care (gross negligence).”
897
 The 
                                                 
889
 See id. at 760–71. 
890
 See infra Part B.1.a. (examining the scope of good faith). 
891
 Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755 (emphasis added). 
892
 Id.  
893
 Id. (emphasis added).  
894
 Id. at 772. 
895
 Disney V, 906 A.2d at 62.  
896
 Id. 
897
 Holland, supra note 10, at 695.  
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Supreme Court stated that this claim was simply a “verbal effort to collapse the duty to act in 
good faith into the duty to act with due care.”
898
 In other words, the plaintiffs asked the Supreme 
Court to “treat a failure to exercise due care as a failure to act in good faith.”
899
 The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument and upheld the Chancery Court’s definition of bad faith conduct as 
a legally appropriate (although not exclusive) standard.
900
 Indeed, even the plaintiffs’ own 
definition of bad faith would not help their case because they failed to establish a breach of the 
duty of care at the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that directors did 
not breach their duty of care, and that they did not act in bad faith concerning the employment 
and termination of Ovitz.
901
   
 The Supreme Court provided further explication concerning the duty of good faith. The 
court observed that at least three different categories of fiduciary misconduct might fall within 
the realm of bad faith.
902
 The first category, at one end of the spectrum, is subjective bad faith.
903
 
Subjective bad faith is the fiduciary misconduct that involves an actual intent to do harm to the 
corporation or other improper intent (e.g., preferring extraneous considerations over the 
corporation’s interest), and it constitutes obvious, quintessential bad faith conduct.  
 The second category of misconduct, which is at the opposite end of the spectrum, 
involves grossly negligent conduct (lack of due care) without any malevolent intent.
904
 The court 
explicitly held that the lack of due care—a failure to be informed of all material information by a 
grossly negligent process—, without more, cannot constitute bad faith.
905
 In so holding, the court 
nullified the plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent the exculpatory provision by equating grossly 
negligent process with bad faith conduct. The court stated that equating grossly negligent 
conduct with “acts or omissions not in good faith” would eviscerate the protection afforded to 
directors under section 102(b)(7).
906
 The court emphasized that from a legal standpoint, 
directors’ duties of care and good faith must remain distinct. The court observed as follows:  
                                                 
898
 Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63.  
899
 Id.  
900
 Id. at 67. 
901
 Id. at 75. The Supreme Court also approved the Chancery Court’s holding that the employment contract and the 
non-fault termination that granted Ovitz large severance package did not constitute waste. Id. at 75. 
902
 Id. at 64. 
903
 Id. 
904
 Id. 
905
 Id. at 65. 
906
 Id.  
 
 
 146  
From a broad philosophical standpoint, that question is more complex than would appear, if only 
because … ‘issues of good faith are (to a certain degree) inseparably and necessarily intertwined 
with the duties of care and loyalty....’ But, in the pragmatic, conduct-regulating legal realm which 
calls for more precise conceptual line drawing, the answer is that grossly negligent conduct, 
without more, does not and cannot constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith. 
The conduct that is the subject of due care may overlap with the conduct that comes within the 
rubric of good faith in a psychological sense, but from a legal standpoint those duties are and must 
remain quite distinct.
907
 
 
 The court then addressed the third category of fiduciary misconduct, which fell between 
the categories of subjective bad motivation and grossly negligent conduct.
908
 This intermediate 
category is what the Court of Chancery intended to capture with the bad faith definition of 
“intentional dereliction of a duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.”
909
 The 
Supreme Court explicitly held that this category of fiduciary misconduct constitutes a violation 
of the duty of good faith, and it is not exculpable under section 102(b)(7).
910
 The court explained 
why this category constitutes bad faith as follows:  
[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the classic sense 
(i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or of a related person to the interest of the 
corporation) or gross negligence. Cases have arisen where corporate directors have no conflicting 
self-interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is more culpable than simple inattention 
or failure to be informed of all facts material to the decision. To protect the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, fiduciary conduct of this kind, which does not involve disloyalty 
(as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, should be 
proscribed. A vehicle is needed to address such violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is 
the duty to act in good faith.
911
 
Thus, an intentional or conscious violation of the duty of care constitutes bad faith. 
Egregious process failures that implicate more than grossly negligent conduct may amount to the 
lack of good faith. If directors know that they make a material decision without adequate 
                                                 
907
 Id. 
908
 Id. at 66.  
909
 The Supreme Court stated that this intermediate category was also recognized in section 102(b)(7). The Supreme 
Court observed as follows: 
[T]he legislature has also recognized this intermediate category of fiduciary misconduct, which 
ranks between conduct involving subjective bad faith and gross negligence. Section 102(b)(7)(ii) 
of the DGCL expressly denies money damage exculpation for ‘acts or omissions not in good faith 
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.’ By its very terms that 
provision distinguishes between ‘intentional misconduct’ and a ‘knowing violation of law’ (both 
examples of subjective bad faith) on the one hand, and ‘acts...not in good faith,’ on the other. 
Because the statute exculpates directors only for conduct amounting to gross negligence, the 
statutory denial of exculpation for ‘acts...not in good faith’ must encompass the intermediate 
category of misconduct captured by the Chancellor’s definition of bad faith. 
Id. at 67. See Bishop, supra note 807, at 933 (criticizing the court for relying on the formulation of the exculpatory 
statute provision by stating that the statute was predicated on common law in the first place); Bruner, supra note 
835, at 1150 (criticizing the formulation of the exculpatory language and the court’s reliance on it).  
910
 Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.  
911
 Id. 
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information, or if they deliberately fail to make any good faith attempt to exercise an informed 
business judgment, their conduct may constitute a breach of the duty of good faith. If directors’ 
conduct demonstrates that they were “consciously indifferent to a material issue facing the 
corporation,”
912
 or if their action or inaction was a result of “reckless indifference to or a 
deliberate disregard of the [corporation’s] interests”
913
 they may be held personally liable 
regardless of exculpatory protection. In the decision-making context, it is the egregiousness or 
magnitude of due care violation that may infer bad faith conduct. In the oversight context, it is 
the ongoing nature of the violation—a sustained and systematic failure—that may constitute bad 
faith.
914
 And the necessary condition in either context for bad faith liability is the subjective 
element: directors’ “consciousness” or “awareness” of their failure in complying with their 
responsibilities.  
The Disney case involved the directors’ decision-making process and the explication of 
conduct not in good faith. Shortly after Disney, the Supreme Court applied the good faith 
standard in the oversight context in Stone v. Ritter.
915
 The Stone court also resolved the doctrinal 
issue concerning whether good faith is an independent, separate fiduciary duty. The next section 
examines the good faith analysis of the Supreme Court in Stone.  
b. Stone v. Ritter 
In Stone, the plaintiff shareholders claimed director liability for failing to discharge their 
responsibilities in overseeing the corporate executives’ and other employees’ compliance with 
the federal money-laundering laws.
916
 The standard for determining director liability in the 
oversight context had been previously articulated by the Court of Chancery in In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation as follows: 
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated upon ignorance of 
liability creating activities within the corporation … in my opinion only a sustained or systematic 
failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable 
information and reporting system exits—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary 
condition to liability.
917
  
                                                 
912
 Disney III, 825 A.2d at 291. 
913
 Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 n.111. 
914
 See Reed & Neiderman, supra note 741, at 123 (“It is the magnitude or ongoing nature of the action(s) or 
inaction(s) that provides the indicia of what ultimately needs to be proven—i.e., the director's good faith or bad faith 
motivation (“state of mind”). 
915
 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
916
 Id. at 364.  
917
 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). See generally Hillary A. Sale, Good Faith’s Procedure and Substance, In re 
Caremark International Inc., Derivative Litigation, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 8-20 
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The Supreme Court held that the Caremark standard articulated the necessary preconditions for 
director liability for lack of good faith in the oversight context.
918
 The court stated that the 
Caremark standard described bad faith conduct in the oversight context and that it was fully 
consistent with one of the examples of bad faith conduct provided in Disney: “intentional failure 
to act in the face of a known duty to act, a conscious disregard of a duty.”
919
 The Supreme Court 
further explained the necessary conditions for good faith liability in the oversight context as 
follows:  
(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) 
having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its 
operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention.
920
  
 
The court added that “[i]n either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors 
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”
921
 
                                                 
05/2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133570. Sale points out the 
importance of the Caremark decision in shifting the focus “from exculpable care claims to non-exculpable good-
faith claims.” Id. Exculpatory provisions precluded shareholder complaints that did not involve traditional duty of 
loyalty violation because complaints with claims for damages grounded solely on duty of care violations were 
subject to dismissal. Caremark provided that certain oversight failures are not covered by exculpatory provisions 
and actionable under good faith. Accordingly, Caremark created room for plaintiffs to plead good faith allegations 
in their claims. Over time, “as the pleading process changed and cases survived the motion to dismiss [e.g. Disney 
litigation], good faith evolved from a procedural pleading mechanism to a defined, substantive directorial 
obligation.” Id. at 2. Cf. Bainbridge et al., supra note 859, at 595–97 (stating that, under Caremark, oversight 
liability was articulated as a species of the duty of care, and criticizing the approach that categorizes Caremark 
oversight liability under good faith for moving oversight breaches from exculpable due care conduct to non-
exculpable bad faith conduct and thereby expanding the scope of director liability). 
918
 Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.  
919
 Id. at 369. 
920
 Id. at 370 (emphasis added).  
921
 Id. See also Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that, to hold directors liable for a 
failure in monitoring under Caremark, “the directors have to have acted with a state of mind consistent with a 
conscious decision to breach their duty of care”). It should be noted that directors’ “knowing” that they were not 
discharging their responsibilities was not a necessary condition for good faith liability in Caremark. The Caremark 
court stated: “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish the lack of good faith that is a 
necessary condition to liability.” Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. The Stone court endorsed the Caremark standard and 
added a “knowing” element as a necessary condition for liability. Accordingly, Stone clearly increased the liability 
bar under the Caremark standard. See Bainbridge et al., supra note 859, at 598–604. (stating that the subjective state 
of mind of directors was not an element of the Caremark standard and that Stone court created a set ambiguities with 
respect to oversight liability by radically reinterpreting Caremark). “[B]y requiring ‘a showing that the directors 
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations,’ the Stone court arguably disallows director liability 
in the paradigm case in which a board over a sustained period of time simply failed to even consider whether a law 
compliance program was necessary.” Id. at 605 (citation omitted). See also Bainbridge, supra note 311 at 975–78 
(stating that the Stone court in fact endorsed the Guttman interpretation of Caremark, which ‘“transformed director 
oversight liability from a duty of care claim into a duty of loyalty claim”’) (citation omitted).   
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 The key holding of Stone is that it resolved the issue left open in Disney
922
 concerning the 
status of good faith. Stone held that good faith is not a separate, independent fiduciary duty; it is 
rather a subsidiary element of the fundamental duty of loyalty.
923
 The Supreme Court stated that 
director conduct that is not in good faith also constitutes disloyal conduct, and it results in 
liability because it constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty.
924
  The Supreme Court adopted the 
rationale found in opinions of the Court of Chancery explaining why good faith is a subsidiary 
element of the duty of loyalty: “A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she 
acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”
925
 The 
Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands 
on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, 
may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly.
926
 
 
 Thus, the duty of loyalty has expanded from its classical financial conflict of interest 
constraints to include non-pecuniary misconduct that lacks good faith. The Stone court observed: 
“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable 
fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good 
faith.”
927
 The court stated that “good faith may be described colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of 
fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty,” but in the legal context it is a part of 
                                                 
922
 Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 n.112.  
923
 Stone, A.2d at 370. See also Bainbridge et al., supra note 859, at 585–86 (criticizing Stone for subsuming good 
faith into the duty of loyalty and raising concerns with respect to inapplicability of the entire fairness standard in the 
good faith context). The authors criticized Stone for subsuming good faith into the duty of loyalty as follows:   
Liability for acts in bad faith thus will look a lot more like that imposed in cases involving a 
breach of the duty of care than the duty of loyalty. If someone ‘intentionally acts with a purpose 
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,’ for example, it makes no sense 
to ask whether the action was fair to the corporation. Instead, the relevant question is whether the 
corporation was harmed and, if so, by what amount. 
Good faith thus raises the issue of causation in a way that traditional loyalty concerns do not. After 
all, if the plaintiffs are setting out to recover the amount by which the defendant harmed the 
corporation, presumably they need to show that the defendant’s conduct in fact harmed the 
corporation. Indeed, it would be unfair to impose liability without a showing of causation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
924
 Stone, A.2d at 370. 
925
 Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del.Ch.2003)). 
926
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the duty of loyalty.
928
 Thus, while maintaining recognition of the new, emerging concept of good 
faith, the Supreme Court held that it is a component of the duty of loyalty.
929
 
3. “Conscious Disregard of One’s Responsibilities”: A Meaningful Standard or a Rhetorical 
Device?  
In the post-exculpatory world, good faith plays an eminent role in defining the contours 
of directors’ fiduciary obligations. Traditionally, the duty of good faith was defined to require an 
honest exercise of business judgment seeking to advance the best interests of the corporation. 
More recently, good faith assumed an additional role in corporate fiduciary law: a positive duty 
of devotion to directorial responsibilities. Directors must make a genuine, good faith effort to 
comply with their fiduciary duties when discharging their responsibilities. The Delaware 
Supreme Court explicated the emergent concept of good faith in the decision-making context in 
Disney and introduced a new standard for reviewing alleged director misconduct in non-self-
dealing cases: “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s 
responsibilities.”
930
 In Stone, the court explicated this standard in the oversight context and 
subsumed good faith into the duty of loyalty.
931
  
The emergent concept of good faith and the corresponding standard generated an 
extensive scholarly commentary. While some commentators praised Delaware’s new good faith 
doctrine,
932
 others raised concerns with respect to its adequacy in addressing director 
inattentiveness.
933
 Delaware courts set the liability bar under the new good faith standard quite 
                                                 
928
 Id. The Delaware Supreme Court thus recast its former triad formulation of fiduciary duties as a mere 
colloquialism.   
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 See Bainbridge et al., supra note 859, at 584 (stating that the Stone holding appears to be “a compromise between 
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 Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.  
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subjective state of mind); Bishop, supra note 807, at 939 (stating that the most significant result of the new good 
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 See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 885, at 833. The authors argue that the Delaware Supreme Court 
squandered an opportunity to develop and articulate an appropriate doctrinal approach under good faith for the 
situations that involve structural bias such as executive compensation. Id. They do not present a categorical 
definition of the situations that involve structural bias, they rather state that the courts should identify these 
situations while retaining flexibility. Id. at 858. They propose that “[p]laintiffs should be allowed to demonstrate bad 
faith with a two-part showing: (1) the challenged decision occurred within an environment of structural bias [e.g., 
executive compensation], and (2) influenced by that structural bias, the directors were grossly negligent in making 
the challenged decision.” Id. at 833.The authors also criticizes the Delaware Supreme Court for equating “bad faith” 
with “absence of good faith.” In their view, “bad faith” and “absence of good faith” should be treated as two distinct 
 
 
 151  
high. Only a very extreme and unlikely set of facts would result in personal liability for acting in 
bad faith. It is questionable if the new good faith standard is practically applicable for reviewing 
inattentive director conduct which does not involve a pecuniary conflict of interest or waste. In 
the real world, it is hard to imagine that, in the absence of a pecuniary conflict of interest or any 
other ill-intent, directors would deliberately act solely with a purpose to abdicate their 
responsibilities. As one commentator observed: 
It follows that the only way a board is going to be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty when it 
isn’t self-dealing is to (1) really not have any idea what it is doing; and (2) not have a 102(b)(7) 
clause in the charter; or (3) have such a clause but proceed in conscious disregard of the board’s 
responsibility, which would be truly puzzling in the absence of self-dealing. In other words, the 
board will be liable for non-self-dealing conduct on a cold day in August in Miami under a blue 
moon.
934
 
 
In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear that bad faith requires worse 
dereliction than grossly negligent conduct. While this holding is inevitable to uphold the 
protection afforded directors by section 102(b)(7), it is very difficult for a plaintiff to 
demonstrate bad faith conduct unless directors commit fraud or waste. Gross negligence already 
requires an extreme deficiency in performance of directorial responsibilities. In order to prove 
grossly negligent conduct, a plaintiff should demonstrate “facts that suggest a wide disparity 
between the process the directors used ... and that which would have been rational.”
935
 
                                                 
concepts. While bad faith involves a problematic intention (e.g. intentional dereliction of duty), “absence of good 
faith” is the conduct that lacks “genuine care” but does not involve any problematic intention or state of mind. The 
authors suggest that courts should use “absence of good faith” standard in the context of structural bias. Id. at 857; 
Anne Tucker Knees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 199 (2010). The author criticizes the Delaware Supreme Court for pushing “the fulcrum point between 
director authority and accountability too far in favor of director authority” under the new good faith doctrine, 
particularly in the context of monitoring a corporation’s legal compliance and business risks. Id. at 235. In her view, 
“[t]he current doctrinal approach has created a ‘toothless tiger’—an eviscerated standard that in practice rarely poses 
any meaningful threat of liability absent a violation of law—warranting a revision to the standard of oversight 
liability. Id. at 215–16. She proposes a “five factor red flag test” in examining director liability in the oversight 
context. “The five factors are: (1) the potential harm to the company; (2) the time directors had to react; (3) the 
particular source of the red flag; (4) the frequency of the red flag; and (5) the availability of relevant information to 
the directors.” If a court finds that a red flag existed under five-factor test and directors failed to take appropriate 
steps, it should impose liability for a breach of good faith. Id. at 207; Bishop, supra note 807, at 934 (criticizing 
Delaware’s new good faith doctrine and arguing that “[a] more plausible role for good faith would be not to make it 
an actionable independent standard, but to relegate it to a status that simply defeats” the protections of the business 
judgment rule and exculpatory provisions”). 
934
 Larry Ribstein, The Disney Affirmance: The End of the SOX Era 
http://busmovie.typepad.comideoblog/2006/06/thedisney-affi.html (June 8, 2006, 10:08 PST) (quoted from 
Bainbridge et. al., supra note 859, at 589 n.159).  
935
 Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 750 n.29 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 n. 39 (Del.Ch. 2003)) (emphasis 
in original).  
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Accordingly, the gross negligence standard puts a nearly insurmountable barrier in front of 
plaintiffs. Requiring a showing of worse dereliction than grossly negligent conduct does not 
provide plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to challenge directors’ decision-making process or 
oversight failures under good faith. The distinction between the gross negligence standard and 
bad faith makes sense as a general matter; however, it has little, if any, application in practice.    
The new good faith doctrine and the relevant standard may not be sufficient to assure 
director engagement or attentiveness in either corporate decision-making or oversight. By taking 
minimal procedural steps in discharging their responsibilities, directors may avoid personal 
liability under the new good faith standard. In the decision-making context, for example, if 
directors hold a meeting and make a cursory discussion of the issue at hand, they would not have 
consciously or intentionally disregarded their responsibilities.
936
 A superficial performance of 
minimal proceduralist responsibilities may preclude a finding of bad faith; however, it is far from 
the conduct expected of directors in performing board service. While good faith requires a 
genuine effort to comply with the fiduciary duties, directors may avoid personal liability by 
meeting minimal proceduralist standards of attention. 
The situation is not much different in the oversight context.
937
 The standard of liability in 
this context had been previously articulated by the Chancery Court in In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litig.
938
 There, the Chancery Court held that sustained and 
systematic failure to discharge oversight responsibilities may indicate lack of good faith and 
result in personal liability.
939
 In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Caremark and took 
it one step further. The Stone court held that “imposition of liability requires a showing that the 
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”
940
 Accordingly, after 
Stone, there is room for directors to escape personal liability by arguing that they did not know 
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 See Furlow, supra note 450, at 1077–79 (arguing that the concept of dereliction of duty was developed in cases 
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they were not discharging their responsibilities, even though their conduct constituted sustained 
and systematic failure of oversight obligations.
941
 
 Commentators also raised concerns that Delaware’s new good faith standard lacks 
clarity.
942
 In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the conscious disregard standard 
intends to capture the conduct that is short of intentional misconduct but is worse than lack of 
due care (grossly negligent conduct).
943
 This distinction makes sense doctrinally; however, it is 
hard to depict a factual setting that would fall within this grey area. In the absence of provable 
subjective bad faith (smoking gun memorandum), it is not clear how a plaintiff can demonstrate 
such conduct. Although the Disney court provided some conceptual guidance by clarifying that 
bad faith requires worse dereliction than grossly negligent conduct, the court did not provide an 
explanation as to what a plaintiff is required to do to demonstrate such conduct.
944
 Gross 
negligence itself is a nebulous standard, and suggesting that unintentional bad faith must be 
worse than gross negligence is not helpful. As one commentator observed, “measures framed in 
terms of exceeding gross negligence, but less than intentional negligence, are not particularly 
useful.”
945
 Another observed that the “murky” distinction between exculpable gross negligence 
and non-exculpable bad faith—a distinction that is “virtually impossible to draw in abstract, let 
alone in concrete, terms—would be rendered entirely moot.”
946
 
                                                 
941
 See supra note 921 & accompanying text. But see Bishop, supra note 807, at 937 (stating that the Stone court 
“did not define the precise contours of when oversight failure is systemic and actionable” and that this approach 
would encourage directors to take affirmative steps to be more involved in the oversight of the corporations). 
942
 See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 885, at 834, 855 (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court “created 
space for a doctrine of good faith, but it provided little guidance as to how that doctrine might work, even in cases 
like Disney V itself” and that Delaware courts “have left the duty of good faith too vague to provide any real 
guidance”); Knees, supra note 933, at 235 (stating that the recent good faith doctrine “provide[s] little indication of 
how [the conscious disregard] standard will be applied or how a court will determine whether or not one’s duties 
were ‘consciously’ disregarded”). 
943
 Disney V, 906 A.2d at 65. 
944
 See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good 
Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 402 (2007) (stating that the new good faith doctrine “does not 
tell us how courts should review director decisions, or how to recognize a conscious disregard of a director's 
responsibilities”). 
945
 Bishop, supra note 807, at 934.  
946
 See Bruner, supra note 835, at 1177 (criticizing the new good faith doctrine by stating “the incoherence of 
Delaware’s fiduciary duty doctrine resulting from the interaction of the bench and the legislature over the course of 
decades has resulted in a doctrinal framework that is self-contradictory and that, as a practical matter, utterly 
sacrifices the ‘clarity’ and ‘predictability’ upon which Delaware’s corporate establishment has long prided itself”); 
Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 31–33 (2005) (stating that tort law distinctions between negligence and intent do not work in the context of 
board decision-making, and arguing that “intent and recklessness can be characterized as negligence and negligence 
similarly can be recast as intent”); Strine et al., supra note 832, at 695 (observing that “even after Stone v. Ritter, [ ] 
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 After Disney and Stone, it is clear that the main focus of judicial inquiry into good faith is 
a director’s subjective state of mind.
947
 The infusion of good faith into the duty of loyalty 
requires the judiciary to “ask the question whether a particular director accused of disloyalty has 
committed a breach by taking action in bad faith.”
948
 In examining whether a director acted in 
bad faith, a court “will generally be required to look to the [director’s] actions as circumstantial 
evidence of state of mind.”
949
 The objective circumstances surrounding a directors’ action are 
highly relevant and important in good faith analysis. However, in addition to a failure to take a 
specific action or actions, a state of mind that is inconsistent with loyalty is a necessary condition 
for personal liability. Inattentive conduct constitutes bad faith if the particular director knew that 
she was not discharging her responsibilities. Accordingly, the objective criterion that “the 
director should have known that she was not discharging her responsibilities” is mostly excluded 
from good faith analysis. In the absence of such objective criterion, it is hard to tell whether the 
new good faith standard would be meaningful for reviewing inattentive director conduct. As 
Professor Eisenberg observed: 
[The conscious disregard standard] would make little or no sense unless they mean either that the 
manager was conscious that he was disregarding his duties or that a reasonable person in the 
manager’s position would have known that he was disregarding his duties—not that the actual 
manager was subjectively conscious that he was disregarding his duties. Surely it [should] be no 
defense in such a case that the manager on being asked, ‘Were you consciously disregarding your 
duties?’ truthfully replied, ‘No,’ or, ‘I didn’t think about it one way or the other.’
950
 
 
 Further, an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of directors necessarily requires 
inferences to be drawn from the quality of the decision itself.
951
 Substantive merits of a business 
                                                 
there remains controversy over what circumstances generate a genuine inference of bad faith and whether the 
judiciary is sufficiently distinguishing between concepts of gross negligence and bad faith”). 
947
 See Strine et al., supra note 832, at 693; Gold, supra note 944, at 423, 426 (stating that the Disney test for bad 
faith (intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities) “is a straightforward, 
subjective standard of conduct” and that the reasoning of the court in Disney V “makes clear that bad faith involves 
the defendants’ actual state of mind”).  
948
 Strine et al., supra note 832, at 695.  As Strine and his colleagues further explained, the inclusion of good faith in 
the duty of loyalty “puts plaintiffs to the test of proving that directors who have not engaged in self-dealing acted 
with a state of mind inconsistent with their duty of loyalty, and fact-finders to the corresponding challenge of 
delivering defendant-specific answers.” Id. at 696.  
949
 Gold, supra note 944, at 429 (quoting No. Civ. A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *17 n.92 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 
2004)).  
950
 Eisenberg, supra note 825, at 72 (emphasis added); see also supra note 842–51 & accompanying text (examining 
Eisenberg’s good faith analysis). 
951
 See Bruner, supra note 835, at 1156 (“Analysis of good faith ‘call[s] for an ad hoc determination of the board’s 
motives in the particular instance’—an ‘inquiry into a subjective state of mind’ that would ‘require inferences to be 
drawn from overt conduct,’ including ‘the quality of the decision made.’”) (quoting No. CV-6085, 1988 WL 53322, 
at *15 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988)).  
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decision would naturally play an important role in shaping directors’ state of mind. Even though 
an alleged instance of misconduct involves an egregiously deficient decisional process, directors 
may provide substantive justifications for their conduct, arguing that they have acted in good 
faith in approving the challenged decision. In other words, directors’ good faith belief with 
respect to the substantive merits of a business decision may justify their egregiously deficient 
decisional process. If directors believe in good faith that the decision itself is in the best interests 
of the corporation, it is difficult to argue that they would have consciously abdicated their 
responsibilities. In Disney, for example, directors’ good faith belief that Ovitz would be a 
valuable employee for the company arguably dominated the judicial inquiry into the challenged 
decision-making process of the defendant directors.
952
 Therefore, judicial review of directors’ 
due care compliance under the conscious disregard standard ultimately converges to an inquiry 
into the substantive merits of a business decision.  
It is well-recognized that, in Delaware law, directors are granted the widest latitude with 
respect to the substantive merits of a business decision. Under the business judgment rule, 
Delaware courts review the quality of business decisions under the onerous waste standard. 
Delaware courts do not interfere with the business judgment of directors unless it is so irrational 
that is explicable only on the basis of bad faith.
953
 Because good faith analysis necessarily 
includes consideration of the quality of a decision for inquiring into the subjective state of mind 
of directors, under the conscious disregard standard, a business decision that falls short of the 
onerous waste standard may justify decisional process failures however egregious they may 
be.
954
 While directors are required to make informed decisions to be afforded the substantive 
protection of the business judgment rule, there is no such requirement under the conscious 
disregard standard. 
 After the introduction of exculpatory provisions into corporate law, the new good faith 
doctrine emerged as a hope that it would provide necessary discipline for inattentive directors. 
                                                 
952
 See supra Part B.2.a. (examining Disney).  
953
 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test 
or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment 
rule.”); see also Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 452 (describing an irrational decision as “one that is so 
blatantly imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally informed person could 
have made it”). Allen’s description of an irrational decision assists understanding of the connection between process 
and substance of a decision in the judicial inquiry into good faith.  
954
 See Gold, supra note 944, at 429–32, 473–74 (proposing the application of the waste/irrationality standard in 
examining whether a director consciously disregarded his responsibilities).  
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After Disney and Stone, it is highly doubtful whether the good faith doctrine and the conscious 
disregard standard would meaningfully serve this purpose. In pursuit of such purpose, some 
commentators suggested an independent duty of good faith along with a distinct content from the 
duty of loyalty. Hillary Sale, for example, had argued that “a breach of good faith need not be 
intentional or conscious, [but] it does require some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious 
failure.”
955
 In a similar fashion, Professor Eisenberg proposed that judicial inquiry into good 
faith should include both objective and subjective standards.
956
 In Disney and Stone, the 
Delaware Supreme Court rejected this approach.
957
 Had the Delaware Supreme Court adopted 
this approach, the duty of good faith could play a more promising role to incentivize directors for 
attentive decision-making and oversight. It must be admitted, however, this approach would 
result in creation of another ambiguous standard, which would require worse dereliction than 
gross negligence but would differ from it only in degree, not in kind. It would be quite hard to 
define such a standard. Moreover, it could refresh the fear of personal liability among corporate 
directors, and the Delaware legislature could enact another statutory provision to permit further 
limitation of personal liability in addition to section 102(b)(7).
958
 Therefore, the Delaware 
                                                 
955
 Sale, supra note 831, at 493.  
956
 See supra notes 842–51 & accompanying text.  
957
 See Strine et. al., supra note 839, at 632 (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court undermined the doctrinal 
premise of this approach); Gold, supra note 944, at 424. The author observed as follows: 
On its face, the Disney V formulation—‘intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard of 
one’s responsibilities’—indicates a subjective standard. One does not do something intentionally 
without being aware of it. But, even if ‘conscious’ and ‘intentional’ should mean what Eisenberg 
contends, the Disney V rationale closes off that possibility. A manager who did not know he had 
disregarded his duties, despite the fact that a reasonable person in his position would have known, 
is hard to distinguish from a manager who acted with gross negligence. Eisenberg’s example is 
precisely what the Delaware Supreme Court sought to avoid in rejecting gross negligence as a 
category of ‘bad faith’ conduct. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
958
 See Andrew C. W. Lund, Opting out of Good Faith, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 393, 394 (2010) (proposing the 
application of a robust version of the conscious disregard standard, coupled with permitting corporations to 
exculpate director monetary liability under such a standard). The author convincingly argues that “any attempt to 
calibrate the proper application of conscious disregard was bound to err in one direction or the other” because of the 
difficulty in differentiating conscious and unconscious acts in the corporate context. Id. at 393.  He observed as 
follows: 
[T]he inability to sharply distinguish conscious due care breaches from unconscious ones 
reintroduces the same costs that led to the adoption of section 102(b)(7) in the first place. If it is 
difficult for courts to predictably determine directors’ states of mind, the requisite line-drawing is 
liable to be a relatively arbitrary process. As due care bleeds into conscious due care, any 
advantages gained by permitting due care exculpation begin to evaporate. 
The difficulty of establishing an appropriate application of the conscious disregard standard was 
not a hypothetical one. … Drawing the line between gross negligence-the standard of review for 
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Supreme Court may have followed the right path by subsuming good faith into the duty of 
loyalty and by articulating a bad faith standard that is qualitatively different and more culpable 
than gross negligence.  
 Notwithstanding, after Disney and Stone, directors of Delaware corporations with a 
section 102(b)(7) provision face virtually no threat of personal liability for inattentive 
misconduct that does not involve pecuniary self-interest, fraud, or waste. Section 102(b)(7) and 
its interpretation by Delaware courts practically eliminates any meaningful threat for 
disinterested and yet inattentive directors. Because of the emphasis on its subjective aspect, the 
conscious disregard standard would have rare application in reviewing inattentive corporate 
decision-making or oversight. The new good faith doctrine and the relevant standard may not be 
sufficient to assure director engagement or attentiveness. Thus, as one commentator observed, 
“good faith functions as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard. That is, it operates 
as a speech act, a performance, as opposed to a careful method of analysis.”
959
 
                                                 
due care claims-and conscious gross negligence did, in fact, seem arbitrary. Adjusting the test for 
conscious disregard at the margins was likely to be an unsatisfactory solution. Any such attempt 
was bound to be overinclusive or underinclusive with respect to the kinds of claims that would 
qualify as demonstrating conscious disregard. The former would tend to conflict with the privately 
ordered preferences against director liability in due care cases, while the latter would tend to 
eviscerate the new good faith doctrine and any potential advantages of more precise culpability 
distinctions. 
Id. at 395–96. (footnote omitted).  
959
 Griffith, supra note 946, at 1. Hill and McDonnell argued that the increasing public attention with respect to 
corporate governance in the twenty-first century and the mixed state/national system of regulating corporate 
governance may have compelled Delaware courts to redefine the contours of the directors’ fiduciary obligations in 
the post-exculpatory era. They observed as follows:  
Th[e] outline of the politics of the Disney cases reflects several important broad patterns. Our 
mixed federal system of regulating corporate governance creates a variety of political pressures on 
Delaware, the leading state corporate law jurisdiction. On the one hand, other states stand ready to 
take corporations away from Delaware should Delaware’s rules become too unattractive. On the 
other hand, federal actors (Congress, the SEC, and the securities exchanges) may preempt many 
areas of corporate lawmaking if they are unhappy with what Delaware is doing, with Sarbanes-
Oxley standing as a leading example of national action. Different affected interest groups have 
differing abilities to affect rulemaking at the state and federal levels. Managers and corporate 
lawyers tend to have more influence at the state level, whereas shareholders and perhaps other 
constituencies such as creditors and employees do better politically at the national level. The 
specialization of Delaware courts and the experimentation that occurs among the states also tends 
to lead to higher-quality rulemaking in Delaware. The mixed federal system thus allows much 
corporate lawmaking to be done by highly expert bodies, Delaware courts, while the threat of 
preemption by the SEC and Congress helps keep in check the tendency towards managerial bias to 
which Delaware is prone. 
The differing interest groups push the law in different directions; managers and corporate lawyers 
tend to push towards limited and enabling regulation on most matters, while shareholders and 
other constituencies tend to push for more expansive and mandatory regulation. The relative 
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strength of these groups varies over time, in part in response to how well things are going in the 
area of corporate governance. Thus, in the late-1990s stock prices were booming and the dot-corns 
seemed to be leading a vigorous and innovative economy. In the early years of this decade, in 
contrast, the corporate scandals and capital market downturn made things look bleaker. 
Shareholder activists became a more powerful political force as they looked for ways to reform the 
system. One can see this as a useful learning process—problems arise, they generate pressure for 
change, and the regulators generate new solutions. A more cynical view sees a cycle driven by the 
availability bias—constituents and politicians panic when scandals dominate the press, then they 
become overly complacent in times when few corporate scandals have received recent attention. 
Both of these views strike us as partly right—they are not mutually exclusive.  
Hill & McDonnell, supra note 885, at 848 (footnotes omitted).  
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CHAPTER V. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS AND THE DIRECTOR DEMAND 
REQUIREMENT  
A. The Dual Nature of Derivative Suits 
1. A Corporate Cause of Action 
The fundamental statutory corporate principle is that the authority to manage the business 
and affairs of a corporation belongs to its board of directors.
960
 As a corollary to this principle, it 
is within the authority of a board to decide whether or not to pursue a legal claim belonging to 
the corporation. The derivative action is a common law exception to this principle. It is a 
“method by which shareholders may seek redress on behalf of the corporation for an alleged 
harm caused by the misuse of managerial power.”
961
 Equity developed the derivative action to 
enable shareholders to litigate a corporate cause of action where those in the control of the 
corporation refuse to do so.
962
 For example, it is unlikely that directors will institute litigation to 
enforce a corporate cause of action which involves fiduciary claims against themselves.
963
 
Similarly, directors will rarely bring a lawsuit against one of their colleagues or executive 
officers for a breach of a fiduciary duty. To protect a corporation’s interests in these types of 
situations, courts permit minority shareholders “to enforce a corporate cause of action against 
officers, directors, and third parties” by bringing a derivative action.
964
 As the Supreme Court of 
the United States explained, “[d]evised as a suit in equity, the purpose of the derivative action 
[is] to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a means to protect the interests of the 
corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless directors and managers.’”
965
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 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).  
961
 Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 265 (Del. 1995) (footnote omitted). 
962
 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“[A] stockholder is not powerless to challenge director 
action which results in harm to the corporation. The machinery of corporate democracy and the derivative suit are 
potent tools to redress the conduct of a torpid and unfaithful management.”); Andrew C.W. Lund, Rethinking 
Aronson: Board Authority and Overdelegation, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 703, 709 (2009) (observing that the derivative 
action is an important device “by which shareholders can minimize agency costs that arise in widely-held 
corporations”). 
963
 See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 1011 (observing that “[i]f the fiduciary duties owed by directors, 
officers, and controlling shareholders could be enforced only in suits by the corporation, many wrongs would never 
be remedied”). 
964
 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970)) 
(emphasis in original).  
965
 Id. at 95 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)). See also Agostino v. Hicks, 
845 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. Ch. 2004) The Delaware Chancery Court explained the policy underlying derivative 
actions as follows:  
Generally a cause of action belonging to a corporation can be asserted only by the corporation. 
However, whenever a corporation possesses a cause of action which it either refuses to assert or, 
 
 
 160  
 In a derivative action, a “shareholder’s right to bring the suit derives from the 
corporation.”
966
 The legal claim brought in a derivative action belongs to the corporation, not to 
the shareholder bringing the action. It is the corporation which suffers the injury from the 
complained of action, and the requested remedy must go to the corporation. As the residual 
owners of the corporation, shareholders suffer an indirect harm because the direct injury to the 
corporation “depletes corporate assets, and affects the shareholder only by reducing the value of 
his stock.”
967
 In a derivative action a plaintiff-shareholder “‘stands in the shoes of the 
corporation’”
968
 in order to redress the injury suffered by the corporation. Accordingly, a 
derivative action involves two claims: “the [shareholder] plaintiff’s right to sue on behalf of the 
corporation” and “the merits of the corporation’s claim itself.”
969
 As the Delaware Supreme 
Court explained in Aronson: “[t]he nature of the [derivative] action is two-fold. First, it is the 
equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is a suit by 
the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.”
970
  
Shareholders can bring a direct action on their own behalf against either corporate 
fiduciaries or the corporation itself if they suffer a direct injury. For example, a wrongful act that 
does not harm the corporation yet interferes with shareholder voting or pre-emptive rights may 
be brought as a direct action by the injured shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court 
explained the difference between a derivative and direct action as follows: 
[The derivative action] enables a stockholder to bring suit on behalf of the corporation for harm 
done to the corporation. Because a derivative suit is being brought on behalf of the corporation, 
the recovery: if any, must go to the corporation. A stockholder who is directly injured, however, 
does retain the right to bring an individual action for injuries affecting his or her legal rights as a 
stockholder. Such a claim is distinct from an injury caused to the corporation alone. In such 
individual suits, the recovery or other relief flows directly to the stockholders, not to the 
corporation.
971
 
                                                 
by reason of circumstances, is unable to assert, equity will permit a stockholder to sue in his own 
name for the benefit of the corporation solely for the purpose of preventing injustice when it is 
apparent that the corporation’s rights would not be protected otherwise. 
Id. (quoting Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 78 A2d 473,475 (Del. Ch. 1951)).  
966
 EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 1011.  
967
 Id. at 1030. See also id. at 1030–31 (examining actions that can be characterized as either direct or derivative).  
968
 Elf Atochem North Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293 n.39 (Del. 1999) (quoting Schleiff v. Baltimore & 
Ohio R.R. Co., 130 A.2d 321, 327 (Del. Ch. 1955)). 
969
 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534–35 (1970). 
970
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.  
971
 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004).  
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Whether an action is derivative or direct has important legal consequences. The 
derivative action is subject to special procedural rules.
972
 To prevent abuse of the derivative 
action, the law requires shareholders to comply with “exacting procedural prerequisites” in 
bringing a derivative action.
973
 For example, in a derivative action shareholders are required to: 
“(a) retain ownership of the shares throughout the litigation; (b) make presuit demand on the 
board; and (c) obtain court approval of any settlement.”
974
 In contrast, the special rules governing 
the derivative action do not apply to a shareholder direct action. Accordingly, plaintiff-
shareholders may be incentivized to characterize their claims so as to state a direct action to 
avoid the procedural hurdles of a derivative action. However, the “[p]laintiff’s classification of 
the suit is not binding,” and “[t]he [c]ourt will independently examine the nature of the wrong 
alleged and any potential relief to make its own determination of the suit’s classification.”
975
  
The Delaware Supreme Court in Tooley held that the analysis for determining whether a 
claim is derivative or direct “must be based solely on the following questions: Who suffered the 
alleged harm—the corporation or the suing stockholder individually—and who would receive 
the benefit of the recovery or other remedy?”
976
 The Tooley court also acknowledged that its 
prior jurisprudence included concepts that were confusing and not helpful in distinguishing 
whether an action is derivative or direct, and they should be regarded as erroneous.
977
 First, the 
court addressed the “special injury” rule. Special injury had been defined as “a wrong that ‘is 
separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, … or a wrong involving a 
contractual right of a shareholder, such as the right to vote, or to assert majority control, which 
exists independently of any right of the corporation.’”
978
 The court observed that this analysis is 
“is not helpful to a proper analytical distinction between direct and derivative actions.”
979
 
Second, the court addressed the corollary principle that “a suit must be maintained derivatively if 
the injury falls equally upon all stockholders.”
980
 The court explained that this concept is 
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 See infra Part B., C.  
973
 Agostino, 845 A.2d at 1117.  
974
 Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036. 
975
 Id. (quoting Tooley, 2003 WL 203060, at *3).  
976
 Id. (emphasis added).  
977
 Id. at 1032.  
978
 Id. at 1035 (quoting Tooley, 2003 WL 203060, at *3 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l. Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 
(Del. Ch. 1985), aff’d 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1986))). 
979
 Id.  
980
 Id. 1037. The Delaware Supreme Court had previously used this analysis in Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246 
(Del. 1970). 
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confusing, and it is also inaccurate “because a direct, individual claim of stockholders that does 
not depend on harm to the corporation can also fall on all stockholders equally, without the claim 
thereby becoming a derivative claim.”
981
 The court expressly disapproved the use of both 
concepts and limited the test for determining whether an action is derivative or direct to the 
injury-remedy analysis.
982
 Thus, if the harm is suffered by, and the potential remedy belongs to, 
the corporation, the complaint should be classified as derivative.   
2. The Plaintiff-Minority Shareholder’s Standing to Bring the Action 
A plaintiff-shareholder must own stock at the time of the alleged wrongful act and 
throughout the course of the litigation to have standing to bring a derivative action. The 
requirement that a plaintiff be a stock owner at the time of the complained act is called the 
“contemporaneous ownership rule”, and the requirement that a stockholder retain shareholder 
status throughout the litigation is called “continuous ownership rule.”
983
 A plaintiff-shareholder 
must satisfy both tests to have standing to commence and maintain a derivative action.
984
  
 The contemporaneous ownership requirement is codified under Section 327 of the 
General Delaware Corporation Law as follows:  
 
In any derivative suit instituted by a stockholder of a corporation, it shall be averred in the 
complaint that the plaintiff was a stockholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction of 
which such stockholder complains or that such stockholder’s stock thereafter devolved upon such 
stockholder by operation of law.
985
 
 
Similarly, Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1(a) provides in its pertinent part:  
 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders … to enforce a right of a corporation 
…, the corporation …  having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the 
complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder … at the time of the transaction of which 
the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff’s share …. thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by 
operation of law. 
986
    
                                                                                                                                                                           
Accordingly, where a plaintiff became a shareholder after the alleged wrongdoing occurred, 
generally the plaintiff has no standing to bring a derivative claim concerning that wrongdoing.  
 Section 327 and Rule 23.1 provide an exception to the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement. If a plaintiff obtains her shares by operation of law, she can bring a derivative suit 
                                                 
981
 Id.  
982
 Id. at 1039. 
983
 See Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 954 A.2d 911, 935 (Del. Ch. 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
984
 Id. 
985
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327. 
986
 DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1.  
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for an alleged wrongdoing that occurred prior her acquisition of the stock.
987
 For example, a 
plaintiff who obtains the stock of a corporation by inheritance is permitted to bring a derivative 
complaint for a wrongful act that occurred before she became a stock owner of the 
corporation.
988
 Another exception to the contemporaneous ownership requirement is provided by 
the common law: “continuing-wrong” doctrine.
989
 The Delaware Chancery Court in Desimone v. 
Barrows defined the scope of the continuing wrong doctrine as “a narrow one that typically is 
applied only in unusual situations, such as where a plaintiff acquires his stock after a particular 
transaction has begun but before it is completed.”
990
 The Desimone court further explained that 
this doctrine is not “a sweeping exception to the contemporaneous ownership requirement”, and 
it “does not bestow standing upon a stockholder to challenge transactions occurring before he 
bought his stock simply because they are similar or related to transactions or other conduct that 
occurred later.”
991
  
The purpose of the contemporaneous ownership requirement is to eliminate potential 
abuse of a derivative action as a strike suit. As the Delaware Supreme Court explained, it 
“prevent[s] strike suits whereby an individual purchases stock in a corporation with purely 
litigious motives, i.e., for the sole purpose of prosecuting a derivative action to attack 
transactions which occurred prior to the purchase of stock.”
992
 It should be noted that even if a 
shareholder does not purchase the stock for such a purpose; she is not allowed to bring a 
derivative action for a wrongful act that occurred prior the purchase of the stock. As the 
Delaware Chancery Court stated in Desimone v. Barrows:  
Although this court has often recognized that a primary purpose of § 327 is to prevent plaintiffs 
from buying stock in order to maintain a derivative suit, there is no indication in the unambiguous 
text of the statute that that is its only purpose or that a plaintiff has standing when he otherwise 
would not simply because he was ignorant of the wrongdoing before he acquired the stock. This 
court cannot supplant the plain language of a Delaware statute with conjecture about that statute's 
underlying public policy. … [D]ecisions of this court that merely attempt to explain the statute … 
could not and did not alter the plain language of the statute. Section 327 is clear that stock 
                                                 
987
 Parfi, 954 A.2d at 937 (describing by operation of law exception as “[a] transfer of shares … that the shareholder 
acquires the shares without any act or cooperation on his or her part”) (quoting WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5981 (2004)) (emphasis in original).  
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 See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 1046.  
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 924 A.2d 908, 924–25 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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 Id. at 925. 
992
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ownership at the time of challenged conduct is a prerequisite to maintaining a derivative action 
and the General Assembly has not legislated a ‘state of mind exception’ to that requirement.
993
 
 
Section 327 and Rule 23.1 do not explicitly require a plaintiff-shareholder to maintain 
stock ownership during the pendency of a derivative action. However, the common law imposes 
the continuous ownership requirement as an extension of the contemporaneous ownership 
doctrine.
994
 As the Delaware Supreme Court stated, a plaintiff-shareholder is permitted to bring a 
derivative action “only because his status as a shareholder provides an interest and incentive to 
obtain legal redress for the benefit of the corporation.”
995
 Accordingly, a plaintiff-shareholder 
loses standing in a derivative action “once she ceases to be a stockholder in the corporation on 
whose behalf the suit was brought, [because] [s]he no longer has a financial interest in any 
recovery pursued for the benefit of the corporation.”
996
 
An implication of the continuing ownership rule in the merger context is that “when a 
merger eliminates a plaintiff’s shareholder status in a company, it also eliminates her standing to 
pursue derivative claims on behalf of that company.”
997
 As the Delaware Supreme Court 
explained in Lewis v. Ward: 
[A] merger which eliminates a complaining stockholder’s ownership of stock in a corporation also 
ordinarily eliminates his status to bring or maintain a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, 
whether the merger takes place before or after the suit is brought, on the theory that upon the 
merger the derivative rights pass to the surviving corporation which then has the sole right or 
standing to prosecute the action.
998
 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court recognized two exceptions to the continuous ownership 
requirement in the merger context: first, “if the merger itself is the subject of a claim of fraud, 
being perpetrated merely to deprive shareholders of the standing to bring a derivative action; or 
[second] if the merger is in reality merely a reorganization which does not affect plaintiff’s 
ownership in the business enterprise.”
999
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 924 A.2d at 926–27 (footnotes omitted). 
994
 See, e.g., Alabama By-Products, 657 A.2d at 265; Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A. 2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984); Lewis 
v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 901 (Del. 2004). 
995
 Alabama By-Products, 657 A.2d at 265. 
996
 Id.  
997
 Ward, 852 A.2d at 901.  
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 Id. (quoting Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 21 (Del.Ch.1982)). 
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 Id. (quoting Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 354 (Del.1988) (citing Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1046 
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B. The Director Demand Requirement 
1. The Purpose of the Director Demand Requirement 
The basic statutory corporate norm is that the authority to manage the business and affairs 
of a corporation belongs to its board of directors.
1000
 Under usual circumstances, it is within the 
ambit of directors’ managerial authority to initiate or to refrain from initiating a legal action on 
behalf of the corporation.
1001
 The derivative action constitutes an exception to the directorial 
power concerning the pursuit of a corporate claim. As the Delaware Supreme Court observed, 
“[b]y its very nature the derivative action impinges on the managerial [power] of directors.”
1002
 
“There is, …, the potential for conflict between the directors’ power to manage the corporation 
and the shareholders’ power to sue derivatively.”
1003
 In recognition of this conflict, the law 
imposes the demand requirement on a shareholder’s right to bring a derivative action on behalf 
of the corporation. As one commentator nicely put it, “[t]he demand requirement is a natural 
outgrowth of the authority that corporate law vests in the board to make corporate decisions, 
including litigation decisions.”
1004
 
Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 requires a derivative complaint to “allege with 
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from 
the directors [or] the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the 
effort.”
1005
 Accordingly, a shareholder is required to make a pre-suit demand on the board of 
directors to pursue a corporate claim. Or, alternatively, she is required to demonstrate that such a 
demand would be futile and, therefore, should be excused. Under the demand requirement, a 
shareholder is not permitted to bring a derivative action to enforce the unasserted rights of a 
corporation unless she “(a) has first demanded that the directors pursue the corporate claim and 
the directors have wrongfully refused to do so; or (b) establishes that pre-suit demand is excused 
because the directors are deemed incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the pursuit 
of the litigation.”
1006
  
                                                 
1000
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).  
1001
 Alabama By-Products, 657 A.2d at 254. 
1002
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).  
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(Del. 1988)).  
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1005
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When a demand is made, it gives the board of directors an opportunity to investigate the 
merits of the corporate claim and to exercise its business judgment whether the pursuit of the 
claim will serve the best interests of the corporation.
1007
 If the directors refuse to take action, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that it was a wrongful refusal. Where no demand was made, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the directors were incapable of reaching an impartial decision 
regarding whether or not to pursue the corporate claim. Accordingly, the demand requirement is 
“designed to ensure that through derivative suits ‘shareholders do not improperly seize corporate 
powers.’”
1008
 In short, it reinforces the norm of management by directors in the context of 
shareholder derivative actions. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated, “the demand requirement 
is a recognition of the fundamental statutory precept that section l41(a) vests boards of directors 
with the power to manage the business and affairs of corporations.”
1009
 
2. The Relation of the Director Demand Requirement to the Business Judgment Rule 
The demand requirement recognizes the basic corporate norm that directors rather than 
shareholders are empowered to manage the business and affairs of a corporation. Likewise, the 
business judgment rule is “an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware 
directors under Section 141(a).”
1010
 The business judgment rule protects directors by providing a 
defense to the merits of a suit that involves a claim of a fiduciary breach.
1011
 It is the primary 
standard of review that directs judicial inquiry into director behavior in the decision-making 
context. It presumes that directors exercise sound business judgments upon complying with their 
fiduciary duties.
1012
 The business judgment rule also plays an important role in the pre-trial stage 
of a shareholder derivative action. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated, “[b]ecause … 
                                                 
1007
 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 809 (stating that the demand requirement is “a rule of substantive right designed to 
give a corporation the opportunity to rectify an alleged wrong without litigation, and to control any litigation which 
does arise”) (citation omitted). 
1008
 Braddock v. Zimmerman, 906 A.2d 776, 785 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted).  
1009
 Id. at 784. See also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12 (stating that the demand requirement “promotes … alternate 
dispute resolution, rather than immediate recourse to litigation” by “insur[ing] that a stockholder exhausts his 
intracorporate remedies” and “it provide[s] a safeguard against strike suits” that are brought not to remedy a 
corporate wrong but for their settlement or harassment value); White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 364 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(“The purpose for the demand requirement and concomitant heightened pleading standard is to ‘effectively 
distinguish between strike suits motivated by the hope of creating settlement leverage through the prospect of 
expensive and time-consuming litigation discovery and suits reflecting a reasonable apprehension of actionable 
director malfeasance that the sitting board cannot be expected to objectively pursue on the corporation’s behalf.’”) 
(citation omitted).  
1010
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.  
1011
 Id. 
1012
 Id. 
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derivative suits challenge the propriety of decisions made by directors pursuant to their 
managerial authority, … the stockholder plaintiffs must overcome the powerful presumptions of 
the business judgment rule before they will be permitted to pursue the derivative claim.”
1013
 
Accordingly, the business judgment rule also shapes judicial inquiry to review whether a 
shareholder challenging a business decision met the demand requirement. First, where a demand 
was made and refused, the refusal is subject to judicial review under the business judgment rule 
standard.
1014
 Second, where no demand is made, the business judgment rule plays an eminent 
role in the determination of demand futility.
1015
 Thus, “[t]he function of the business judgment 
rule is of paramount significance in the context of a derivative action.”
1016
  
3. Heightened Pleading Requirements 
In a demand refused or demand excusal case, a plaintiff is required to comply with 
stringent pleading requirements. Rule 23.1 provides:  
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain 
the action the plaintiff desires from the directors [or] the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain 
the action or for not making the effort.
1017
   
 
Accordingly, a plaintiff must plead particularized facts in claiming that demand is excused, or if 
made and refused, the refusal was wrongful. Vague or “conclusory statements or mere notice 
pleading” does not suffice to comply with Rule 23.1.
1018
 The pleading standard that applies to 
derivative complaints is “an exception to the general notice pleading standard.”
1019
 It is stricter 
than the notice pleading standard that governs non-derivative claims.
1020
 In Brehm v. Eisner, the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated that “[p]leadings in derivative suits… must comply with 
stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ substantially from the permissive notice 
pleadings” permitted in other types of cases.
1021
 The Brehm court further stated that the 
particularized factual statements in a derivative complaint must also be “‘simple, concise and 
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 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993).  
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 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813. 
1015
 Id. at 812. 
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 Id. 
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 DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1 
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 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).  
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 Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 210 (Del. 1991).  
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direct.’ A prolix complaint larded with conclusory language, …, does not comply with these 
fundamental pleading mandates.”
1022
 As the Delaware Chancery Court stated:  
Generalities, artistically ambiguous, all-encompassing conclusory allegations are not enough. 
What is required are pleadings that are specific and, if conclusory, supported by sufficient factual 
allegations that corroborate the conclusion and support the proposition that demand is futile.
1023 
 
Thus, the stringent pleading requirements for a derivative complaint put a very difficult, 
if not insurmountable, burden on the plaintiff-shareholder.
1024
 A failure to comply with these 
high pleading standards requires the dismissal of a derivative complaint. The Delaware Supreme 
Court stated that the reason behind the heightened pleading requirements is to prevent “a 
stockholder to cause the corporation to expend money and resources in discovery and trial in the 
stockholder’s quixotic pursuit of a purported corporate claim based solely on conclusions, 
opinions or speculation.”
1025
 As Delaware courts recognized in numerous cases, it is very 
difficult for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss a derivative action based on the plaintiff’s 
failure to satisfy the demand requirement.
1026
  
C. Demand Excusal: Futility 
1. Decision–Making Cases  
Shareholders are allowed to bring a derivative action without making a pre-suit demand 
on the board of directors if such a demand would be futile. A pre-suit demand is excused if 
directors are incapable of reaching an impartial decision regarding the pursuit of the perceived 
corporate wrong. “Where directors are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they 
cannot be considered proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation.”
1027
 In 
such instances, the futility exception to the demand requirement “allows board authority to be 
overridden … in order that fiduciary duties remain enforceable.”
1028
 Indeed, in most cases, 
shareholders attempt to litigate derivative claims without making a pre-suit demand on directors, 
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 Id. 
1023
 Richardson v. Graves, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 466, at * 5 (Del. Ch. June 17, 1983). 
1024
 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254. 
1025
 Id. at 255. 
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Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. 1997) (stating that “[a] plaintiff's standing to sue in a derivative suit, whether 
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complaint” and that “plaintiffs in a derivative suit are not entitled to discovery to assist their compliance with the 
particularized pleading requirement of Rule 23.1 in a case of demand refusal”). 
1027
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.  
1028
 Lund, supra note 962, at 704.  
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arguing that the demand would be futile and, therefore, should be excused.
1029
 Therefore, 
demand futility plays an important role in derivative litigation.  
In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the standard to determine demand 
futility where a decision is challenged in a derivative suit. The Aronson court started its analysis 
by stating that, in the decision-making context, “demand futility is inextricably bound to issues 
of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine’s applicability.”
1030
 The court then 
provided that demand should be excused as futile if the derivative complaint pleads 
particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that: “(1) the directors are disinterested and 
independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of 
business judgment.”
1031
 The court also stated that “the mere threat of personal liability for 
approving a questioned transaction, standing alone, is insufficient to challenge either the 
independence or disinterestedness of directors.”
1032
 Rather, a showing of “a substantial likelihood 
of director liability” is required to challenge disinterestedness or independence of directors.
1033
 A 
substantial likelihood of director liability also exists if the challenged transaction is so egregious 
on its face that it cannot meet the business judgment test.
1034
 In other words, a particularized 
pleading of waste excuses the director demand requirement.  
Accordingly, the Aronson court articulated a two-pronged test to determine demand 
futility. Under the first prong, the well-pleaded facts must create a reasonable doubt as to the 
disinterestedness or independence of a majority of the board concerning the challenged 
decision.
1035
 The basis for demand futility under the first prong is that either “(1) a majority of 
the board has a material financial or familial interest; [or] (2) a majority of the board is incapable 
of acting independently for some other reason such as domination or control.”
1036
 The 
interestedness “may be shown by demonstrating a potential personal benefit or detriment to the 
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 Id. at 712  n.44. See also Blasband, 634 A.2d at 933 (stating that “stockholders often do not make a demand on 
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[majority of] director[s] as a result of the decision.”
1037
 For example, a demand will be excused if 
the challenged transaction is between the corporation and the majority of its board of directors. If 
the directors’ independence is challenged, “a plaintiff must show that the [majority of the] Board 
is either dominated by an officer or director who is the proponent of the challenged transaction or 
that the [majority of the] Board is so under his influence that its discretion is ‘sterilized.’”
1038
 The 
inquiry into independence is whether the majority of the defendant directors’ “decision is based 
on the corporate merits of the subject before the board, rather than extraneous considerations or 
influences”
1039
 and, therefore, whether a majority of the board is capable of making an objective 
evaluation in responding to a demand.
1040
 Personal and professional friendships between 
directors may be considered to affect the disinterested directors’ independence in approving their 
colleagues’ interested transactions if the relationship rises to “a bias-producing” level.
1041
  
If a plaintiff is unable to satisfy the threshold test either by showing a disqualifying 
interest or lack of independence of a majority of the board, she must satisfy the second prong for 
demand to be excused. Under the second prong, the plaintiff must plead particularized facts 
creating a reasonable doubt “as to the ‘soundness’ of the challenged transaction” sufficient to 
rebut the business judgment rule presumption.
1042
 In other words, well-pleaded facts must raise a 
reasonable doubt that the business judgment rule protection is applicable to the actions of the 
defendant directors. In Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the demand will 
be excused under the second prong of Aronson if “the particularized facts in the complaint create 
a reasonable doubt [as to] the informational component of the directors’ decisionmaking 
process.”
1043
 In sum, under the Aronson test, “[t]he premise of a shareholder claim of futility of 
demand is that a majority of the board of directors either has a financial interest in the challenged 
transaction or lacks independence or otherwise failed to exercise due care.”
1044
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2. Monitoring/Oversight Cases   
In Rales v. Blasband, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the standard to determine 
demand futility where a derivative complaint involves allegations regarding nonfeasance or 
oversight failures of directors.
1045
 The Aronson test is not appropriate in this context because 
“[t]he essential predicate for the Aronson test is the fact that a decision of the board of directors 
is being challenged in the derivative suit.”
1046
 The Aronson demand futility test is predicated 
upon the concept of the business judgment rule. Basically, in order for demand to be excused 
under the Aronson test, a plaintiff must plead particularized facts raising a reasonable doubt that 
the business judgment rule presumption is applicable to the challenged decision. The business 
judgment rule, however, has no application if the alleged wrongdoing relates to an unconsidered 
failure to act. As the Aronson court stated, “the business judgment rule operates only in the 
context of director action. … [I]t has no role where directors have either abdicated their 
functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act.”
1047
 Therefore, the Aronson test is not 
applicable in the determination of demand futility in oversight cases.   
The Rales court held that, where the Aronson test is not applicable,
1048
 a court should 
determine demand futility by “examin[ing] whether the board that would be addressing the 
demand can impartially consider its merits without being influenced by improper 
considerations.”
1049
 The Rales court further explained: 
[A] court must determine whether or not the particularized factual allegations of a derivative 
stockholder complaint create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the 
board of directors could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business 
judgment in responding to a demand. If the derivative plaintiff satisfies this burden, then demand 
will be excused as futile.”
1050
 
 
Accordingly, the inquiry under the Rales demand futility test is whether a complaint 
“raises a reasonable doubt regarding the ability of a majority of the [b]oard to exercise properly 
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its business judgment in a decision on a demand had one been made at the time th[e] action was 
filed.”
1051
 The Rales court also reiterated the Aronson court’s proposition that “the mere threat of 
personal liability, standing alone, is insufficient to challenge either the independence or 
disinterestedness of directors....”
1052
 Rather, a complaint must challenge the independence or 
disinterestedness of directors by pleading with particularity facts indicating “a substantial 
likelihood” of director liability exists.
1053
 Thus, for demand to be excused in an oversight case, a 
derivative complaint must raise a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board is capable of 
evaluating a demand in a disinterested and independent manner. 
3. Exculpatory Provisions and Substantial Likelihood of Liability 
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits a certificate of 
incorporation to include a provision exculpating directors from liability for money damages for a 
breach of the duty of care.
1054
 If a certificate of incorporation includes such a provision, a 
plaintiff who brings a derivative action for money damages must plead non-exculpated claims 
for demand excusal. In a demand futility case, a plaintiff basically alleges that a majority of a the 
board of directors is incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the pursuit of a 
corporate claim. If the basis for the plaintiff’s demand futility claim is that the substantial 
likelihood of liability would taint directors’ judgment, she must then plead particularized facts 
creating a reasonable doubt that the alleged misconduct is protected by an exculpatory provision. 
As the Delaware Chancery Court explained, where directors are exempted from liability by an 
exculpatory provision, “the risk of liability does not disable them from considering a demand 
fairly unless particularized pleading permits the court to conclude that there is a substantial 
likelihood that their conduct falls outside the exemption.”
1055
 Similarly, the Delaware Supreme 
Court stated that, if directors are exculpated from liability for certain conduct, “a serious threat of 
liability may only be found to exist if the plaintiff pleads a non-exculpated claim against the 
directors based on particularized facts.”
1056
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D. Wrongful Refusal 
A plaintiff is required to make a demand on the board of directors to litigate a perceived 
wrongful act unless such demand would be futile. The Delaware Chancery Court identified 
minimum requirements that a demand should meet as follows:   
To constitute a demand, a communication must specifically state: (i) the identity of the alleged 
wrongdoers, (ii) the wrongdoing they allegedly perpetrated and the resultant injury to the 
corporation, and (iii) the legal action the shareholder wants the board to take on the corporation’s 
behalf.
1057
 
 
The court also stated that “ambiguous communications” should be “construed against a finding 
of a demand.”
1058
 The burden of proof to show that the communication includes essential 
elements of a demand rests upon the party asserting that a demand was made.
1059
 
A board receiving a demand is entitled to “a reasonable period of time” to investigate and 
respond to the claim.
1060
 There is “no prescribed procedure that a board must follow,” however, a 
board of directors must act on an informed basis in responding to a demand.
1061
 After receiving a 
demand, “the board must investigate the alleged wrongdoing and then decide upon an 
appropriate course of action.”
1062
 The board may “accept the demand and prosecute the action, [ 
] resolve the grievance internally without resort to litigation, or [ ] refuse the demand.”
1063
 In 
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First, the directors must determine the best method to inform themselves of the facts relating to the 
alleged wrongdoing and the considerations, both legal and financial, bearing on a response to the 
demand. If a factual investigation is required,
 
it must be conducted reasonably and in good faith. 
Second, the board must weigh the alternatives available to it, including the advisability of 
implementing internal corrective action and commencing legal proceedings. 
Id. at 935. The court noted, however, “a formal investigation will not always be necessary because the directors may 
already have sufficient information regarding the subject of the demand to make a decision in response to it.” Id. at 
935 n.11.  
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 Piven v. Ryan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12745, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2006). 
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 Rales, 634 A.2d at 935 (quoting Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1001 (1984)).  
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responding to a demand, a board “must affirmatively object to or support the continuation of the 
[derivative] litigation.”
1064
 
A board of directors is free to accept or refuse a demand “within the boundaries of their 
fiduciary duties.”
1065
 Where a demand was made and refused, the board’s decision will be upheld 
unless it was wrongful. The propriety of a demand refusal is subject to judicial review under the 
deferential business judgment rule.
1066
 As the Delaware Supreme Court stated, a board’s refusal 
“is entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule unless the stockholder can allege 
facts with particularity creating a reasonable doubt that the board is entitled to the benefit of the 
presumption.”
1067
 Where a board’s refusal to sue is protected under the business judgment rule, 
“the stockholders’ ability to initiate a derivative suit is terminated.”
1068
 
It does not suffice for a plaintiff to merely state that the board’s refusal was wrongful. 
Rather, a plaintiff must raise a reasonable doubt, by alleging particularized facts, that the refusal 
was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Indeed, by making a pre-suit demand, a 
plaintiff waives his right to contest the independence and disinterestedness of a majority of the 
board.
1069
 Accordingly, “when a board refuses a demand, the only issues to be examined are the 
                                                 
1064
 Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990) (quoting Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 
A.2d 726, 731 (Del. 1988)).  
1065
 Lund, supra note 962, at 704.  
1066
 See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado Corp., 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981) (“[W]hen stockholders, after making 
demand and having their suit rejected, attack the board’s decision as improper, the board’s decision falls under the 
‘business judgment’ rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met.”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). See also In re infoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963 (Del Ch. 2007), in which the 
Chancery Court observed as follows: 
A board may in good faith refuse a shareholder demand to begin litigation even if there is 
substantial basis to conclude that the lawsuit would eventually be successful on the merits. It is 
within the bounds of business judgment to conclude that a lawsuit, even if legitimate, would be 
excessively costly to the corporation or harm its long-term strategic interests. It is not enough for a 
shareholder merely to plead facts sufficient to raise an inference that the board of 
directors would refuse a demand. A court should not intervene unless that shareholder raises the 
more troubling inference that the refusal itself would not be a good faith exercise of business 
judgment. 
Id. at 986 (emphasis in original).  
1067
 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Del. 1996) (footnote omitted).  
1068
 Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 775 (citation omitted).  
1069
 See Levine, 591 A.2d at 197–98 (“We reaffirm the rule that on a Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss 
a derivative suit in a case of demand refused, director independence and lack of self-interest is conceded.); Grimes, 
673 A.2d 1219 (“[The] plaintiff, by making a demand, waived his right to contest the independence of the board.”) 
By making a demand, a plaintiff also waives his right to claim demand futility.); Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 775 (“By 
making a demand, a stockholder tacitly acknowledges the absence of facts to support a finding of futility….Thus, 
when a demand is made, the question of whether demand was excused is moot.”).  
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good faith and reasonableness of its investigation.”
1070
 In reviewing a demand refusal, a court 
will only examine “whether the directors acted in an informed manner and with due care, in a 
good faith belief that their action was in the best interest of the corporation.”
1071
 A court will 
uphold a board refusal and dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff fails to carry this heavy burden.  
 In Grimes v. Donald, however, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “if there is reason 
to doubt
 
that the board acted independently or with due care in responding to the demand, the 
stockholder may have the basis ex post to claim wrongful refusal.”
1072
 The court reaffirmed this 
holding in Scattered and stated that a demand does not concede “independence ‘conclusively’ 
and in futuro for all purposes relevant to the demand.”
1073
 The court explained that “a board that 
appears independent ex ante may not necessarily act independently ex post in rejecting a 
demand.”
1074
 The court further explained that this proposition is completely consistent with the 
court’s prior holding that the only issues to be examined in a demand refused case are “good 
faith and the reasonableness of the investigation” because a failure of a board or a committee to 
act independently when conducting an investigation is “a failure to carry out its fiduciary duties 
in good faith or to conduct a reasonable investigation.”
1075
 Accordingly, a “[f]ailure of an 
otherwise independent-appearing board or committee to act independently” in investigating the 
claims raised in a demand may constitute wrongful refusal.
1076
 One commentator explained this 
point as follows:  
[W]hile Grimes and Scattered do not preclude the possibility that a disinterested and independent 
board might subsequently take some action showing that it did not in fact ‘act[ ] independently’ in 
responding to a demand, that must be an ‘ex post’ determination—i.e., a determination “[b]ased on 
knowledge and fact; viewed after the fact, in hindsight.’ Grimes and Scattered do not permit a 
shareholder who makes a demand, thereby conceding disinterestedness and independence and that 
the board is capable of acting on the demand, to allege that a board did not ‘act[ ] independently’ 
in responding to the demand for reasons having nothing to do with ‘act’ of refusing the demand 
and that would have excused the demand ‘ex ante’ if true.
1077
 
                                                 
1070
 Levine, 591 A.2d at 212 (quoting Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 777). 
1071
 Id. at 198. Where an investigation committee is appointed to investigate the facts underlying the demand and to 
make a recommendation to an executive committee that has decision-making authority, “particularized allegations 
that the Special Committee (as the investigating committee) or the Executive Committee (as the decisionmaking 
committee) was biased, lacked independence, or failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, such allegations could 
have created a reasonable doubt that demand was properly refused.” Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 
A.2d 70, 75 (Del. 1997). 
1072
 673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Del. 1996) (“The stockholder then has the right to bring the underlying action with the 
same standing which the stockholder would have had, ex ante, if demand had been excused as futile.”).  
1073
 Scattered, 701 A.2d at 74–75. 
1074
 Id. at 75.  
1075
 Id.  
1076
 Id.  
1077
 4 RADIN, supra note 161, at 4494 (citations and footnotes omitted).  
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 Judicial inquiry into the propriety of a demand refusal is solely based on well-pleaded 
allegations of a complaint. The plaintiff is not entitled to discovery in a demand refused case.
1078
 
In Levine, the plaintiff argued that the burden of proof should fall upon the defendant directors to 
demonstrate that refusal was not wrongful because the directors have “‘better access to the 
relevant facts’ and having raised the defense, the board should have ‘the burden of proving that 
defense.’”
1079
 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument and reaffirmed that the 
plaintiff bears the burden to raise a reasonable doubt that the board’s refusal was not protected by 
the business judgment rule.
1080
  Similarly, in Scattered, the plaintiffs requested limited discovery 
because “the Executive Committee has denied them access to books, records and any other 
documents that would provide information on the reasons why demand was refused.”
1081
 The 
Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument and stated that the plaintiff could have used “the 
‘tools at hand’ to obtain the relevant corporate records, such as reports or minutes, reflecting the 
corporate action and related information in order to determine whether or not there is a basis to 
assert that demand was wrongfully refused.”
1082
 The court specifically noted the availability of 
Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
1083
 for the plaintiffs to obtain information 
regarding the subject of their request.
1084
 Because the plaintiff failed to take advantage of section 
220, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for limited discovery.
1085
 Thus, as the Scattered 
court put it, “[t]he law in Delaware is settled that plaintiffs in a derivative suit are not entitled to 
discovery to assist their compliance with the particularized pleading requirement of Rule 23.1 in 
a case of demand refusal.”
1086
 
 The heightened pleading requirements and the business judgment rule presumption put a 
heavy burden on a plaintiff in a demand refused case. When a plaintiff makes a demand on the 
board of directors, the plaintiff practically “places the control of the derivative litigation in the 
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 See, e.g., Levine, 591 A.2d at 210; Scattered, 701 A.2d at 77.  
1079
 Levine, 591 A.2d at 209. 
1080
 Id. at 210 (“To hold as [the plaintiff] suggests would be a complete abrogation of the principles underlying the 
pleading requirements of Rule 23.1.”).  
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 Scattered, 701 A.2d at 77–78. 
1082
 Id. at 78 (quoting Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1218). 
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 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220.  
1084
 Scattered, 701 A.2d at 78. See also Grimes v. DSC Commc’ns. Corp., 724 A.2d 561, 569 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(granting the plaintiff access to the books and records under section 220 in order to obtain information regarding the 
demand refusal).  
1085
 Scattered, 701 A.2d at 79. 
1086
 Id. at 77. 
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hands of the board of directors.”
1087
 A demand refusal is protected under the business judgment 
rule as long as it is a product of a good faith and informed investigation. In other words, such a 
demand refusal will be upheld unless it constitutes waste. This is parallel and completely 
consistent with the effect of the business judgment rule as applied to the case on the merits: the 
plaintiff has to prove that the demand refusal constitutes waste. Accordingly, if the board of 
directors rejects the demand, the plaintiff has little chance to continue with the derivative 
litigation. As one commentator noted, “[t]he general consensus is that it is almost impossible for 
shareholder plaintiffs to prevail in a ‘wrongful refusal’ action.”
1088
 
E. Special Litigation Committees 
Even in a case where the demand is excused, a corporation has an opportunity to oppose 
or control a derivative suit through a Special Litigation Committee (SLC) consisting of 
disinterested and independent directors who are empowered with the full authority to investigate 
the derivative claims and to determine whether the litigation is in the best interests of the 
corporation.
1089
 In a demand excused case,
1090
 a board of directors may form an SLC and 
                                                 
1087
 Levine, 591 A.2d at 209 (quoting Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773–76).  
1088
 Lund, supra note 962, at 712 n.44.  
1089
 See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785–87 (Del. 1981). A board of directors which appoints an SCL is 
bound by the decision of the committee since full authority with respect to the derivative suit is delegated to the 
committee. The board of directors may not alter or reject the SCL’s decision. The Delaware Supreme Court in 
Zapata  held that an authorized and independent board committee possesses the corporate  power to seek termination 
of  derivative litigation. The court observed as follows:  
…When, if at all, should an authorized board committee be permitted to cause litigation, properly initiated  
by a derivative stockholder in his own right, to be dismissed? As noted above, a board has the power to 
choose not to pursue litigation when demand is made upon it, so long as the decision is not wrongful. If the 
board determines that a suit would be detrimental to the company, the board’s determination prevails. Even 
when demand is excusable, circumstances may arise when continuation of the litigation would not be in the 
corporation's best interests. Our inquiry is whether, under such circumstances, there is a permissible 
procedure under § 141(a) by which a corporation can rid itself of detrimental litigation. If there is not, a 
single stockholder in an extreme case might control the destiny of the entire corporation…. ‘To allow one 
shareholder to incapacitate an entire board of directors merely by leveling charges against them gives too 
much leverage to dissident shareholders.’ 
…[I]t must be clear that an independent committee possesses the corporate power to seek the termination 
of a derivative suit. Section 141(c) allows a board to delegate all of its authority to a committee. 
Accordingly, a committee with properly delegated authority would have the power to move for dismissal or 
summary judgment if the entire board did. 
Id. at 785 (citation omitted). The Zapata court also stated that a “board, tainted by the self-interest of a majority of 
its members, can legally delegate its authority to a committee of … disinterested directors.” Id. at 786.  The court 
observed: 
We do not think that the interest taint of the board majority is per se a legal bar to the delegation of 
the board’s power to an independent committee composed of disinterested board members. The 
committee can properly act for the corporation to move to dismiss derivative litigation that is 
believed to be detrimental to the corporation’s best interest. 
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delegate its authority to the committee to decide whether or not the continuation of the derivative 
suit is in the best interests of the corporation and to act accordingly. The decision of an SLC is 
binding upon the corporation.  After conducting a reasonable investigation in good faith and in 
an independent manner, the SLC may take control of the litigation (the corporation pursues 
claims), settle the suit with the plaintiff, or move to dismiss the litigation if it concludes that the 
continuation of the litigation is not in the best interests of the corporation. The use of an SLC 
may be advantageous for a board, particularly if its majority is interested in the challenged 
transaction. In Beam v. Stewart, the Delaware Supreme Court observed regarding SLCs as 
follows: 
An SLC is a unique creature that was introduced into Delaware law by Zapata v. Maldonado in 
1981. The SLC procedure is a method sometimes employed where presuit demand has already 
been excused and the SLC is vested with the full power of the board to conduct an extensive 
investigation into the merits of the corporate claim with a view toward determining whether—in 
the SLC’s business judgment—the corporate claim should be pursued. Unlike the demand-excusal 
context, where the board is presumed to be independent, the SLC has the burden of establishing its 
own independence by a yardstick that must be ‘like Caesar’s wife’—‘above reproach.’ Moreover, 
unlike the presuit demand context, the SLC analysis contemplates not only a shift in the burden of 
persuasion but also the availability of discovery into various issues, including independence. 
                                                 
Id. If the full board lacks the disinterestedness or independence to evaluate a demand, the board by resolution may 
increase the number of directors and then appoint new directors to fill new directorships. The board may then 
appoint the new disinterested and independent directors as the SLC by delegating its full authority to make an 
impartial decision with respect to the continuation of the derivative suit based on the best interests of the 
corporation.  
1090
 The use of an SLC is not limited to situations where a plaintiff brings a derivative action without making a 
demand by claiming that it would be futile. A board which receives a demand may also appoint an SCL with full 
authority with respect to derivative litigation. In this case, the timing of the formation of the SCL has important 
consequences.  In Abbey v. Computer & Commc’ns. Technology Corp., 457 A.2d 368 (Del Ch. 1983) the plaintiff 
made a demand on the board of directors and then brought a derivative action claiming that the board did not 
respond to the demand in a reasonable time. Id. at 370. After the commencement of the suit, the board of directors 
held a meeting to discuss the demand and decided to appoint an SCL to consider the demand. Id. at 371. The 
corporation filed a motion to dismiss the derivative action by claiming that the demand is not excused and the board 
was not allowed a reasonable time to respond to the demand. Id. The plaintiff argued that the formation of the SLC 
demonstrated that the demand was futile. Id. at 372. The court held that by appointing an SLC before filing the 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 23.1 the board conceded its disqualification and, therefore, its right to claim that 
the demand was not excused. Id. at 374. The court thus denied the motion to dismiss the derivative action pursuant 
to Rule 23.1. Id. In Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767 (Del. 1990), the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that, if a 
board files a motion to dismiss before appointing an SLC, the board has not conceded its ability to make an 
objective evaluation with respect the demand and, therefore, the demand is not excused. Id. at 77. Accordingly, 
where a demand has been made, the board must move to dismiss the derivative action pursuant to Rule 23.1before 
appointing an SLC in order to preserve the demand required argument. Similarly, where no demand has been made, 
the board must file a motion to dismiss the suit for failure to make demand before appointing an SLC in order to 
preserve the demand required argument. It should be also noted that a board is allowed to appoint an SLC even after 
a motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand has been denied. See In re infoUSA, Inc., 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
33, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2008)(“The SLC appears to have been properly formed, and the fact that it was formed 
after demand was excused does not render its formation ‘too late.’”). Thus, “there is no rule requiring a corporation 
to choose between a motion seeking to require a demand and a motion seeking to terminate the case based on a 
special litigation committee determination.” 4 RADIN, supra note 161, at 4659 (footnote omitted). 
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….[B]ecause the members of an SLC are vested with enormous power to seek dismissal of a 
derivative suit brought against their director-colleagues in a setting where presuit demand is 
already excused, the Court of Chancery must exercise careful oversight of the bona fides of the 
SLC and its process.
1091
 
 
If an SLC concludes, after conducting a thorough and objective investigation in good 
faith, that proceeding with the derivative action is not in the corporation’s best interest, the 
committee should file a motion to dismiss the action.
1092
 The Delaware Supreme Court 
articulated the standard for reviewing an SLC’s decision to seek the termination or settlement of 
a derivative suit in Zapata. The court first noted that application of the business judgment rule in 
this context is not proper because the inherent risks in this type of situation “justify caution 
beyond adherence to the theory of business judgment.”
1093
 The court also stated that at this stage 
of the litigation “some tribute must be paid to the fact that the lawsuit was properly initiated.”
1094
 
The court raised concern that the directors who serve on an SLC pass judgment on fellow 
directors in the same corporation, and “[t]he question naturally arises whether a ‘there but for the 
grace of God go I’ empathy might not play a role.”
1095
 In light of these considerations, the court 
articulated a two-step process as follows: 
First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the 
bases supporting its conclusions. Limited discovery may be ordered to facilitate such inquiries. 
The corporation should have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a reasonable 
investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith and reasonableness. If the Court 
determines either that the committee is not independent or has not shown reasonable bases for its 
conclusions, or, if the Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but 
not limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the corporation’s motion. If, 
however, the Court is satisfied under Rule 56 standards that the committee was independent and 
showed reasonable bases for good faith findings and recommendations, the Court may proceed, in 
its discretion, to the next step. 
The second step provides, …, the essential key in striking the balance between legitimate 
corporate claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation’s best interests as 
                                                 
1091
 845 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. 2004) (citations omitted). See also Grime v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 n.13. In 
Grime, the court noted the distinction between an investigation committee and an SLC. An investigation committee 
is formed to assist and advise a board in responding a demand. In contrast, an SLC is vested with the full authority 
of the board to determine whether the derivative litigation is in the best interests of the corporation. The role of an 
SLC is not advisory, rather; it is empowered with managerial authority to control the derivative litigation. The 
Grime court noted as follows:  
The use of a committee of the board formed to respond to a demand or to advise the board on its 
duty in responding to a demand is not the same as the SLC process contemplated 
by Zapata, however. It is important that these discrete and quite different processes not be 
confused. 
Id.  
1092
 Zapata, 430 A.2d 779, at 788. 
1093
 Id. at 787.   
1094
 Id.  
1095
 Id.  
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expressed by an independent investigating committee. The Court should determine, applying its 
own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted. This means, of 
course, that instances could arise where a committee can establish its independence and sound 
bases for its good faith decisions and still have the corporation's motion denied. The second step is 
intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result 
does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply prematurely 
terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's interest. 
The Court of Chancery of course must carefully consider and weigh how compelling the corporate 
interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit. The Court of Chancery should, 
when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the 
corporation’s best interests. 
If the Court’s independent business judgment is satisfied, the Court may proceed to grant the 
motion…
1096
 
 
 Thus, an SLC’s judgment to terminate a derivative suit is not entitled to business 
judgment rule protection. First, the burden is on the corporation to prove that the SLC members 
acted in good faith and in an independent manner and conducted a reasonable investigation. The 
corporation should present to the court “a thorough written record of the investigation and its 
findings and recommendations.”
1097
 The plaintiff is not bound by the stringent pleading 
requirements in challenging an SLC’s decision, rather; she is entitled to limited discovery. 
Moreover, courts closely scrutinize the independence of SLC directors in reviewing their 
decision to terminate the derivative suit.
1098
 Even when the corporation satisfies the first test, the 
merits of an SLC’s decision, at the court’s discretion, are subject to close judicial scrutiny.
1099
 A 
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 Id. at 788–89. 
1097
 Id. at 788. 
1098
 See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that the SLC directors lack 
independence). See Holland, supra note 10, at 684. As Justice Holland summarized: 
The Oracle special litigation committee consisted of only two members, both of whom were 
professors at Stanford University. The derivative action was brought against ‘another Stanford 
professor with professional ties to one of the committee members, a Stanford alumnus who had 
directed millions of dollars in contributions to Stanford and served on a Stanford advisory board 
with one of the committee members, and Larry Ellison, the CEO, who had donated millions of 
dollars to Stanford.’ 
Id. (citation omitted). The Oracle court concluded that the SLC failed to satisfy the test for independence:  
It is no easy task to decide whether to accuse a fellow director of insider trading. For Oracle to 
compound that difficulty by requiring SLC members to consider accusing a fellow professor and 
two large benefactors of their university of conduct that is rightly considered a violation of 
criminal law was unnecessary and inconsistent with the concept of independence recognized by 
our law. The possibility that these extraneous considerations biased the inquiry of the SLC is too 
substantial for this court to ignore. I therefore deny the SLC’s motion to terminate. 
Oracle, 824 A.2d at 921.   
1099
 But see Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. May 30, 
1997). In this case, former Chancellor Allen criticized the second step of the Zapata test as follows:  
As to the conceptually difficult second step of the Zapata technique, it is difficult to rationalize in 
principle; but it must have been designed to offer protection for cases in which, while the court 
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court may apply its own independent business judgment to determine whether the SLC’s 
decision is in the best interests of the corporation. The unique nature of SLCs requires a 
departure from the deferential business judgment rule in order to protect the interests of a 
corporation.
1100
 
 
  
 
  
                                                 
could not consciously determine on the first leg of the analysis that there was no want of 
independence or good faith, it nevertheless ‘felt’ that the result reached was ‘irrational’ or 
‘egregious’ or some other such extreme word. My opinion is that courts should not make such 
judgments but for reasons of legitimacy and for reasons of shareholder welfare. 
Id.  
1100
 The Delaware Chancery Court in several decisions questioned the efficiency of the SLC procedure in derivative 
litigation. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 509–10 (Del. 1984) (“[The SLC procedure] is fraught with 
practical complications at the trial court level. It certainly does not speed up the course of derivative litigation and, 
…, it is doubtful that it reduces the expense or inconvenience of derivative litigation to the corporation.”); 
Sutherland v. Sutherland, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2008) (describing the SLC procedure 
“as inefficient due to its tendency to create ‘litigation within litigation’”) (quoting Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 510–12).  
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CHAPTER VI. A PROPOSAL TO STRIKE A BALANCE ON DUE CARE LIABILITY OF 
DIRECTORS IN DELAWARE  
The cardinal precept of corporate law is that the authority to manage the business and 
affairs of a corporation belongs to its board of directors.
1101
 In the modern world, a board of 
directors does not actively participate in daily operation of a corporation’s business. A board of 
directors hires executive officers, and the executive officers take care of direct, hands-on 
management of the business and affairs of the corporation. Retaining the ultimate authority and 
responsibility,
1102
 a board of directors delegates many of its managerial responsibilities to the 
board committees and to the corporation’s executive officers. In modern corporations, a board of 
directors primarily functions as a control mechanism over the management of a corporation’s 
business and affairs. A modern corporate board’s managerial role entails two main functions: 
decision-making and oversight. As explained in the Corporate Director’s Guidebook: 
The board’s decisionmaking function generally involves considering and, if warranted, approving 
corporate policy and strategic goals and taking specific actions such as evaluating and selecting 
top management, approving major expenditures and transactions and acquiring and disposing of 
material assets. The board’s oversight function involves monitoring the corporation’s business and 
affairs including, for example, financial performance, management performance, compliance with 
legal obligations and corporate policies, and evaluating and designing appropriate risk 
management structures.
1103
 
 
Thus, directors do not actively manage the business and affairs of a corporation; rather, they 
manage the direction of a corporation.  
Because directors manage the direction of a corporation for the benefit of its 
shareholders, they are subject to the fiduciary duties imposed by the common law.
1104
  Directors 
are elected by shareholders to maximize the value of shareholders’ investments in 
corporations.
1105
 Therefore, “[t]he existence and exercise of [directors’ statutory] power carries 
with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”
1106
 The 
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 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“A cardinal 
precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage 
the business and affairs of the corporation.”). 
1102
 See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A. 2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988)).  
1103
 CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 11. 
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 See supra Chapter II.C.1. (explaining the fiduciary status of corporate directors).  
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 See CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 11 (“Directors have a responsibility to act in the 
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. To do so, they must focus on maximizing the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its shareholders.”).  
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 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811. 
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fiduciary duties are in place to assure that directors act in accordance with the purpose for which 
they are elected. Directors must act in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders 
when exercising their statutory authority, and they must discharge their managerial 
responsibilities accordingly.  
Traditionally, directors’ fiduciary duties are divided into two categories: loyalty and care. 
Almost three centuries ago, the Lord Chancellor of England recognized the fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care by stating that directors of a corporation must act with “fidelity and reasonable 
diligence.”
1107
 The duty of loyalty requires directors to subordinate their self-interest (or a related 
person’s or institution’s interest) to the interest of the corporation when these two conflict.
1108
 
Directors must refrain from using their position to advance their personal betterment at the 
expense of the corporation and its shareholders. The duty of loyalty encompasses the obligation 
to act in good faith as well.
1109
 Good faith requires an honest exercise of managerial powers to 
advance the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
1110
 Good faith encompasses 
“all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.”
1111
 The duty of care describes the manner in which directors must perform board 
service.
1112
 It requires directors to discharge their managerial responsibilities diligently, 
attentively, and on an informed basis.
1113
 Directors must pay an informed attention to corporate 
matters when performing their decision-making and oversight functions.  
Although the duties of loyalty and care are two different concepts, they are both designed 
to ensure that directors exercise their managerial power in a manner that is consistent with the 
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 Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch.). 
1108
 See supra Chapter IV.A.1., 2. (examining the duty of loyalty and its historical progress in Delaware). 
1109
 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (holding that the duty of loyalty “encompasses cases where 
the fiduciary fails to act in good faith). 
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 See supra Chapter IV.B.1.a., 2. (examining the scope of good faith). 
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 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
1112
 See supra Chapter III.B.1.a., b. (examining the standard of care and the historical progress of duty of care law in 
Delaware).  
1113
 Generally, directors may discharge their due care responsibilities by “attending meetings, reading materials and 
otherwise preparing in advance of meetings, asking questions of management or advisors, requesting legal or other 
expert advice when desirable for a board decision, and bringing the director’s own knowledge and experience to 
bear.” CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 19. In order to comply with the duty of care, a board 
meeting “should be informative and should encourage the free exchange of ideas so that a corporation’s directors— 
through their active, meaningful participation—may keep themselves fully informed.” Fogel v. U.S. Energy Sys., 
2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 2007). The duty of care encompasses the directors’ oversight 
function as well. In order to comply with the duty of care in the oversight context, directors should inform 
themselves of corporate business and affairs by installing appropriate monitoring and reporting systems, and take 
appropriate steps when necessary. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig, 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. 
Ch.1996).  
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best interests of the corporation.
1114
 One commentator explained the fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care and how they relate to one another as follows:  
The duty of loyalty defines what the directors are to seek to accomplish—i.e., the best interests of 
the corporation. The duty of care defines how they are to pursue that goal—i.e., by [making 
informed decisions.] Good faith, on the other hand, describes the state of mind of a director who is 
acting in accordance with her duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty requires that a director’s 
corporate decision be based on a good-faith belief that it will serve the best interests of the 
corporation. It is the absence of that belief that justifies imposing personal liability upon a 
director.
1115
 
 
He exemplified the interaction between the duties of loyalty and care in the decision-making 
context as follows:  
 
The directors’ belief that a decision will benefit the corporation is developed by gathering 
information relevant to the decision at hand. This process implicates the duty of care. Care and 
loyalty relate to one another as do means and ends. Loyalty defines the end to be served by the 
decision—the best interests of the corporation or its stockholders. Care is the means by which the 
decision is made. “Good faith” is the state of mind, the belief, that animates the decision.
1116
 
 
Thus, the duties of loyalty and care are related to each other in a broader sense, and they are 
equally important in order to protect the interests of a corporation and its shareholders. Conduct 
required under the duties of loyalty and care is pivotal for ensuring the proper exercise of 
managerial powers bestowed upon corporate directors by statutes.   
 The duty of care, however, raises certain policy concerns in the corporate context. The 
risky nature of business and the special characteristics of board service call courts’ ability to 
measure directors’ due care compliance into question.
1117
 Directors deal with complex business 
                                                 
1114
 See Disney, 907 A.2d 693, 746 n.402.  (“Perhaps these categories of care and loyalty, so rigidly defined and 
categorized in Delaware for many years, are really just different ways of analyzing the same issue.”). 
1115
 Furlow, supra note 450, at 1063 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).  
1116
 Id. at 1070.   
1117
 See supra Chapter III.C.3. (examining the rationale supporting the business judgment rule); see also James D. 
Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of 
Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 108–09 (1985). The authors nicely explain the potential 
problems that may arise from judicial review of risky business decisions as follows:  
The [directors’] role includes risk seeking, mindful that the greater returns lie with opportunities 
having the greater risk. The linkage between risk and return offers the most compelling 
justification for judicial deference to managerial decisions. It is argued that an overly intrusive 
judicial approach would discourage legitimate and necessary entrepreneurial risk taking. Judicial 
intrusion creates a fear that decisions resulting in corporate losses will subject corporate managers 
to liability. This fear is heightened by the volatility of the business environment and the frequent 
need for corporate decisions to be made on the basis of incomplete or imperfect information. 
Moreover, even though theoretically the circumstances under which a decision is rendered should 
be considered in judging whether the directors were negligent, the crispness with which a trier of 
fact will understand those circumstances as they then existed, as contrasted with how they are 
reconstructed with the benefit of hindsight, interjects a pernicious dimension into any activism on 
the court’s part. Further supporting this deference to the directors’ business judgments is the view 
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matters, and they often make risky business decisions on the basis of incomplete and imperfect 
information under unique circumstances. When a business decision results in a bad outcome to 
the corporation, it is difficult to determine with a hindsight review whether directors exercised 
appropriate care in making the decision. In other words, it is difficult to determine whether the 
bad outcome is a result of directors’ failure to exercise due care or whether it is merely a 
realization of the risk inherent in the nature of business. If courts enforce the duty of care strictly 
and hold directors responsible for corporate losses, those who serve on corporate boards would 
tend to be risk-averse and exercise excessive care to avoid personal liability. This, in turn, would 
contradict the policy that seeks to promote corporate risk-taking. Risk is an essential element of 
business success, and the law should not discourage directors from making risky decisions in the 
pursuit of maximizing the value of corporations.    
 Furthermore, the magnitude of potential liability for a breach of the duty of care may 
deter competent people from serving on corporate boards. Directors often make large-scale 
business decisions, and the loss resulting from an unsuccessful business decision may well be in 
excess of millions of dollars. Directors are personally liable for the entire amount of damages 
suffered by the corporation as a result of a breach of the duty of care. A strict enforcement of the 
duty of care may expose directors to catastrophic personal liability for their honest mistakes. 
Draconian monetary liability may often be disproportionate to the wrongful conduct. At the very 
least, this would cause reluctance among competent individuals to serve on corporate boards. 
Considering the modest directorship fees, competent individuals would avoid risking their life-
time savings for a small return by serving on corporate boards. Moreover, those who serve on 
corporate boards would naturally be overcautious and risk-averse to avoid personal liability. 
 Over the years, courts developed the business judgment rule to facilitate corporate risk-
taking by freeing directors from the fear of personal liability.
1118
 The business judgment rule “is 
                                                 
that directors are, at least in the normative view, selected because of their experience in, 
knowledge of, or sensitivity to production, finance, or the marketplace. These are not entry level 
qualifications to the judiciary. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).  
1118
 See supra Chapter III.C.1 (examining the development of the business judgment rule in Delaware). Professor 
Hecker nicely explained the rationale supporting the business judgment rule as follows:  
Business necessarily involves risk, and risk and potential profit are directly related. Over time, 
riskier decisions produce greater profit, even after factoring in losses, than do more conservative 
decisions. The business judgment rule recognizes this and attempts to free directors from the fear 
of personal liability if a decision that appeared to be a reasonable risk at the time turns out badly. 
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the foundation of [Delaware] corporation law.”
1119
 It is judicial recognition of the cardinal 
statutory corporate norm that the authority to manage the business and affairs of a corporation is 
bestowed upon its board of directors.
1120
 It “exists to protect and promote the full and free 
exercise of” the directorial powers.
1121
 The business judgment rule upholds the directors’ 
managerial authority in a court room by defining the limits of judicial inquiry into fiduciary 
behavior in the decision-making context. As one commentator nicely summarized: 
In Delaware in particular, the skilled application of the rule allows the courts to police ridiculous 
behavior while shielding unreasonable, but not irrational, behavior. The rule allows courts to 
balance proper entrepreneurial risk-taking against aberrant behavior that has no accountability. 
The ancient theory of the rule is sound—business is most likely to prosper when managers are free 
to make decisions unencumbered by judicial second-guessing regarding the wisdom of their 
choices.
1122
 
 
The rule operates as a presumption “that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”
1123
 Where a business decision meets the 
prerequisites of the business judgment rule, it immunizes the substantive merits of a business 
decision from judicial review and protects directors from liability even though the decision 
results in a loss to the corporation. In Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court provided a 
succinct statement of the business judgment rule as follows:  
[Under the business judgment rule] directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the 
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act 
in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a 
grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably 
available.
1124
   
 
 The implications of the business judgment rule are of paramount significance in the duty 
of care context. In the decision-making context, “[t]he duty of the directors of a company to act 
                                                 
A contrary rule that imposed liability on the basis of ordinary negligence, or even gross 
negligence, with respect to the substance of a decision would create an incentive for directors to 
pursue the least risky, most conservative of the options available to them, to the disadvantage of 
their shareholders generally. 
Hecker, supra note 26, at 937 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).  
1119
 Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 742, at 1442.  
1120
 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the business judgment 
rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a 
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”).  
1121
 Id.  
1122
 Bishop, supra note 807, at 920 (footnotes omitted).  
1123
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.  
1124
 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).  
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on an informed basis, … , forms the duty of care element of the business judgment rule.”
1125
 To 
be afforded business judgment rule protection, directors must “inform themselves, prior to 
making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.”
1126
 
Because the business judgment rule presumes that directors make informed decisions, the burden 
is on the plaintiff to establish facts demonstrating directors’ failure to make an informed 
decision. Further, under the business judgment rule, directors’ decision-making process is subject 
to judicial review under a lenient gross negligence standard, which is less exacting than the 
typical due care standard of ordinary negligence.  
A plaintiff contesting a business decision on the ground of the duty of care assumes the 
difficult burden to demonstrate that directors reached their decision “by a grossly negligent 
process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.”
1127
 A grossly 
negligent decision-making process requires an extreme deficiency in the performance of 
directorial responsibilities.
1128
 If a plaintiff is able to rebut the business judgment rule 
presumption by showing a grossly negligent decisional process, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant directors to prove the entire fairness of their decision-making process and the decision 
resulting from it.
1129
 If a plaintiff is unable to overcome the business judgment rule presumption, 
the challenged decision is subject to judicial review under the onerous waste (irrationality) 
standard.
1130
  
The business judgment rule does not protect a decision that is irrational—not attributable 
to any rational business purpose.
1131
 The waste standard is extremely difficult for a plaintiff to 
                                                 
1125
 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993). Delaware courts “do not measure, weigh or 
quantify directors’ judgments” on the ground of the duty of care. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264. Accordingly, “[d]ue care 
in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.” Id. (emphasis in original).  
1126
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Former Justice Quillen nicely explained the informational element of the business 
judgment rule as follows: “[D]irectors [must] exercise[ ] due care by informing themselves of the pertinent facts 
necessary to make a decision and by reflecting upon such facts with sufficient deliberation.” Quillen, supra note 
198, at 490. 
1127
 Brehm, 746 A.2d 244 at 264 n.66.  
1128
 Judicial inquiry under a gross negligence standard involves an objective evaluation of the challenged decision-
making process based on the facts of a particular case. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259. Commentators have raised 
concerns with respect to the adequacy of an objective test for evaluating the directors’ decision-making process. See 
supra Chapter III.E.1. (examining the scholarly response to the Van Gorkom holding in which the Delaware 
Supreme Court found the defendant directors to have breached their duty of care by failing to inform themselves in a 
grossly negligent manner before approving a major corporate action).  
1129
 Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.  
1130
 See supra Chapter III.C.1.a. (examining waste/irrationality standard).  
1131
 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.65 (“Directors’ business ‘decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to 
any rational business purpose.’”) (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,  280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
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overcome—she must show that a decision is so aberrant that it is explicable only on the basis of 
bad faith
1132
 or that a transaction is “so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound 
judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”
1133
 Thus, 
under the business judgment rule, directors are afforded considerable protection from personal 
liability for corporate losses resulting from an unsuccessful business decision.  
 The business judgment rule, however, “operates only in the context of director action. … 
[I]t has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious 
decision, failed to act.”
1134
 Where no decision was made, the business judgment rule presumption 
is unavailable. It does not protect directors’ nonfeasance or unconsidered failures to act.
1135
 
Accordingly, the business judgment rule is not applicable where a plaintiff claims an oversight 
failure.
1136
 Notwithstanding, Delaware courts apply a lenient standard of gross negligence rather 
than an exacting ordinary negligence for reviewing an alleged oversight failure.
1137
 A lenient 
standard for determining the directors’ due care compliance in the oversight context, as it is in 
the decision-making context, is necessary to encourage qualified individuals to assume 
directorships without fear of personal liability. Thus, although the business judgment rule is 
technically not applicable in reviewing the oversight failures, the policy underlying the rule 
justifies a lenient judicial treatment in addressing this type of claim as well.   
                                                 
1132
 Id.  
1133
 Disney, 906 A.2d at 74.  
1134
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813.  
1135
 As the Delaware Chancery Court nicely illustrated: 
Director liability for a breach of the duty to exercise appropriate attention may, in theory, arise in two 
distinct contexts. First, such liability may be said to follow from a board decision that results in a loss 
because that decision was ill advised or ‘negligent’. Second, liability to the corporation for a loss may be 
said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention 
would, arguably, have prevented the loss.  
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (emphasis in original). The second category of due care claims typically relates to the 
directors’ oversight failures. These types of claims are often referred to as “classic Caremark claims.” 
1136
 However, as the Delaware Supreme Court noted, “a conscious decision to refrain from acting may nonetheless 
be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule.” Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813. 
Accordingly, the directors’ “good faith, informed, and disinterested decisions as to the specifics regarding 
implementation of its oversight functions are subject to the protection of the business judgment rule.” Hecker, supra 
note 26, at 938 (footnote omitted).  
1137
 See supra Chapter III.D. (examining the standard of review in the decision-making context). See also Disney, 
907 A.2d at 748. (“[I]n instances where directors have not exercised business judgment, that is, in the event of 
director inaction, the protections of the business judgment rule do not apply. Under those circumstances, the 
appropriate standard for determining liability is widely believed to be gross negligence.”) (footnotes omitted).  
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 In addition to protecting directors against merits of a lawsuit, the business judgment rule 
plays an important role in the pre-trial stage of derivative litigation.
1138
 In order to protect the 
interests of a corporation from malfeasance or nonfeasance of unfaithful directors or officers, 
equity developed the derivative action to enable shareholders “to enforce a corporate cause of 
action against officers, directors, and third parties.”
1139
 It is unlikely that directors will pursue a 
corporate cause of action involving fiduciary claims against themselves or their colleagues. 
Accordingly, minority shareholders are allowed to bring a derivative action against directors to 
redress corporate harm resulting from a breach of a fiduciary duty.  
Plaintiff-shareholders are subject to the director demand requirement to bring a derivative 
action. Under the director demand requirement, a plaintiff must either make a pre-suit demand on 
the board of directors to litigate the perceived wrongdoing or demonstrate that such demand 
would be futile and, therefore, should be excused. Where a demand has been made refused, the 
refusal is subject to judicial review under the deferential business judgment rule. Where a 
plaintiff claims demand excusal, she must plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant directors are sufficiently independent to impartially evaluate the demand,
1140
 
or that the challenged decision is otherwise entitled to business judgment rule protection. Thus, 
the business judgment rule puts a heavy burden on a plaintiff at the pleading stage of a derivative 
action. In order to proceed to discovery and the merits of a derivative complaint, a plaintiff must 
plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt as to the availability of the business 
judgment rule presumption that directors are faithful to their fiduciary duties.
1141
   
Although the business judgment rule arguably provides directors considerable protection 
from personal liability, the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in the landmark case of Smith v. 
Van Gorkom
1142
 created serious concern that it was not as protective as predicted. In Van 
Gorkom, the court found the defendant directors to have lost the protection of the business 
                                                 
1138
 See supra Chapter V. (examining derivative litigation).  
1139
 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 
(1970)) (emphasis in original).  
1140
 If a plaintiff challenges a business decision, she may challenge the directors’ independence to evaluate a demand 
by creating a reasonable doubt that either the majority of the board is disinterested in the decision or the majority of 
the board is free from domination or control by the interested party. In the oversight context, a plaintiff may create a 
reasonable doubt that the directors are impartial and independent by pleading with particularity facts indicating that 
the majority of the board faces a substantial likelihood of liability. For a detailed examination of demand excusal see 
supra Chapter V.C. 
1141
 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048–49 (Del. 2004).  
1142
 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  
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judgment rule for failing to inform themselves in a grossly negligent process before approving a 
cash-out merger.
1143
 In so holding, the court exposed the defendant directors to potentially 
catastrophic personal liability even though self-dealing, fraud, waste, or bad faith was not at 
issue in the case. The court’s holding shocked the corporate world. It sparked “vociferous 
commentary and harsh criticism.”
1144
 After Van Gorkom, the fear of personal liability reached its 
peak among corporate directors.
1145
 Director liability insurance premiums skyrocketed, and many 
qualified individuals refused to serve on corporate boards. Therefore, the prevailing perception in 
corporate America after Van Gorkom was that “[t]he Delaware business judgment rule had been 
inadequate to protect the directors, placing the future of directors, and therefore corporate 
governance, in serious doubt.”
1146
 
The Delaware legislature swiftly responded to the corporate crisis caused by Van Gorkom 
by adding section 102(b)(7) to its General Corporation Law.
1147
 Essentially, this section allows a 
corporation to exonerate its directors from personal monetary liability for a breach of the duty of 
care through a charter provision. As the Delaware Supreme court explained it: 
The purpose of Section 102(b)(7) was to permit shareholders—who are entitled to rely upon 
directors to discharge their fiduciary duties at all times—to adopt a provision in the certificate of 
incorporation to exculpate directors from any personal liability for the payment of monetary 
damages for breaches of their duty of care, but not for duty of loyalty violations, good faith 
violations and certain other conduct.
1148
 
 
Other states followed Delaware’s lead and enacted similar permissive laws. The overwhelming 
majority of corporations quickly took advantage of the permissive statutes and amended their 
certificates of incorporation to adopt such provisions. Therefore, “while exculpatory provisions 
are not a statutory default rule, they operate like one in practice.”
1149
 
 Technically, section 102(b)(7) allows “only limitation or elimination of the damages 
remedy, not the underlying duty of care itself.”
1150
 Corporate directors continue to be subject to 
the duty of care even if a corporate charter includes a section 102(b)(7) provision. Such a 
provision does not affect the availability of injunctive proceedings based on a breach of the duty 
                                                 
1143
 Id. at 893. For a detailed examination of the Van Gorkom case see supra Chapter III.E.1. 
1144
 Horsey, supra note 230, at 972.  
1145
 See supra Chapter III.E.1 (examining the aftermath of and scholarly response to Van Gorkom). 
1146
 Bishop, supra note 807, at 906.  
1147
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
1148
 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (emphasis in original).  
1149
 Knees, supra note 933, at 218. 
1150
 Hecker, supra note 26, at 941 n.103; Disney, 907 A.2d at 752.  
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of care.
1151
 However, as Professor Hecker observed, “[a]s a practical matter, one would not 
expect to encounter many cases outside of the mergers and acquisitions context in which a 
plaintiff sought to enjoin a breach of the duty of care.”
1152
 Furthermore, injunctive remedies 
“have only limited applications and thus cannot serve as an adequate substitute for financial 
liability, in part because due care suits typically arise well after the event.”
1153
 Therefore, outside 
the mergers and acquisitions context, injunctive relief may not be an efficient tool for 
shareholders to enforce the duty of care.  
 The effect of a section 102(b)(7) provision is as much procedural as it is substantive.
1154
 
Delaware courts have consistently stated that a section 102(b)(7) provision “bars the recovery of 
monetary damages from directors for a successful shareholder claim that is based exclusively 
upon establishing a violation of the duty of care.”
1155
 In Malpiede, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that “any claims for money damages against directors that are based solely on alleged 
breaches of the board’s duty of care” are dismissible once the corporation’s section 102(b)(7) 
provision is properly invoked.
1156
 A section 102(b)(7) provision “bars a claim [for money 
damages] that is found to state only a due care violation.”
1157
 Accordingly, a section 102(b)(7) 
provision not only exempts directors from monetary liability but also prevents a shareholder 
from litigating a due care violation unless the shareholder seeks injunctive relief. “This, in turn, 
masks the proper inquiry into whether the duty of care itself has been breached—a question quite 
separate and distinct from whether liability should attach to that breach.”
1158
 
The procedural effect of a section 102(b)(7) provision destroys the efficacy of the duty of 
care. The primary purpose of section 102(b)(7) is to provide directors substantive protection 
from monetary liability for a duty of care violation; however, its procedural impact goes far 
beyond that and devastates the viability of a duty of care action. In the absence of an 
                                                 
1151
 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001); Disney, 907 A.2d at 752. 
1152
 Hecker, supra note 26, at 941 n.103.  
1153
 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.19 Rep.’s note 2. 
(1994). 
1154
 Sale, supra note 917, at 12 (arguing that the procedural impact of section 102(b)(7) eradicates the duty of care). 
1155
 Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 91.  
1156
 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at1095 n.71. 
1157
 Id. at 1095 (emphasis added). See also Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 92 (“The rationale of Malpiede constitutes 
judicial cognizance of a practical reality: unless there is a violation of the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, a 
trial on the issue of entire fairness is unnecessary because a Section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director 
defendants from paying monetary damages that are exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of care.”). 
1158
 Bishop, supra note 807, at 918. 
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enforcement mechanism, it is hard to believe that the duty of care will play a meaningful role to 
deter directors from irresponsible decision making or oversight. Although such provisions do not 
affect the availability of injunctive relief, as a practical matter, plaintiffs rarely seek to enjoin a 
breach of the duty of care outside the mergers and acquisitions context. Therefore, a section 
102(b)(7) provision significantly reduces the ability of shareholders to monitor and discipline 
noncompliant director behavior through litigation.  
 Section 102(b)(7) explicitly excludes duty of loyalty violations and “acts or omissions not 
in good faith” from exculpable conduct.
1159
 Accordingly, as the Delaware Supreme Court put it, 
“in actions against the directors of Delaware corporations with a Section 102(b)(7) charter 
provision, a shareholder’s complaint must allege well-pled facts that, if true, implicate breaches 
of loyalty or good faith.”
1160
 A shareholder can bring a fiduciary claim for money damages 
against directors for a breach of the classic duty of loyalty (pecuniary conflict of interest) or for a 
failure to act in good faith. The Delaware Supreme Court provided three examples of conduct 
that would establish a failure to act in good faith in Disney:  
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests 
of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or 
where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for his duties.
1161
 
 
In Stone, the court held that good faith is not an independent, free-standing fiduciary duty; it is 
rather a subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty.
1162
 In so holding, the court expanded the duty 
of loyalty “beyond its classical financial conflict of interest bounds to include nonpecuniary 
misconduct not in good faith.”
1163
 Conduct lacking good faith results in personal liability because 
it constitutes a breach of duty of loyalty. Thus, after Stone, the only actionable fiduciary claim 
for money damages is a violation of the duty of loyalty, which now includes the obligation of 
good faith. Where a corporate charter includes a section 102(b)(7) provision, a shareholder 
complaint for money damages must contain “well-pleaded allegations that the defendant 
                                                 
1159
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
1160
 Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 92.  
1161
 Disney, 906 A.2d at 67 (citation omitted). The court also noted that “[t]here may be other examples of bad faith 
yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are the most salient.” Id. (citation omitted).  
1162
 Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70.  
1163
 Hecker, supra note 26, at 981.  
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directors breached their duty of loyalty by engaging in intentional, bad faith, or self-interested 
conduct.”
1164
 
 In the post-exculpatory world, the concept of good faith is most important with respect to 
non-self-dealing director decisions, or oversight failures that involve complete abdication of all 
directorial responsibility.
1165
 Under Delaware’s new good faith doctrine, “[k]nowing or 
deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty to act faithfully and with appropriate 
care”
1166
 constitutes non-exculpable bad faith conduct. In other words, an intentional or 
conscious abdication of directorial responsibilities in corporate decision making or oversight is 
bad faith conduct, and it is actionable under the duty of loyalty. Directors are subject to personal 
liability for money damages for such conduct regardless of a section 102(b)(7) provision.  
However, the liability bar under the new good faith standard is quite high.
1167
 Actionable 
bad faith conduct not only involves egregious misconduct but also requires a subjective and 
negative state of mind that is inconsistent with the interests of the corporation.  Only a very 
extreme and unlikely set of facts would constitute non-exculpable bad faith conduct and result in 
personal liability. Considering the exacting procedural hurdles a plaintiff must overcome to bring 
a derivative action, the plaintiff has little chance to plead successful non-exculpable derivative 
claims against disinterested yet inattentive directors.
1168
 It is extremely difficult for a plaintiff to 
                                                 
1164
 McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 495 (Del. Ch. 2000).  
1165
 Self-dealing director transactions are addressed under the classic duty of loyalty and malicious director decisions 
are addressed under the classic good faith concept (good faith element of the business judgment rule).  
1166
 Disney, 906 A.2d at 63 n.97 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
1167
 See supra Chapter IV.B.3 (examining the new good faith doctrine and contending that it is inadequate to address 
inattentive director conduct).  
1168
 See generally Knees, supra note 933. The author observed as follows:  
Demand, particularized pleadings at the outset of the case, the presumption of the business 
judgment rule, demand-excuse tests, and the role of an SLC all pose significant procedural 
obstacles for a shareholder plaintiff bringing a derivative suit for failed oversight. These 
procedural hurdles, combined with the doctrinal collapse of the three fiduciary duties into a single 
standard under the duty of loyalty, create a very narrow scope of oversight liability, which serves 
director authority. The threshold that a plaintiff must surpass in order to rebut the business 
judgment rule presumption at the outset of the case is heightened by the collapse of the fiduciary 
duties into a single, actionable standard under the duty of loyalty. In order to rebut the business 
judgment rule, the shareholder plaintiff must demonstrate a likely breach of a fiduciary duty—
which can only be pleaded as a breach of the duty of loyalty in oversight [or disinterested business 
decision] cases where an exculpatory provision exists. Therefore, the plaintiff must plead with 
particularity at the outset of its case that a director-defendant acted with either intent to harm the 
corporation or a conscious disregard of his or her duties, both very high thresholds. 
Id. at 233–34 (footnote omitted). She concludes that section 102(b)(7) and its interpretation by Delaware courts 
created  a “toothless tiger”—an eviscerated standard that in practice rarely poses any meaningful threat of liability 
absent a violation of law. Id. at 215–16. See also Lund, supra note 962, at 393, 407–13 (examining Lyondell 
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challenge directors’ good faith without the benefit of discovery.
1169
 The demand requirement and 
the role of the business judgment rule presumption at the outset of derivative litigation 
practically prevent shareholders from challenging inattentive decision making or oversight under 
the duty of loyalty.  
 Section 102(b)(7) and its interpretation by Delaware Courts significantly limit the scope 
of shareholder derivative lawsuits. The shareholder derivative action is traditionally an important 
mechanism to enforce and encourage compliant director behavior. However, the combined effect 
of section 102(b)(7), the demand requirement, recent doctrinal developments, and the business 
judgment rule significantly narrows the scope of director liability. The doctrinal limitations and 
procedural obstacles have created an environment in which virtually no oversight or decision-
making claims could survive a motion to dismiss.
1170
 In the non-self-dealing context, “[p]leading 
particularized facts establishing a breach of the duty of loyalty at the outset of a case, before 
discovery, is a significant procedural hurdle for plaintiffs.”
1171
 The cumulative effect of doctrinal 
and procedural hurdles “is a de facto ‘no liability’ rule for [disinterested yet inattentive] 
corporate directors.”
1172
 
Thus, a combination of substantive doctrines and procedural requirements dilutes 
disciplinary power of the derivative lawsuit and undermines director accountability.
1173
 A section 
102(b)(7) provision virtually eliminates any threat of personal liability for fiduciary misconduct 
unless it involves “conflicted directors who acted in their own interests or committed fraud or 
waste.”
1174
 It is highly doubtful whether a nearly impenetrable shield against personal liability 
for nonpecuniary misconduct is adequate to assure director engagement to managerial 
                                                 
Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009), McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008), In re Lear 
S’holders Litig., 967 A.2d 640 (Del. Ch. 2008) and concluding that the scope of the conscious disregard standard is 
very narrow). 
1169
 As Knees observed, “demonstrating intent to harm or a conscious disregard of one’s duties may require the type 
of investigation that is best suited for depositions and other forms of traditional discovery.” Knees, supra note 933, 
at 228.  
1170
 Id. at 257.  
1171
 Id. at 228.  
1172
 See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate 
Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 118 (2006). 
1173
 Id. 
1174
 Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Director Inattention and Director Protection under Delaware General Corporation Law 
Section 102(b)(7): A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 695, 707 (2008); see also Jones, supra 
note 1172, at 118 (“Independent directors face an infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to the 
corporation caused by their breach of fiduciary duty. They face no real risk of liability for their acts or omissions as 
directors.”). 
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responsibilities. “One wonders how a set of virtually unenforceable rules can be expected to 
influence the actions of corporate officers and directors.”
1175
 One commentator stated that 
section 102(b)(7) “encourages an unsound policy allowing directors to be inattentive and 
careless.”
1176
 It basically invites directors to manage the direction of a corporation with a warm 
heart and empty mind.  
 Elizabeth Nowicki raised concern with respect to the adequacy of the fiduciary liability 
regime created by section 102(b)(7). She argued that section 102(b)(7) practically eliminates any 
meaningful threat of monetary liability for inattentive directors, and this is not desirable to 
induce directors for compliant behavior.
1177
 Behavioral psychology research examined in her 
work is worth considering in evaluating the potential effect of ex ante liability protection on 
director behavior. The study she examined indicates that the threat of punishment plays an 
important role in motivating actor behavior. According to the study, “the threat of punishment, 
or even just the awareness of having one’s behavior monitored, can motivate improved task 
performance, increased attention, and appropriate or responsible behavior.”
1178
 The study also 
illustrates that “actors who face a credible threat of punishment for the failure to perform well or 
who know they are monitored perform better than those who face no threat of punishment or who 
do not believe they are being observed.”
1179
 Accordingly, behavioral research suggests that “the 
threat of punishment by way of legal liability should be useful in addressing director inattention 
and boardroom lethargy.”
1180
 The existence of some credible threat of personal liability is 
necessary to assure director engagement or attentiveness. Nowicki concluded that section 
102(b)(7) does not serve this end, and, therefore, it should be revised.
1181
 
 It is also worth considering behavioral psychology research concerning ingroup bias to 
evaluate the potential effect of a section 102(b)(7) provision on director behavior. In general, 
ingroup bias is the “tendency to evaluate one’s own groups more positively in relation to other 
                                                 
1175
 Jones, supra note 1172, at 108. 
1176
 Blank, supra note 696, at 122 (citation omitted).  
1177
 See generally Nowicki, supra note 1174; see also Jones, supra note 1172, at 111(stating “that the existing 
liability regime for fiduciary duties fails as an accountability mechanism”). 
1178
 Nowicki, supra note 1174, at 706 (emphasis added).  
1179
 Id. at 697 (emphasis added).  
1180
 Id. at 706.  
1181
 See infra notes 1206–10 & accompanying text.  
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groups.”
1182
 This may result in preferential treatment among group members.
1183
 In the corporate 
context, this may cause directors to favor their board colleagues or the corporation’s executive 
officers. Commentators have examined the relation of ingroup bias to board performance, and 
they have argued that ingroup bias may adversely affect director behavior.
1184
 Directors may be 
biased in favor of the corporation’s executive officers due to social factors, such as reputational 
and self-image concerns among peers, and professional and personal friendships.
1185
 For 
example, Cox and Munsinger noted that “[w]hen an individual perceives a group, such as his 
colleagues on the board, as agreeable, not only is he attracted to continued association with the 
group, but also because of this attraction he conforms his actions to the group’s views.”
1186
 
Similarly, Anthony Page noted that “directors may be biased merely due to their role as members 
                                                 
1182
 Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 249 
(2009).  
1183
 Id.  
1184
 See generally Cox & Munsinger, supra note 1117 (examining ingroup bias in the context of director 
independence and special litigation committees); Page, supra note 1182, at 249–59 (examining ingroup bias in the 
context of director independence); see also generally Hill & McDonnell, supra note, at 885 (examining structural 
bias in the non-self-dealing context and arguing that Delaware’s new good faith doctrine is not adequate to address 
structural bias); see also Jones, supra note 1172, at 1139–45 (examining social psychology research and arguing that 
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argued that extralegal forces are important factors that control director conduct, and they sufficiently motivate 
directors for better behavior. Former Chancellor Allen, for example, argues that “the moral beliefs of members of 
the groups from which directors are drawn and their concern for reputation among peers” constrain director 
misbehavior, and there is no need for “liability rules” to enforce directorial responsibilities. Allen, supra note 250, at 
13. While market incentives and reputational concerns may affect director behavior positively, they alone are not 
sufficient to assure compliant behavior. Indeed, behavioral research concerning ingroup bias indicates that these 
factors may have adverse effects on director behavior. See infra notes 1185–92 & accompanying text. Further, in his 
extensive work examining social psychology, Jones convincingly argues that in order for market and social norms to 
positively influence director behavior, “they must be supported by an external accountability mechanism. Without a 
reliable accountability mechanism, social norms that guide managerial conduct are likely to erode and tolerate 
increasing levels of unethical conduct.” Jones, supra note 1172, at 108. Other commentators recognize that, 
although market and social incentives are important, they alone are not sufficient to motivate directors to attend their 
duties diligently. See Knees, supra note 933, at 236; Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 122. 
1185
 See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 1117, at 91–108; Page, supra note 1182, at 255–59; Jones, supra note 1172, 
at 141 (“Directors of large public corporations are members of a surprisingly homogeneous group. They 
overwhelmingly share common social, economic, racial, and religious backgrounds. These common characteristics 
help cement a culture that emphasizes shared goals and values and discourages open dissent. Problems highlighted 
in studies of boards—an unwillingness to ask discerning questions, a desire to conceal ignorance, and the perceived 
obligation to support the CEO—can be explained in part by the tendency to conform and the desire to fit in.”) 
(footnote omitted). See also Bernard S. Sharfman & Steven J. Toll, Dysfunctional Deference and Board 
Composition: Lessons from Enron, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 153, 154–55 (2008) (“[B]ehavioral scientists 
have been saying for years that small deliberative groups are prone to error in their decisionmaking if these groups 
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 Cox & Munsinger, supra note 1117, at 92;  
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of a board of directors,”
1187
 and this can “lead to biased decision making based on unconscious 
cognitive, affective, and motivational processes.”
1188
 In the corporate context, this has been 
referred to as “structural bias.”  
Structural bias may cause suboptimal director behavior in corporate decision making or 
oversight.
1189
 Directors may tend to unduly defer to the judgment of the executive management 
in deciding corporate matters.
1190
 When directors are called to approve a corporate action, they 
may conform to the executive management’s proposal without much questioning and thoroughly 
investigating it.
1191
 Therefore, the directors’ decision may usually be a foregone conclusion.
1192
 
Similarly, directors may tend to be unduly deferential to the management performance and legal 
compliance of the corporation’s executive officers and, therefore, they may not oversee the 
corporate business and affairs in an efficient manner. Section 102(b)(7) and its interpretation by 
Delaware courts do not provide a sound legal environment to address structural bias in corporate 
board rooms. In the absence of some credible threat of personal liability for inattentive conduct, 
directors may be inclined to become passive decision makers and overseers by discharging their 
responsibilities perfunctorily. However, if directors know that their conduct may be subject to 
judicial review and that they may be exposed to personal liability, they will be naturally induced 
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 Page, supra note 1182, at 248. 
1188
 Id. at 251.  
1189
 Agency problems arising from centralized management (separation of legal control from beneficial ownership) 
increase the risk of inattentive director conduct. As one commentator observed:   
The structure of the modem, publicly held corporation lends itself to problems of board 
inattention. Although corporations are owned by shareholders, they are managed by a board of 
directors elected by the shareholders. This creates a division between ownership (at the 
shareholder level) and control (at the director level), which raises the classic ‘other people’s 
money’ problem. Directors are managing a corporation representing an investment of ‘other 
people’s money,’ yet, in theory, no one does as good a job managing a business as the business 
owner herself because she has the most at stake. 
Nowicki, supra note 1174, at 699. 
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 See Jones, supra note 1172, at 139 (“Certain aspects of board culture such as passivity and deference to the 
CEO allow chronic corporate governance problems to fester.”). 
1191
 See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 885, at 860 (“In most cases, directors are giving less care than they should be 
because they are being deferential and, almost certainly, they feel reasonable in doing so because they have some 
level of identification or shared perspective with the officers.”). Even Professor Bainbridge, who ardently opposes to 
the enforcement of the duty of care, acknowledges this point. He observed: “In practice, of course, many boards of 
directors are captured by the firm’s senior management and simply rubberstamp management decisions.” 
Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 105.  
1192
 For example, in the famous corporate law cases of Van Gorkom and Disney, the challenged board decisions were 
arguably foregone conclusions. In Van Gorkom, the board approved the sale of the corporation in a two-hour 
meeting upon twenty minutes oral presentation of the chairman. See supra Chapter III.E.1. In Disney, the board of 
directors approved the employment of Michael Ovitz after it was publicly announced. See supra Chapter IV. B.2.a.  
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to act more responsibly. One commentator nicely illustrated how some credible threat of 
personal liability would assist overcoming structural bias as follows:  
Most directors―even the most responsible and diligent directors―will have some inhibition about 
openly questioning and criticizing the actions of [senior officers]. Importantly, the prospect of 
liability will often provide the justification (or excuse) for those kinds of conversations to occur 
within the boardroom’s collegial setting. We can imagine a director saying something like, ‘Of 
course we have the utmost faith in you, Sally, but the lawyers insist we ask you the following for 
the record. . . .’ Thus, the symbolic existence of personal liability, even though its practical 
consequences may be mitigated by private-ordering arrangements such as indemnification and 
insurance, may play an important role in assisting the directors, aided by the corporation’s lawyer, 
to fulfill their monitoring and oversight functions.
1193
 
 
 Traditionally, the duty of care has been the primary legal tool to address inattentive 
director conduct. The common law imposes the duty of care to assure that directors discharge 
their board responsibilities diligently, attentively, and on an informed basis. By permitting the 
exculpation of monetary liability for conduct lacking due care, section 102(b)(7) obliterates any 
meaningful threat of punishment for inattentive decision making and oversight. A section 
102(b)(7) provision practically precludes a shareholder from bringing a derivative action based 
on a duty of care claim. Therefore, in the post-exculpatory era, ‘“the fiduciary duty of care exists 
only as an aspirational and unenforceable standard,’ except in actions for injunctive relief.”
1194
 
This may not be adequate to address the board inattention problem. Directors should not be 
afforded a free-pass to ignore their due care responsibilities. As former Chancellor Allen 
observed:  
[U]ndeniably [a] strong protection appears to have [ ] its dark side. Public company directors, 
having neither substantial investment risk nor liability risk, might well tend to become passive. 
Indeed it is to try to assure director engagement or attentiveness that the law imposes a fiduciary 
duty of care in the first place.
1195
 
 
 The standard of conduct required of directors under the duty of care is vitally important 
in performing board service. The key element of the duty of care is information, and information 
is one of the key elements of business success. In the decision-making context, the duty of care 
requires directors to employ an informative and deliberative process. In the oversight context, it 
requires directors to pay an informed and ongoing attention to the business and affairs of the 
corporation. Directors’ failure to act with due care may significantly harm a corporation.   
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 Davis, supra note 17, at 586 (emphasis added).  
1194
 Holland, supra note 10, at 692–93 (citation omitted).  
1195
 Allen, supra note 250, at 13.  
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 In modern corporations, a board of directors primarily functions as a control mechanism 
over the corporation’s executive officers. The duty of care requires directors to perform their 
functions truly by taking an active and direct role in corporate decision making and oversight.
1196
 
Accordingly, the duty of care is in place to assure that a board of directors properly serves the 
very purpose for which it was designed.
1197
 As such, the law should put appropriate systems into 
place to assure that directors engage in informed decision-making and oversight by exercising 
due care. This is necessary for ensuring a healthy functioning of the corporate system. As one 
commentator observed:  
[D]irector inattention is a problem because it undermines investor confidence. When investors lose 
confidence in the management of the modem corporation, they stop investing in stocks and 
corporations, which tightens capital market liquidity and limits corporate expansion. Further, as an 
academic matter, director inattention throws into question the utility of the corporation as a 
business entity. One of the key benefits to the corporate form is that it allows for passive 
investment because management is the responsibility of directors. If the directors are inattentive, 
this undermines the utility of passive investment. Corporations utilize a management structure that 
vests ‘control’ of the corporation into the hands of directors who are elected by shareholders. If 
directors are not performing their control functions, the corporation is not working as designed.
1198
 
 
 It is also a reality, however, the enormous scope of potential monetary liability for a due 
care breach, coupled with the fact-specific nature of the duty of care,
1199
 would have counter-
effects on director behavior. A breach of the duty of care subjects directors to personal liability 
for the entire amount of economic harm to the corporation that results from flawed decision 
making or oversight. For a multibillion dollar corporation, a single mistake could result in a 
multimillion of dollar damage award against directors. This may discourage competent people 
from serving on corporate boards and may reduce the efficiency of corporate decision making. 
Further, personal liability for a due care breach raises serious fairness concerns. The liability that 
directors could face for a due care breach appears to be “disproportionate in relation to the 
degree of wrongdoing.”
1200
 As one commentator nicely explained:  
The measure of damages is not directly related to an individual director’s degree of culpability or 
the benefit received by the director. Even for a director who erred in approving a transaction or 
who disregarded evidence of misconduct, such a result seems unfair. A director who lacked intent 
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to harm the corporation or was unaware of the potential consequences of a failure to act is not the 
most blameworthy agent … for the corporation’s losses.
1201
 
Further, the public policy underlying the duty of care is not to require directors to compensate for 
corporate damages resulting from faulty actions or inactions. “It is generally agreed that recovery 
in fiduciary duty lawsuits is more about deterrence than about making the corporation or its 
shareholders whole.”
1202
 Accordingly, it may be appropriate to provide directors an adequate—
not absolute—protection from personal liability arising from “conduct undertaken in good faith, 
but which nevertheless constitutes breach of the duty of care.”
1203
 
 Therefore, there are two competing values in the duty of care context: first; the need to 
promote directorship service and risky decision making and, second; the need to deter 
noncompliant behavior and to induce a diligent attendance to directorial responsibilities.
1204
 
Because the human quality and risk are essential elements of business success and innovation, 
the law should free directors from the fear of monetary liability for corporate losses. On the other 
hand, behavioral psychology suggests that a credible accountability mechanism is necessary to 
encourage compliant behavior. Awareness of being monitored induces heightened actor 
attentiveness. Accordingly, there should be an appropriate legal mechanism setting a fair balance 
between the two competing values.  
Preferring one value over another is not an appropriate way to ensure a healthy 
functioning of the corporate system. Substantial exposure to personal liability may cause over-
cautious and risk-averse director behavior. Lack of an accountability mechanism may make 
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 Nowicki, supra note 1174, at 716 (“Indeed, there tends to be little relationship between the amount recovered 
and the harm suffered.”). See also Davis, supra note 17, at 575. He explains that the tort system shifts “the loss from 
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Id.  
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 1 RADIN, supra note 161, at 744. 
1204
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directors comfortable with sloppy behavior. Further, it may encourage incompetent people, who 
are unwilling to give necessary attention to corporate matters, to serve on corporate boards. An 
efficient enforcement mechanism of due care responsibilities should not be sacrificed for the 
sake of corporate risk-taking. Rather, the competing values should be aligned under an 
appropriate legal framework. The law must try to assure director engagement to due care 
responsibilities while providing an adequate protection from personal liability.    
As discussed throughout this chapter, section 102(b)(7) does not serve this end. The 
liability shield of section 102(b)(7) and its procedural impact devastate the efficacy of the duty of 
care. A section 102(b)(7) provision practically forbids a shareholder from challenging “mere” 
inattentive director conduct. Under section 102(b)(7), “the fulcrum point between director 
authority and accountability has been pushed too far in favor of director authority.”
1205
 Delaware 
courts’ recent attempt to regenerate a liability threat for inattentive conduct under the good faith 
doctrine was not fruitful. Requiring a plaintiff to plead a duty of loyalty claim by demonstrating 
bad faith at the outset of a derivative lawsuit practically closes a court’s door to a shareholder 
whose corporation suffers from inattentive director conduct. Although intentional abdication of 
directorial responsibilities is technically actionable under the duty of loyalty, a combination of 
substantive doctrines and procedural requirements prevent shareholders from challenging 
nonpecuniary misconduct. In the presence of an exculpatory provision, even a meritorious 
derivative claim challenging inattentive director conduct is likely to fail to survive a motion to 
dismiss. Therefore, the liability regime created by section 102(b)(7) is not adequate to motivate 
directors to be engaged, attentive corporate decision-makers and overseers.  
Nowicki proposes a revision of section 102(b)(7) in the form of a liability cap.
1206
 She 
argues that directors should face some credible threat of personal liability for inattentive conduct. 
She also acknowledges, however, holding directors liable for catastrophic corporate losses for a 
due care breach may not be appropriate. Under her proposal, the directors’ liability exposure for 
inattentive but good faith conduct is limited to a reasonable amount. She proposes that the 
formulation of section 102(b)(7) should be replaced with the following formulation authorizing a 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation to include: 
A provision limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for 
monetary damages for breach of a fiduciary duty to the greatest of (i) the benefit received by the 
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director as a result of the fiduciary duty violation, (ii) the compensation received by the director 
from the corporation in the year or years of the fiduciary duty violation, or (iii) $80,000; provided 
that such a provision shall not limit a director’s liability for willful misconduct, for a knowing 
violation of the law (including, without limitation, any claim of unlawful insider trading or 
manipulation of the market for any security), or under section 174 of this title; and provided that 
the amounts in (i), (ii), or (iii) cannot be indemnified and cannot be insured.
1207
 
 
Under her proposal, directors could be held personally liable for a broader scope of conduct than 
section 102(b)(7), and the dollar amount of a directors’ personal liability exposure would be 
capped. 
 Jones contests this proposal by arguing that “any dollar amount proposed as a damages 
cap is necessarily arbitrary and may be insufficient to induce the desired behavior.”
1208
 Further, 
as Nowicki acknowledges as well, the plaintiffs’ bar may be unwilling to take cases that are 
subject to caps because attorneys’ fees in a fiduciary duty violation case are often calculated 
based on the recovery achieved.
1209
 Thus, capped recovery may “dissuade good attorneys from 
taking even compelling fiduciary duty [of care] cases.”
1210
 
 This dissertation proposes an alternative approach in order to revive the duty of care 
while providing directors an adequate protection from personal liability. It recognizes that 
directors should not be held personally liable for corporate losses as long as they act in good 
faith. It also recognizes the need for an effective enforcement mechanism of the duty of care in 
order to induce directors for compliant behavior. The premise of this dissertation’s proposal is 
that directors should not be afforded ex ante protection from monetary liability for a duty of care 
violation; rather, they should be entitled to an ex post good faith defense to avoid monetary 
liability for corporate losses that may result from flawed decision making or oversight. It argues 
that whether directors breached their duty of care and whether personal liability should attach to 
that breach should be treated as two distinct questions. A due care breach should not result in per 
se imposition of personal liability for money damages. Accordingly, this dissertation argues for a 
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 Jones, supra note 1172, at 154. Alternatively, he proposes that (grossly) negligent directors should “make 
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middle-ground approach—one that protects directors from monetary liability for good faith 
conduct but also recognizes the need to empower shareholders to encourage and enforce director 
compliance with due care responsibilities.  
 Section 102(b)(7) was enacted as a response to the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in 
Van Gorkom.
1211
 The duty of care analysis of the Van Gorkom court significantly increased the 
fear of personal liability among corporate directors. However, the Van Gorkom court’s teaching 
is of paramount significance in corporate decision making. The gist of Van Gorkom is that 
directors should make a business decision on a credible basis by employing an informative and 
deliberative process. This dissertation argues that section 102(b)(7) was an overreaction to Van 
Gorkom. It undermined the importance of Van Gorkom’s teaching that directors should 
deliberate in an informed manner before making a business decision. This dissertation attempts 
to rectify the objectionable doctrinal aspects of Van Gorkom while preserving its gist.  
 In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court found the defendant directors to have lost 
the protection of the business judgment rule for breaching their duty of care and thereby exposed 
them to potentially catastrophic personal liability.
1212
 The court remanded the case to the trial 
court for a determination of damages based on “the extent that the fair value of Trans Union 
exceeds” the challenged sale price.
1213
  Accordingly, the court held that grossly negligent 
conduct not only rebuts the business judgment rule presumption but also requires imposition of 
personal liability for money damages. 
Commentators largely criticized the Van Gorkom court for making an entirely objective 
evaluation of the challenged decision-making process and for disregarding the special and 
subjective circumstances under which the decision was made.
1214
  The subjective factors of the 
case, such as impeccable credentials of the defendant directors as business men, their familiarity 
with financial status of the corporation, and the expertise of the chairman in the merger and 
acquisitions processes, played no role in shaping the opinion of the majority of the court. 
Commentators were also critical that the substantive quality of the challenged decision played no 
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role in the court’s due care analysis.
1215
 The approved sale price represented a substantial 
premium over the value of the company in the stock market. Further, the defendant directors 
acted in good faith in approving the sale of the company. The fact that the court imposed 
potentially catastrophic liability on the defendant directors for a decision made in good faith 
outraged corporate law community. Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Van 
Gorkom received harsh criticism primarily for two reasons: first, for applying an entirely 
objective test to evaluate challenged conduct with an exclusive focus on the process, and second, 
for imposing personal liability on directors who acted in good faith.
1216
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 See supra notes 675–80 & accompanying text.  
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 Indeed, the Van Gorkom case represents the problematic aspect of the duty of care (the negligence concept) in 
the corporate director context. The fact-specific nature of the duty of care increases the risk of directors’ liability 
exposure. There is no prescribed procedure that directors can follow to avoid a breach of the duty of care and 
personal liability. Corporate matters that directors deal with encompass a wide variety of situations, and it is very 
difficult to provide a pre-set formula that directors must follow to act with due care. “[T]he exact course of conduct 
that must be followed to properly discharge their responsibilities ‘will change in the specific context of the action 
the director is taking with regard to either the corporation or its shareholders.’” Holland, supra note 10, at 682 
(citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)). Accordingly, the directors’ duty of care is defined by 
standards rather than specific rules. This aspect of the duty of care raises several problems in the corporate context. 
As former Chancellor Allen observed with two other colleagues:  
The difficulties with the common law case-by-case form of fiduciary regulation are several. By its 
nature fiduciary duty law is an imperfect tool to forge rules to regulate a phenomenon as complex 
and policy-laden as corporate takeovers. Being highly general, prospective statements of the 
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from authoritative judicial decisions. Moreover, as applied in specific cases the articulated 
fiduciary duty is often so highly particularized that it becomes difficult to generalize ex ante rules 
from those judicial holdings. To express it differently, the almost infinite potential variation in the 
fact patterns calling for director decisions, the disparate time frames within which different boards 
may be required to act, and the divergent skills and information needed to make particular 
business decisions, usually make it impossible for courts to articulate ex ante precise guidelines 
for appropriate fiduciary action in future cases. Given the blunt nature of the fiduciary doctrine 
tool, judges must instead describe fiduciary duties in general terms that can (it is hoped) be 
sensibly and fairly applied in future diverse circumstances in which directors are called upon to 
act. In discharging this task, judges also face the difficulty of bringing legal expertise to bear in 
reviewing the decisions of business professionals, an exercise inherently fraught with risks of 
error. 
Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 18, at 1294 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Delaware courts attempted 
to balance the fact-specific nature of the duty of care by applying a lenient standard of gross negligence to review 
the directors’ decisional process. However, the Van Gorkom holding triggered a doctrinal controversy with respect 
to the gross negligence standard. Many commentators criticized the holding by arguing that the challenged 
decisional process was not grossly negligent. While it is uncontestable that the standard of gross negligence is less 
exacting than the typical due care standard of ordinary negligence, these two standards differ only in degree, not in 
kind. It is hard to draw a clear line between them. There are no hard and fast rules defining the concept of gross 
negligence, as there is no pre-set formula for directors to comply with the duty of care. What constitutes grossly 
negligent conduct may substantially change from one case to another. Further, as the former Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court observed, there is some risk that hindsight bias will color a court’s “assessment of what an 
acceptably good process would have been or would have produced.” Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 742, at 
1424. Therefore, it may be more appropriate that the directors’ personal monetary liability be predicated upon the 
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This dissertation argues that a finding of a due care breach should not automatically 
establish personal liability for damages that the corporation may have suffered as a consequence. 
Rather, it should only shift the burden to the defendant directors to demonstrate that they made a 
good faith effort to exercise an informed business judgment. Directors should convince the court 
that they honestly believed that they exercised appropriate care under the circumstances of the 
case.
1217
 In other words, directors should justify their process failure on the basis of good faith. 
Thus, the test for determining a due care breach should be predicated upon an objective gross 
                                                 
concept of good faith. Moreover, due to the widespread adoption of exculpatory provisions, the predominant rule in 
corporate law in the twenty-first century is that directors should not be held monetarily liable for nonpecuniary 
misconduct as long as they act in good faith. It is also necessary, however, to maintain the gross negligence standard 
for reviewing directors’ decisional process in order to encourage them to employ an appropriate process before 
making a decision. Under this dissertation’s proposal, Delaware’s emphasis on process would be maintained, and 
the controversy with respect to the gross negligence standard would be eliminated because grossly negligent conduct 
leads only to a subjective inquiry with respect to good faith. See supra Chapter III.C.1.a. (examining scholarly 
commentary with respect to the gross negligence standard). 
1217
 This dissertation does not attempt to provide a precise standard to determine whether directors acted in good 
faith where the business judgment rule is rebutted solely on the ground of the duty of care. Rather, it argues that 
courts should employ a flexible approach and consider all relevant factors to determine whether the defendant 
directors believed that the deficient decisional process was appropriate under the circumstances. PCG § 4.01(c)(2) 
requires directors to be “informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director or 
officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances.” PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
§ 4.01(c)(2) (emphasis added). “[T]he term ‘reasonably believes’ has both an objective and a subjective content.” 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. e. (emphasis added). This dissertation basically proposes 
a replacement of the term “reasonably believes” with the term “honestly believes” because the term “reasonable” 
represents the objective inquiry. In Delaware, the objective test is initially performed under a gross negligence 
standard for determining the applicability of the business judgment rule. Therefore, where the challenged decisional 
process fails to satisfy an objective test, the focus should shift to a subjective test under the entire fairness standard. 
This dissertation proposes that this subjective inquiry should be directed to directors’ good faith. The “reasonable 
belief” test is explicated under PCG § 4.01(c) cmt. e. A replacement of the term “reasonably” with the term 
“honestly” in the PCG’s commentary would assist explaining this dissertation’s approach:  
There is no precise way to measure how much information will be required to meet the ‘[honest] 
belief’ test in given circumstances. Among the factors that may have to be taken into account in 
judging a director’s [honest] belief as to what was ‘appropriate under the circumstances’ are: (i) 
the importance of the business judgment to be made; (ii) the time available for obtaining 
information; (iii) the costs related to obtaining information; (iv) the director’s confidence in those 
who explored a matter and those making presentations; and (v) the state of the corporation’s 
business at the time and the nature of competing demands for the board’s attention. The different 
backgrounds of individual directors, the distinct role each plays in the corporation, and the general 
value of maintaining board cohesiveness may all be relevant when determining whether a director 
[honestly believed] that the information before him or her was ‘appropriate under the 
circumstances.’  
Of course, the business or professional experience of directors or officers may help to inform them 
about a decision. They may also be informed by the general views or specialized experience of 
colleagues… 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. e.  
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negligence concept, and the test for determining personal liability for a due care breach should be 
predicated upon a subjective good faith concept.  
In the decision-making context, Delaware’s business judgment rule may provide a fertile 
ground for this dissertation’s proposal.
1218
 In Cede v. Technicolor, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that rebuttal of the business judgment rule shifts the burden to the defendant directors to 
prove that the challenged action or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its 
shareholders.
1219
 Accordingly, if the plaintiff rebuts the business judgment rule on the basis that 
the decision was uninformed, the burden shifts to the defendant directors to satisfy the entire 
fairness standard. Importantly, as the Cede I court emphasized, burden shifting to the defendant 
directors to show the entire fairness of the challenged decision “does not create per se liability on 
the part of the directors.”
1220
 After Cede I, a breach of the duty of care does not directly result in 
personal liability for money damages. Rather, “the determination that a board has failed to 
demonstrate entire fairness will be the basis for a finding of substantive liability.”
1221
 As the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated:  
Because the decision that the procedural presumption of the business judgment rule has been 
rebutted does not establish substantive liability under the entire fairness standard, such a ruling 
does not necessarily present an insurmountable obstacle for a board of directors to overcome. 
Thus, an initial judicial determination that a given breach of a board’s fiduciary duties has rebutted 
the presumption of the business judgment rule does not preclude a subsequent judicial 
                                                 
1218
 It should be noted that, in Delaware law, it is not clear whether a rebuttal of the business judgment rule by a 
showing of grossly negligent decision-making process requires directors to prove the entire fairness of the 
challenged decision where directors are protected from personal liability by a section 102(b)(7) provision. In 
Emerald Partners, the Delaware Supreme Court held that  
when the presumption of the business judgment rule has been rebutted in the shareholder 
complaint solely by successfully alleging a duty of care violation, the director defendants do not 
have to prove entire fairness to the trier of fact, because of the exculpation afforded to the directors 
by the Section 102(b)(7) provision inserted by the shareholders into the corporation’s charter. 
Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 92. The court reiterated this point by stating that a corporation’s section 102(b)(7) 
provision obviates  “a trial pursuant to the entire fairness standard, even if the presumption of the business judgment 
rule is successfully rebutted by a duty of care violation, since liability for duty of loyalty violations or violations of 
good faith are not at issue.” Id. However, in Disney, the Delaware Supreme court’s analysis into the challenged 
decision included “due care determinations.” Disney, 906 A.2d at 52. After Disney, one may argue that a rebuttal of 
the business judgment rule by a showing of grossly negligent conduct requires directors to satisfy the entire fairness 
standard. In that case, where directors fail to satisfy the entire fairness standard, the question arises whether they will 
be held liable for money damages. It is difficult to argue that Delaware courts would impose liability for money 
damages where the corporation’s certificate include a section 102(b)(7) provision and the business judgment rule has 
been rebutted solely by successfully showing grossly negligent conduct. 
1219
 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) [hereinafter Cede I].  
1220
 Id. at 371 (emphasis in original).  
1221
 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1165 (Del. 1995) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Cede 
II]. 
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determination that the board action was entirely fair, and is, therefore, not outcome-
determinative per se.
1222
 
 
The entire fairness standard has two basic components: fair dealing and fair price.
1223
 The 
fair dealing component relates to “how the board action was initiated, structured, negotiated, and 
timed.”
1224
 The fair price component concerns “the economic and financial considerations of the 
proposed decision.”
1225
 Under an entire fairness review, a court closely scrutinizes all aspects of 
a decision or transaction, including its process and substantive merits. An entire fairness review 
requires “exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction [or the decision] is entirely fair 
to the stockholders.”
1226
 A court “must carefully analyze the factual circumstances” by “taking 
into account all relevant factors.”
1227
 In fairness review, directors must present evidence 
“regarding the manner in which the board otherwise discharged all three of its primary fiduciary 
duties.”
1228
 As the Cede II court stated, “irrespective of the particular breach or breaches of 
fiduciary duty that constituted the basis for shifting the procedural burden of proof to the 
board, each of the fiduciary duties retains independent substantive significance in an entire 
fairness analysis.”
1229
 
 The Cede II court stated that, “arm’s-length negotiation provides ‘strong evidence that 
the transaction meets the test of fairness.”’
1230
 The Cede II court also emphasized that “[t]he 
independence of the bargaining parties is a well-recognized touchstone of fair dealing.”
1231
 In a 
duty of care case, the primary concern is a deficient decision-making process, not director 
independence or self-interest. Accordingly, although the entire fairness standard includes an 
exacting judicial inquiry into substantive merits of a decision, it is not very difficult for directors 
to satisfy it where the business judgment rule is rebutted solely on the ground of the duty of care.  
Further, despite the grossly negligent decision-making process, the directors’ good faith 
with respect to the process and substance of the challenged decision play an important role in an 
entire fairness review. “Even after evidence of a breach of the duty of due care has rebutted the 
                                                 
1222
 Id. at 1163 (emphasis in original).  
1223
 Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, 766 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 2000). 
1224
 In re Digex, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1207 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
1225
 Id. 
1226
 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994). 
1227
 Cede II, 663 A.2d at 1179. 
1228
 Id. at 1164.  
1229
 Id. (emphasis in original).  
1230
 Id. at 1172 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP. Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709–10 n.7 (Del. 1983)).  
1231
 Id. at 1173.  
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procedural presumption of the business judgment rule, the degree of care that the board actually 
exercised remains relevant.”
1232
 Accordingly, a court reassesses a board’s failure in the decision-
making process in light of “the board’s good faith and the arm’s-length negotiations” and other 
relevant facts.
1233
 In Cede II, considering all relevant factors, the court concluded that the 
challenged transaction was entirely fair despite the defendant directors’ grossly negligent 
decisional process. The Cede II holding indicates that Delaware courts give significant deference 
to directors’ good faith under an entire fairness analysis. Thus, directors who are found to have 
breached their duty of care but nevertheless acted in good faith could demonstrate the entire 
fairness of the challenged transaction. 
The entire fairness standard “is traditionally tied to situations involving self-dealing—in 
other words, loyalty cases.”
1234
 Where directors have a pecuniary conflict of interest in a 
corporate transaction, Delaware courts closely scrutinize the transaction to determine whether it 
was fair to the corporation. In reviewing a self-interested transaction, judicial inquiry necessarily 
focuses on the fair price component, because the primary concern in this context is to determine 
whether the defendant directors profited at the expense of the corporation and its shareholders. 
As the Delaware Chancery Court observed:  
[The entire fairness review] has been said to require that the proponents of a conflicted merger 
demonstrate that they proceeded in a manner that was both procedurally and substantively 
fair. That is more than a bit of a misnomer, as the overriding consideration is whether the 
substantive terms of the transaction were fair. Thus, it has been said that the two-part fairness test 
is not a bifurcated one; rather, all aspects of the transaction are examined as a whole in order to aid 
                                                 
1232
 Id. at 1175. One commentator criticized the application of the entire fairness standard in a duty of care case as 
follows:  
Cede’s burden shift and entire fairness approach to a care breach simply led to a judicial 
assessment of factors which should have been done as part of a more thorough threshold duty of 
care analysis. Recognizing the care-like nature of the factors it was evaluating in its entire fairness 
review, the court could only rationalize its two-stage care analysis by stating that the ‘degree of 
procedural due care a board of directors exercises has been recognized as a continuing component 
of an entire fairness analysis.’ What later comprised the court’s ‘fair dealing’ portion of its entire 
fairness analysis should have been done as part of the initial due care inquiry.  
Johnson, supra note 251, at 648 (citation omitted). However, this approach would diminish the importance of an 
appropriate decision-making process. If a court evaluates the decisional process under gross negligence standard 
with a nexus to subjective elements of the case, the emphasis on an informative and deliberative decision-making 
process would be undermined. Under Cede’s approach, directors would be encouraged to employ a good decision-
making process to avoid entire fairness analysis. Good processes presumably produce good results, and the emphasis 
on the process should be preserved. See Sale, supra note 917 at 2 (praising Delaware’s approach by stating that “[i]t 
pushes fiduciaries to focus on processes and procedures, while avoiding the delineation of specifics because when 
circumstances change, specifics are less useful”). 
1233
 Cede II, 663 A.2d at 1175. 
1234
 Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 742, at 1426 (emphasis in original).  
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in coming to the bottom-line conclusion of whether the transaction was fair. In a non-fraudulent 
transaction, therefore, ‘price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of 
the merger.’
1235
 
 
In the duty of care context, however, the primary issue is not the directors’ self-interest; it is 
rather a flawed decision-making process.
1236
 In a duty of care case, the challenged transaction is 
presumably structured in an arms-length bargaining process based on market competition. 
Accordingly, where the business judgment rule is rebutted by a showing of lack of due care, 
directors’ independence, lack of self-interest, and good faith belief that the transaction was in the 
best interests of the corporation should be interpreted as a strong evidence for meeting the entire 
fairness test. In other words, where directors’ decisional process failed the objective gross 
negligence test, a subjective inquiry into the flawed decisional process on the basis of good faith 
should dominate the entire fairness review. An entire fairness standard should not require 
directors to demonstrate that their grossly negligent decision making caused no harm to the 
corporation. Even though a grossly negligent decisional process results in harm to the 
corporation, this should not preclude a finding of entire fairness if directors can demonstrate that 
they honestly believed that the challenged decisional process was appropriate under the 
                                                 
1235
 Delaware Open MRI Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 311 (Del. Ch. 2006) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  
1236
 Indeed, a robust application of the entire fairness standard may not be suitable in the duty of care context. See 
Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 208, at 461–62. They criticized the application of the entire fairness standard in a 
duty of care case as follows: 
First, the basic rationale for entire fairness review—the difficulty in ascertaining, in non-arms-
length transactions, the price at which the deal would have been effected in the market—is not 
applicable in due care cases. ‘Care cases, unlike loyalty cases, do not deprive corporations of 
‘neutral decisionmakers.’’ In the due care context the plaintiff should be able to identify whatever 
harm flowed from the neutral decision-makers' alleged breach of care, which obviates any need for 
a court to assess the substantive fairness of the board’s business decision. 
Second, in care cases not involving a specific transaction, an entire fairness analysis would have 
little or no utility. The reason is that due care cases in nontransactional settings (for example, 
uninformed or otherwise careless decisions on corporate distributions, or decisions to expand or 
contract a business by means other than by acquiring or divesting an entire corporation) do not 
involve discrete market-based events that lend themselves to a fairness analysis. That is also true 
of nontransactional director conduct such as a failure to monitor the conduct of corporate 
employees. Thus, the Cede II analytical framework could not be used as a uniform review 
standard applicable in all due care cases, which raises fundamental questions of what are the outer 
limits and contours of the Cede II doctrine. 
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Bainbridge et al., supra note 859, at 587 (arguing that the entire 
fairness standard is technically not applicable in duty of care and bad faith cases). For example, if directors approve 
a business project (e.g., a new product) in a grossly negligent manner, and if the project results in a corporate loss, it 
would make little sense to review whether the result of the decision was fair (“fair price”) to the corporation. In that 
case, the judicial inquiry necessarily should focus on the “fair dealing” component.  
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circumstances and that they approved the challenged decision in good faith to advance the best 
interests of the corporation. 
Accordingly, this dissertation proposes that the entire fairness standard should play a 
mitigating role between a duty of care breach and personal liability for money damages.
1237
 
When reviewing grossly negligent decision-making under an entire fairness standard, the specific 
focus of the judicial scrutiny should be whether directors acted in good faith. A court should 
closely scrutinize all relevant factors of the case to determine whether the challenged conduct 
was taken in good faith. For example, directors’ business expertise, their general knowledge 
about the corporation, and the time constraints may be weighed against the deficient decisional 
process for determining directors’ good faith.
1238
 In Cede II, the court gave consideration to the 
fact that the CEO of the company, who led the negotiations in the merger process, was informed 
about the strengths and weakness of the company, and he was an active and experienced 
CEO.
1239
 The court also gave consideration to the fact that the proposed sale price included a 
substantial premium over the corporation’s market value.
1240
 As such, a court should reassess 
grossly negligent decisional processes in light of all relevant factors with a nexus to the 
substantive merits of the decision and subjective good faith of the directors. Under an entire 
fairness review, directors should establish to the court’s satisfaction that the deficient process and 
the resulting decision were a product of a good faith attempt to advance the best interests of the 
corporation. If directors are able to demonstrate that, despite the grossly negligent process, they 
otherwise acted in good faith, it should preclude the imposition of personal liability for monetary 
damages.  
Where a plaintiff brings a duty of care action by alleging an oversight failure, the 
business judgment rule is not applicable. Nevertheless, Delaware courts apply a lenient standard 
of gross negligence for reviewing oversight claims. Therefore, a plaintiff must establish facts 
demonstrating that directors failed to discharge their oversight responsibilities in a grossly 
negligent manner. Directors then should bear the burden to demonstrate that, despite the specific 
                                                 
1237
 The flexible nature of the entire fairness standard provides a fertile ground for this dissertation’s proposal. As 
the Delaware Supreme Court observed, ‘“perfection is not possible, or expected’ as a condition precedent to a 
judicial determination of entire fairness. The standard of entire fairness is also not in the nature of a litmus test that 
‘lend[s] itself to bright line precision or rigid doctrine.”’ Cede II, 663 A.2d at 1179 (citations omitted).  
1238
 See supra note 1217.  
1239
 Cede II, 663 A.2d at 1178. 
1240
 Id.  
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oversight failure, they have otherwise made a good faith effort to discharge their oversight 
responsibilities. The Caremark standard would neatly fit to determine whether directors acted in 
good faith to discharge their oversight responsibilities. Under the Caremark standard, directors 
should demonstrate that they installed appropriate monitoring and reporting systems to be 
informed of corporate business and affairs and that they periodically reviewed the information 
flowing through such systems. In another words, directors should convince the court that the 
complained of failure or inaction was not a result of a sustained and systematic shirking of 
oversight responsibilities. If they fail to do so, they should be then liable for the consequences of 
the misconduct.  
To sum up, this dissertation proposes the repealing of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law because it devastates the viability of a duty of care action by 
permitting ex ante protection from monetary liability for a due care breach. This may cause 
director inattentiveness. There should exist a proper legal mechanism to enforce the duty of care. 
This dissertation argues that shareholders should be able to bring a duty of care claim. It 
proposes a two-step judicial analysis to determine whether directors should be held liable for 
money damages in the duty of care context. First, a court should review directors’ due care 
compliance under a lenient gross negligence standard. Second, where directors’ conduct fails to 
satisfy the gross negligence standard, the court should determine whether directors acted in good 
faith. Personal monetary liability should be imposed only if the wrongful conduct was not taken 
in good faith. In the decision-making context, a plaintiff must rebut the business judgment rule 
by demonstrating grossly negligent conduct. This should lead to a thorough examination of all 
aspects of the challenged decision under the entire fairness standard with the burden on the 
defendant directors to demonstrate their good faith with respect to the deficient decisional 
process and the resulting decision. In the oversight context, a plaintiff must prove that directors 
failed to discharge their oversight responsibilities in a grossly negligent manner. The burden then 
should shift to the defendant directors to satisfy the Caremark standard by demonstrating that 
they made a good faith effort to discharge their oversight responsibilities. 
Under this dissertation’s proposal, the distinct roles played by the directors’ fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care would be preserved. Shareholder derivative suits would play a 
meaningful and appropriate role in curbing inattentive director conduct. The directors’ due care 
failures would be subject to judicial review at the instance of shareholders. If directors knew they 
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might be required to account to courts on the basis of good faith for their decisional process and 
oversight failures, they would be motivated to act more responsibly.
1241
 To avoid the time, 
expense, and publicity of a lawsuit, directors surely would try to discharge their due care 
responsibilities properly. Under this dissertation’s proposal, directors would not be exposed to a 
substantial threat of personal liability. This would encourage competent people to serve on 
corporate boards and make risky business decisions. Still, this dissertation’s proposal preserves 
the symbolic existence of personal liability. This minimal threat of liability is necessary to assure 
director engagement to board responsibilities.
1242
  
One may argue that there is no substantial difference between this dissertation’s proposal 
and the liability regime created by section 102(b)(7). After all, section 102(b)(7) excludes “acts 
or omissions not in good faith” from exculpable conduct, and this dissertation proposes that 
directors should not be held liable for a due care breach as long as they acted in good faith. The 
critical difference is that this dissertation’s proposal does not provide ex ante protection from due 
care liability. The directors’ awareness of being monitored and the “mere” threat of litigation 
with minimal risk of personal liability would improve increased attention and responsible 
behavior. Section 102(b)(7) does not serve this end because it virtually excludes nonpecuniary 
misconduct from judicial scrutiny. It practically confines the scope of shareholder derivative 
lawsuits to self-dealing director transactions. The procedural protective devices and substantive 
doctrines create a formidable bar for fiduciary claims against disinterested and independent 
directors.  
                                                 
1241
 See Jones, supra note 1172, at 1141. The board studies he examined support the view that mere threat of 
litigation would promote better director behavior.  He observed:  
Executives acknowledge that their perfunctory accountability to the board strengthens their 
decision-making practices. Knowing that they will have to account to the board for their decisions 
compels executives to examine the costs and benefits of their proposals and develop a coherent 
rationale for a proposed course of action. 
Id. Similarly, the possibility that directors might be required to defend themselves in a court room for deficient 
decisional process or oversight failures would induce them to discharge their duty of care properly. 
1242
 See Davis, supra note 17, at 587. He observed as follows: 
The threat of liability and the director’s interest in his or her professional stature no doubt interact 
in other important ways. No high profile business or community leader wants to see his or her 
name in a court decision or newspaper as a defendant in a suit for sloppy performance as a 
director, even if the existence of indemnification or insurance assures that he or she faces no out-
of-pocket loss. Without the existence of an enforceable legal duty, and the resulting prospect of 
litigation, this risk of adverse publicity for what the director does in the boardroom is substantially 
diluted. 
Id. 
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One may further argue that the repealing of section 102(b)(7) may refresh the liability 
fear among corporate directors. Under this dissertation’s proposal, the risk of liability exposure is 
minimized. It should be also noted that courts developed the business judgment rule over the 
years to protect directors from personal liability.
1243
 Further, it is well-recognized that Delaware 
courts are very reluctant to impose monetary liability on directors for corporate losses resulting 
from an unsuccessful business decision.
1244
 All of these factors should be sufficient to eliminate 
the fear of liability on the part of corporate directors. When a competent individual undertakes 
board service, she must assume the accountability attached to directorial authority.  
At the end, what can this dissertation’s proposal achieve? It can make a fiduciary claim 
based on “mere” inattentive conduct survive a motion to dismiss. It is unlikely that it would 
make a critical difference in substantive outcome. Nevertheless, it would require the defendant 
directors to justify their decision-making or oversight failures in a court room. Plaintiffs might 
not be able to make the defendant directors compensate corporate losses. However, they would 
be motivated to bring a lawsuit to discipline shirking directors and thereby protect the interests of 
the corporation in the long term. Indeed, the mere existence of litigation threat for due care 
failures would improve director attentiveness. The hope is that this dissertation’s proposal would 
balance director authority and accountability without imposing personal liability on directors 
who act in good faith.  
Thus, this dissertation proposes a reinvigoration of an enforceable duty of care along with 
ex post protection from monetary liability for good faith conduct. Under this approach, the duty 
of care would play an appropriate role in fighting board passivism. Most importantly, inattentive 
director conduct would be subject to judicial scrutiny at the instance of shareholders. By 
scrutinizing alleged due care claims under a lenient standard of gross negligence, courts would 
point out the decisional process or oversight failures in a particular factual setting and thereby 
inspire other directors not to repeat those mistakes in the future. Over time, these court opinions 
would delineate the specific requirements of the duty of care and help directors discharge their 
                                                 
1243
 Compared to section 102(b)(7), this dissertation’s proposal would be more consistent with the traditional 
business judgment rule analysis. 
1244
 See, e.g., Cox & Munsinger, supra note 1117, at 108 (“To the corporate lawyer, it is elementary knowledge that 
directors are seldom exposed to liability for business misjudgments and that courts only rarely, and with great 
reluctance, intrude into directors’ business decisions.”); Nowicki, supra note 1174, at 710 (noting Delaware courts’ 
unwillingness to impose personal monetary liability on disinterested directors).  
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due care responsibilities properly. Accordingly, courts would telegraph to directors the expected 
conduct from them without the downside of actually imposing personal liability. 
Of course, this dissertation’s humble proposal does not claim to solve doctrinal and 
practical problems associated with the duty of care. It attempts to align two simple notions: the 
efficacy of the duty of care should be maintained, and directors should not face personal liability 
as long as they act in good faith.  The duty of care has long been a controversial area of corporate 
law. Corporate scholars have extensively discussed the issue, and they are far from reaching a 
consensus. While all agree that directors should exercise their responsibilities attentively and on 
an informed basis, there is a great controversy regarding whether these objectives should rise to 
the level of an enforceable duty. Board inattentiveness or passivism is a complex problem. The 
duty of care alone may not be adequate to address this problem. At its heart, the duty of care 
relates to the quality of board service. It is difficult to articulate legal parameters to define and 
measure the expected quality of board service. In a broader context, this problem relates to 
corporate governance. While the fiduciary law is developed on a case-by-case basis by courts, 
corporate governance emerged on the federal level based on statutes and regulations. The federal 
regulations and authorities increasingly play an important role in establishing and promoting 
good corporate governance practices. The role of fiduciary duties and derivative lawsuits in 
corporate law has been significantly reduced. The fiduciary law served as an important 
monitoring mechanism in the nineteenth century when corporations emerged as large-scale, self-
governing business entities. In the twentieth century, state legislatures increasingly relaxed the 
fiduciary standards and significantly constrained the scope of derivative action. State authorities’ 
appetite to attract businesses for incorporation by creating a management-friendly climate may 
disable them from addressing the complex and systematic corporate governance problems. 
Derivative litigation may not be the best forum for shareholders to discipline inattentive 
directors. However, the importance of this traditional mechanism (fiduciary duties and derivative 
lawsuit) should not be underestimated. This mechanism is developed by judges over the years on 
a case-by-case basis, and its efficacy should be maintained.   
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CONCLUSION 
The fiduciary duty of care requires directors to discharge their board responsibilities 
diligently, attentively, and on an informed basis. Section 102(b)(7) permits a certificate of 
incorporation to include a provision exonerating directors from monetary liability for a duty of 
care violation. A section 102(b)(7) provision forbids a shareholder from challenging “mere” 
inattentive director conduct, except for injunctive relief. In the post-exculpatory era, it is highly 
doubtful that the duty of care plays a meaningful role to control director behavior. Delaware 
courts’ recent attempt to reinvigorate a liability threat for inattentive director conduct under the 
good faith doctrine was not fruitful. Section 102(b)(7) and its interpretation by Delaware courts 
virtually eliminate any threat of personal liability for fiduciary misconduct unless it involves 
conflicted directors who acted in their own interests or committed fraud or waste. This may not 
be adequate to address director inattentiveness. This dissertation proposes a reinvigoration of the 
duty of care along with ex post liability protection. Directors should not be afforded ex ante 
protection from monetary liability for a duty of care violation. The directors’ due care failures 
should be subject to judicial review at the instance of shareholders. Where directors are found to 
have breached their duty of care, they should justify the challenged conduct in a courtroom on 
the basis of good faith in order to avoid monetary liability. This would both minimize the 
liability threat for directors who act in good faith and also encourage them to pay an increased 
attention to their board responsibilities. The symbolic existence of monetary liability and the 
threat of litigation would strengthen the directors’ decision-making and oversight practices. 
Thus, this approach would promote both corporate risk-taking and compliant director behavior. 
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